In the first part of this series, I claimed that a great secret in the microprocessor industry largely determines whether new products succeed or fail.
I noted that this secret shouldn't be a secret at all because many people (including myself) have talked about it over the years, but clearly a lot of people are in the dark because they continually disregard it and develop products that are doomed.
I gave several examples of products that failed because their creators didn't know the great secret. Those products included RISC processors, media processors, and intelligent RAM chips, in which processor cores were integrated with memory to eliminate one of the great bottlenecks in computer performance.
During my eight years at Microprocessor Report, I covered the markets for media processors, 3D-graphics chips, network processors, and what I coined extreme processors--chips with large numbers of simple cores running in parallel. Many of these chips were cheaper, easier to design, and twice as fast as competing products--and still failed.
However, some did succeed. The critical factor that made the difference in most of these cases is the essence of the so-called secret.
One of those successes is the graphics processing unit, or GPU.
I was reminded again of the secret at Nvidia's recent GPU Technology Conference, where many of the talks dealt with GPU computing.
(Disclosure: I recently wrote a technical white paper for Nvidia.)
Although the GPU field dates back only five or six years, GPUs have already earned a place alongside CPUs. Each is clearly superior for certain kinds of applications.
This is true in spite of the fact that GPUs aren't nearly as easy to program as CPUs. Like other forms of parallel programming, GPU programming requires new hardware (the GPU itself), significant new extensions for programming languages, and a different mindset for programmers--one that simply wasn't part of standard computer-science curriculum for most of the last 50 years.
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Listen carefully. I am about to reveal one of the great apparent secrets of the microprocessor industry. This secret largely determines whether new products succeed or fail.
I don't know why it seems to be a secret. It's simple enough. I figured it out early, in my first job in the industry, and I've seen it demonstrated over and over since then. I'm hardly the only one who knows this secret; I've seen dozens of talks that allude to it, and a few that mentioned it specifically. I've talked about it myself in articles I wrote for Microprocessor Report and other publications.
Unfortunately, I've also seen hundreds of products brought to market in apparent ignorance of this simple rule, and they've all failed, wasting the billions of dollars invested in their development. Assuming the developers weren't throwing away their money on purpose, I conclude they must not have known the one basic fact that doomed their projects, which means it must be a secret.
The secret is...... Read more
I spent Tuesday at Nvidia headquarters, attending the company's annual Analyst Day.
I've been to most of Nvidia's analyst events over the last decade or so, since I covered Nvidia almost from its inception while working as the graphics analyst at Microprocessor Report. These meetings are always a good way to get an update on the company's business operations, and sometimes--like this time--one provides exceptionally good insight into larger industry trends.
Nvidia's GeForce GTX 280 graphics chip
(Credit: Nvidia)Nvidia has had a rough couple of quarters in the market, which CEO Jen-Hsun Huang blamed in part on a bad strategic call in early 2008: to place orders for large quantities of new chips to be delivered later in the year. When the recession hit, these orders turned into about six months of inventory, much of which simply couldn't be sold at the usual markup.
In response, Nvidia CFO David White outlined measures the company plans to take to increase revenue, sell a more valuable mix of products, reduce the cost of goods sold, and cut back on Nvidia's operating expenses.
Three things stood out for me in this presentation:
Nvidia is planning an aggressive transition to state-of-the-art ASIC fabrication technology at TSMC, the company's manufacturing partner. Within "two to three quarters," White said, about two-thirds of the chips Nvidia sells will be made using 40-nanometer process technology. (The first of these chips were announced Tuesday.)
White also acknowledged something that I've long assumed to be true: Nvidia receives "preferential allocation" on advanced process technology at TSMC. It's logical that Nvidia should get the red-carpet treatment, having been TSMC's best customer for many years, but I don't recall hearing Nvidia or TSMC put this fact on the record before.
The third notable point from White's presentation: the gross margins for Nvidia's Tegra, an ARM-based application processor--which Nvidia's Mike Rayfield, general manager of the Tegra division, says has already garnered 42 design wins at 27 companies--are much higher than I'd have guessed--at "over 45 percent." That's quite excellent for an ARM-based SoC; it's a very competitive market.
More surprises
The technical sessions at the event contained their own surprises.
For example, Nvidia effectively seized control of an old Intel marketing buzzword: "balanced."
For years, Intel used to talk about ... Read more
The New York Times ran an article over the weekend (here) describing efforts by the Pentagon and the Bush Administration to influence the opinions of military analysts, primarily retired military officers, who contribute to coverage of the Iraq War and other topics by newspapers and TV news programs.
(Credit:
US Department of Defense)
The Times article claimed that the Pentagon's influence turned these analysts into sock puppets, a claim supported by this quote from Robert S. Bevelacqua-- a military analyst himself:
"It was them saying, 'We need to stick our hands up your back and move your mouth for you.'"
Now, the mere presence of such a quote from an analyst who was part of these Pentagon briefings should make it obvious to anyone that no amount of influence can turn every analyst into a puppet. The Times article was hopelessly, breathlessly hysterical over a simple fact of life... a fact that is familiar to everyone who deals with analysts in politics or the private sector.
The analyst business works the same way for all kinds of analysts-- military, political, financial, and (as in my case) technology analysts.
Within any community of analysts, there will be some who can be bought, some who can be brainwashed, and some who can be bamboozled. Any given analyst will have some ability to think clearly and independently; each analyst decides whether to exercise that ability or simply regurgitate the spin offered by his or her sources.
Analysts also bring in certain biases and preconceived ideas. I have my own, of course. I believe the companies I cover (or work for!) ought to do useful new work, respect the intellectual property of other companies, and deal honestly with its customers, partners, and competitors alike. I approve of technical monopolies-- those created when a company is first to develop a technology-- and I don't approve of monopolies created by predatory trade practices. That still leaves room for plenty of hard competition, and I approve of that, too.
There are similar biases among military analysts. For example, some believe Islamic extremism and anti-American terrorism ought to be met with military force. Some believe the US ought to reserve the military option for more immediate or substantial strategic threats. I don't even know any military analysts, but I can see their biases. Presumably military reporters at the New York Times see them too, and shouldn't pretend otherwise.
Sources-- whether in the public or private sectors-- have a very limited ability to influence these biases. Their best way to influence an analyst's opinions is to make sure the analyst is aware of all the facts that are favorable to the source's position. That's what the Times says the Pentagon did in this case. For example, in attempting to counteract bad publicity generated by criticism of the Guantánamo facility by Amnesty International:
On the flight to Cuba, for much of the day at Guantánamo and on the flight home that night, Pentagon officials briefed the 10 or so analysts on their key messages -- how much had been spent improving the facility, the abuse endured by guards, the extensive rights afforded detainees.
Does the New York Times really believe that this was inappropriate? The article doesn't attempt to claim that these briefings, or the opinions later voiced by the analysts, were misleading or wrong. Apparently the Times believes it's damning enough that the analysts accepted the Pentagon's claims. But I have seen few if any cases of outright deception in my experience with analyst briefings (literally hundreds of them over the years). More commonly, spin is applied by withholding unfavorable facts and by withholding briefings from analysts who hold fixed and unfavorable opinions.
A wise analyst is aware of these blind spots and simply refrains from offering opinions on them. For example, I doubt the Pentagon gave the analysts in the Times story any statistics on unauthorized corporal punishment of detainees by Guantánamo staff, and I doubt any of the analysts interpreted this lack of data as indicating such contact never happens. (I certainly have no idea whether it happens, so I'm not saying it does or doesn't.)
The Times article also suggests that it's inappropriate for analysts to try to help their sources craft their public messages. Given that analysts are paid to have opinions, it should come as no surprise to the Times or anyone else that analysts like to share these opinions with everyone around them-- sources as well as reporters. That's the difference between analysts and reporters, after all; analysts are held to have enough relevant experience to justify having and expressing opinions. Reporters are not.
And it usually doesn't even matter what opinions an individual analyst holds. Reporters simply find analysts who will deliver the kinds of opinions they want. This "quote shopping" is inevitable and ubiquitous, and I'm not even going to say it's wrong; reporters have to have this freedom. But it means that reporters-- including David Barstow, who wrote this piece for the Times-- are trying to influence their readers the same way this article claims the Pentagon is trying to influence military analysts. Barstow included dozens of quotes in his article to support his position, and only twice did he quote a military analyst defending his objectivity-- although I'm pretty sure most would have done so if Barstow had given them the chance.
Ultimately it has to be up to the reader to critically evaluate every line of every news story. Readers shouldn't assume analyst opinions are unbiased any more than they should assume that the facts in the story are complete or truly representative. But facts and opinions usually do have some basis in reality, and a critical reader can usually learn something about the truth of the matter in spite of all the biases that went into the story.
It's certainly useful for the Times to periodically remind us all of how analysts develop their opinions, but it isn't so useful to provide a view of the process that is as biased and misleading as this one.
(Thanks to my friend Elf Sternberg for bringing the Times story to my attention, although I don't think the story is anywhere near as significant as Elf does.)
Second only to Moore's Law as a source of story ideas for pundits in the computer industry, Rambus was back in the news again last week.
This particular verdict was favorable to Rambus, but it wasn't the final word, nor was it exceptionally important. CNET News.com didn't even publish a news article about it, though Tom Krazit did write a pretty good blog post on the subject and it inspired a good post on intellectual property development from former Rambus exec Steve Tobak on his blog. Rambus has been involved in a great many lawsuits. Some of them work out in the company's favor, some don't, and I can't begin to predict what'll happen in the future.
I've written about Rambus many times, including this editorial for Microprocessor Report back in 2000. As I said there, I think Rambus should have disclosed what it was working on while it participated in the JEDEC standards organization.
But that's more a statement of ethics than law. JEDEC didn't require such disclosure at the time-- it does now!-- and other companies had allegedly done what Rambus did. Last week's court decision held that Rambus acted within the law at JEDEC, reinforcing the company's claims that it is owed licensing fees for its patents.
So I guess there are three things for which we should thank Rambus-- developing advanced DRAM technology, causing us all to think about the role of intellectual property in our industry, and providing work for professional bloggers.
Thanks, Rambus.
I usually carry a cheap extension cord when I travel-- the kind you'd get at a hardware store, with a three-wire plug and three outlets molded in plastic at the other end. Hotel rooms often hide outlets behind the bed, and sometimes all of the outlets are in use; even a very short extension cord can solve these problems.
But on my last few trips, I've been dissatisfied with the cord I've been carrying around, and I've had my eye open for a better one. I just got one, and it looks pretty good. It's the Outlets To Go OTG400 from Monster Power, one of the many brands of Monster Cable.
I'm not entirely happy with Monster. I think the company sometimes ... Read more
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