Life has never been better for enterprises and consumers. From free music to free software, the digital economy is an all-you-can-eat free-for-all.
That is, unless you're a vendor.
Traditional vendors are getting shellacked by the digital economy, spurring some, like Rupert Murdoch and his News Corp., to threaten to stick a finger in the dike and demand that users pay for content. (At Murdoch's Wall Street Journal, users already do pay to access some stories online.)
The problem with this approach is that not everyone is willing to follow suit. Why? Well, not everyone needs to. The BBC responded to Murdoch's plans by declaring it won't charge for content. It doesn't need to. U.K. taxpayers already fund it.
Different strokes for different folks. And different business models, too.
Google makes money by making it easy to discover others' content. So does Apple's iTunes. Google can afford to give away lots of free software (and even free hardware) to nudge people into its advertising model.
That's hugely disruptive.
In software, Microsoft doesn't like competing with free Linux. Microsoft spends a lot of money developing Windows. It must seem unfair to have to compete with the rest of the industry, which increasingly coalesces around Linux (or Android, or MySQL, or...).
But that's life in the open-source economy. Your core competence is always going to be someone else's throwaway complement, and ripe for open-source commoditization.
How would you like your software today?
(Credit: Domino's (Screenshot by Matt Asay))Could Domino's have bought an off-the-shelf system from Oracle, SAP, or another vendor and customized it? Probably. But then, this isn't how most IT gets built, anyway.
Most software is written by enterprises to use, not for sale, as Bruce Perens and others point out. So while we credit Microsoft, Oracle, and others as the backbone of the "software industry," the reality is that these companies are really a drop in the software bucket, with companies like Sony, Wal-Mart, and GE the true backbone of a much larger software ecosystem than the vendors comprise.
As open source matures, we're going to see these "software users" develop more software in-house, often building from open-source projects. Gartner calls out intriguing proof of this trend, but it's equally evident in anecdotes like this one, highlighting Virgin America's adoption of open source to reduce costs and improve innovation.
Virgin America is writing few checks to external vendors. That money is paying internal developers instead.
Digitization, then, may not be destroying the software market so much as reshaping it. In this new model, companies like Domino's will need more internal developers as they rely less on outside software vendors.
There will still be a need for companies like SAP, of course, as there are broad industry needs that a company or open-source foundation can satisfy. But for strategic IT projects, we're likely to see more open source plus internal development, and less packaged software purchases.
Is Apple an enterprise software or hardware company? That's the question Gartner's Nick Jones asks, ultimately answering with "you have to have a pretty relaxed definition [of enterprise] before Apple fits it."
"Enterprise" is defined by the company you keep.
With this definition in mind, Apple clearly fits the "enterprise" moniker, whether Apple wants it or not. As BusinessWeek reported back in 2008, the Mac is finding its way into enterprise computing, with or without the IT department's blessing. Ditto the iPhone.
Is it somehow less enterprise because the CIO didn't issue a policy giving permission?
Maybe "enterprise" means something more than "gets used a lot within the enterprise." In fact, Jones points out a few reasons he, personally, doesn't feel Apple is an enterprise vendor:
Apple does the bare minimum for enterprises, they aren't deeply committed to security, management, road maps, low TCO and so on. And they don't open up the architecture of iPhone enough for third parties to fill the holes.
But, again, is this really how we should define "enterprise?"
It reminds me of the criticisms leveled at open-source software early in its adoption. Originally Linux, for example, wasn't considered "enterprise grade" or "enterprise ready," presumably because it didn't meet Jones' hurdles above.
Now, however, Linux is considered an essential enterprise technology. What changed? Nothing...except adoption.
Here's a test for Jones: while Gartner pooh-poohs Apple's iPhone as an enterprise mobile device, perhaps for a variety of good definitional reasons, will it hold to such a rationale once the iPhone's market share within the enterprise dwarfs that of Windows Mobile, which has lost a third of its market share since 2008?
Seriously, at some point it won't be enough to listen to Microsoft's Ray Ozzie deprecate the iPhone's enterprise credentials because its 100,000-plus applications are "not very deep" and lack the "thousands of man years" that have gone into the applications that run on Windows. It won't make sense. Why? Because no matter how "enterprise grade" those Windows Mobile applications are, few within the enterprise are using them.
Enterprise is as enterprise does. Would you rather work for the company that builds software for the enterprise, or would you prefer to work for the company whose software gets used by the enterprise?
If you can have both, great. But it's silly to say Apple isn't an enterprise company simply because it sells to the enterprise without even trying.
The European Commission may be taking its time analyzing the competitive impact of Oracle's proposed acquisition of Sun/MySQL, but the industry can't afford to dither. On Tuesday, MySQL competitor EnterpriseDB announced that Red Hat joined its $19 million Series C funding round, which follows IBM's own investment in EnterpriseDB.
Is the software industry, once devoted to MySQL, preparing to shift allegiances to Postgres?
Probably not, but clouds are forming. On Monday, I talked with EnterpriseDB CEO Ed Boyajian, a former Red Hat executive, and he suggested several reasons for Red Hat's investment of "a significant amount of money" in the open-source database vendor, EnterpriseDB. As he told me:
This is a great step forward for our company and for Postgres. Red Hat has done heroic work bringing commercial open source to mainstream enterprise adoption. And it's making a difference: arguably billions of dollars of spend in operating system and middleware has gone back to customers. You want to talk about returning control to users? That's the real yardstick. That's real disruption.
For EnterpriseDB to have the trust and support of Red Hat as a partner and investor is a huge help to our company and I think it gives another strong indication to enterprise customers challenging their old spending habits, that there is more they can do.
It's important to note that Red Hat has been distributing Postgres for some time. It's in every copy of Red Hat Enterprise Linux and Fedora that Red Hat ships. As such, it's already in the hands of thousands of Red Hat customers and users, and is in heavy demand in some geographies, particularly Latin America. But until now Red Hat has not provided robust support for the database on par with its support for Linux and JBoss.
That's about to change.
The change is good for Red Hat customers, but this isn't the only area in which Red Hat has been seeking to expand its influence. Red Hat has been actively looking for opportunities to invest in a variety of open-source companies, most recently investing in JasperSoft.
Red Hat CEO Jim Whitehurst, however, nicely marries pragmatism with idealism, as suggested by his comments on EnterpriseDB's subscription model:"EnterpriseDB is also working to create customer value through a subscription support model. Clearly, this is a model we see as beneficial."
He's right, but it's interesting to hear him laud a model (i.e., a subscription to proprietary and open-source software, plus maintenance and support) from which he distanced Red Hat in Red Hat's Q1 earnings call. ("I certainly hope for and we certainly like to work with other open source companies out there. But those are fundamentally different business then what we're doing.")
He's right the second time (in the EnterpriseDB news release). They are not fundamentally different business models. I suspect his comments on the earnings call reflected an attempt to get out of an inaccurate and misleading question from the ever-entertaining Trip Chowdhry.
Regardless, Red Hat's investment in Postgres vendor EnterpriseDB suggests that it, along with IBM and others, is prepared to bolster alternatives to MySQL in its larger quest to provide real competition in the database industry.
To be fair, Red Hat's interest in Postgres and EnterpriseDB precedes the EU's intervention in Oracle's proposed acquisition of MySQL. The interest is understandable: Postgres is a great choice for a wide variety of database workloads. It's built for transactions and higher-end use cases, like the Oracle and IBM database workloads that it can replace (or augment).
EnterpriseDB plays into Red Hat's overarching strategy of commoditizing key infrastructure, as Whitehurst has noted. Given that the $20 billion database market is concentrated in just three vendors who control 85 percent of the market, databases are ripe for disruption, disruption that Red Hat can feed from a distance.
Red Hat's investment in EnterpriseDB says more about Red Hat's increasing awareness of its larger role in the open-source ecosystem than it does of any competition with MySQL. It's about time.
It takes time, leadership, and a fair amount of luck to successfully build an open-source community. It also takes money. Lots of it, if IBM's $1 billion commitment to Linux is any indication.
Unfortunately, the return on such open-source community investments may be permanently scuppered by the European Commission's misguided defense of MySQL from Oracle's intended acquisition. If the EC is going to punish successful open-source endeavors like MySQL, will investors still clamor to finance the rise of open source?
In many ways, MySQL is the quintessential commercial open-source success story. On the financial side, MySQL managed to build a vibrant business, doing north of $90 million at the time of its acquisition by Sun Microsystems in February 2008.
Equally compelling, however, is the exceptional user and developer community that formed around the open-source database project, registering tens of millions of downloads and a massive developer community.
This community augmented MySQL's financial fortunes, of course, but it also protected MySQL database users from the whims of the company, as former MySQL CEO Marten Mickos wrote to European Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes:
Even if Oracle for whatever reason would have malicious or ignorant intent regarding MySQL (not that I think so), the positive and massive influence MySQL has on the DBMS market cannot be controlled by a single entity - not even by the owner of the MySQL assets. The users of MySQL exert a more powerful influence in the market than the owner does.
Unfortunately, the EC seems intent on punishing MySQL--both community and company--for its success. Already the MySQL database project has started to fracture into competing forks, while business rivals like EnterpriseDB and IBM collect confused customers.
More worryingly, the EC's actions may end up diminishing potential returns to investors in other open-source projects, particularly those that take the added time and cost to build global communities.
Technology mergers and acquisitions activity is at a 20-month high. Open-source companies, however, may miss out on this resurgence, particularly those, like Acquia and EnterpriseDB, that build on successful open-source communities (Drupal and Postgres, respectively).
Indeed, based on the EC's actions, perhaps the worst thing these companies could do is foster successful open-source communities. Maybe they should just take the cash and run?
Consider: the EC didn't challenge Yahoo's acquisition of Zimbra, VMware's acquisition of SpringSource, Citrix's acquisition of XenSource, etc. What do they have in common? Rising revenue but, except in the case of SpringSource, much more limited communities than MySQL. (Even the Spring community pales in comparison to MySQL, impressive though it is.)
Granted, the major difference with Oracle/MySQL is that the two are ostensibly competitors, as CNET points out. In the letter referenced above, however, Mickos dismisses such competition. The reality is that MySQL and Oracle compete in two different database markets.
Regardless, as well as MySQL was doing, $90-plus million is spare change in the global database market. The EC, in other words, isn't trying to protect MySQL's business. It's trying to protect MySQL's community.
Such mollycoddling of an open-source community is destructive to all future investments in similar endeavors. Why should commercial entities bother fostering community--the very community that makes them less susceptible to hostile takeover and anticompetitive forces--if doing so simply ends up ruining financial returns?
The EC means well, but it is not doing the right thing for MySQL, its community, or other open-source commercial efforts. Quite the opposite. Just as the commercial open-source community has been pondering a move back to community-controlled open source, the EC threatens to hobble the shift.
The EC may well end up with less competition, not more, by blocking Oracle's proposed acquisition of Sun and its crown jewel, MySQL.
Novell has been positioning itself as the Avis of Linux, a distant but gaining Red Hat competitor that "tries harder." Like Oracle, Novell argues that it can give customers Red Hat value at a lower price.
What, me worry?
It's true that adoption of unpaid Linux like CentOS is booming, and that this no-cost alternative to more expensive solutions like Red Hat is a real threat to Red Hat. This is no doubt why Red Hat has made "free-to-paid" a core element of its ongoing strategy, as related in its recent earnings call.
But it's a much bigger threat to Novell and Oracle, both of whom are trying to position themselves as cheaper alternatives to Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
If a customer really wants Red Hat at a lower price, they're not going to move to an incompatible distribution that may or may not run their applications properly. They're going to jump to CentOS, which is basically a carbon copy of RHEL, minus the trademarks (and price tag).
Oracle, for its part, is clearly not in the Linux market. It's in the market to eradicate Red Hat, so as to claim top-to-bottom control of its software stack. But even as Oracle tries to squeeze Red Hat into oblivion, CentOS provides an excellent hedge against commercial competition from Oracle (and Novell), making its pitch ring hollow.
CentOS: Red Hat's biggest annoyance and greatest friend?
It's not dissimilar to the role that piracy plays for protecting Microsoft's Windows dominance against Linux, especially in emerging markets. Quite possibly the worst thing that Microsoft could do, as IDC has also suggested, is to succeed in its anti-piracy efforts.
Were Microsoft to raise its pricing above $0.00 in such markets, suddenly Linux would look like a much better alternative.
Back to Novell and Oracle. It's not enough to try harder. Red Hat has created a dominant global brand that CIOs trust. It's not worth a few dollars here and there to disrupt that to shift to SUSE or Oracle Enterprise Linux.
Not when those CIOs can shave 100 percent of their RHEL subscription costs by moving to CentOS.
I know some CIOs who have, but they tend to be enterprises with lots of developers that are comfortable supporting themselves. Fortunately for Red Hat, few CIOs care to take that risk. Unfortunately for Novell and Oracle, those who do want to save all of their Linux subscription fees, not just some of them.
Postgres for years has lived in the shadow of MySQL's media attention: the "boring" database that quietly goes about its work while its sexy Web 2.0 cousin wins the popularity contest.
Recent data from the Eclipse Foundation, however, suggest that Postgres may be ready to make significant waves in the enterprise, even if it doesn't make headlines.
In a recent letter to European Union's commissioner of competition, former MySQL CEO Marten Mickos stressed that MySQL's target market is the emerging Web database market and that the enterprise IT market was never really a source of strength (or focus).
Postgres is the opposite.
Postgres is an enterprise Java database, more suitable for carrying corporate data than the Web's consumer data. According to a 2009 survey by the Eclipse Foundation, MySQL (27.7 percent) and Oracle (27.3 percent) were the top-two databases used by those surveyed, with Postgres registering a respectable but still distant 9.9 percent.
Given that Oracle database users are far more likely to use Java as their programming language to develop server-centric applications, while MySQL users are three times more likely to use PHP as their primary language (17.4 percent of those surveyed use it, versus 5.4 percent for all users) to builde RIA/Web applications, Postgres is clearly more Oracle than MySQL.
Granted, the Eclipse community is traditionally Java-centric, so it's not surprising that Java would be prominent among its developers. But it's also the case that enterprise IT remains a Java/.Net market, and in such a market Postgres could be poised to boom if it can muster sufficient marketing to make its message heard.
This is where EnterpriseDB comes in.
The MySQL community would not be as well-developed as it is without MySQL, the company. MySQL AB has funded the overwhelming majority of MySQL database development, but it has also provided the marketing muscle to make a name for the Web database.
Postgres has traditionally been a standalone, organic open-source project with little concerted corporate involvement. EnterpriseDB has started to change that, but for too long wrongly fixated on competing with MySQL, a database that serves a different market and different developers. The company also spent too much time talking about Oracle migration technology, rather than focusing on why Postgres is a great database.
That may be changing.
Postgres just released version 8.4 of the venerable database. In EnterpriseDB's discussion of the release, there's no mention of Oracle, MySQL, or any other competitor. Instead, EnterpriseDB seems to be focusing more on its commitment to Postgres development, adding significant enterprise hardening through its open-source Postgres Plus distribution.
It's a welcome change, and one that could position Postgres to take a bigger share of the enterprise Java database market--not because it's cheaper than Oracle or more open than MySQL but because it's a great database in its own right.
That's the right messaging for EnterpriseDB...and Postgres.
If I needed a clear sign that commercial open source is alive and well, reading Roberto Galoppini's remarks on the five Open Innovation Awards winners provided that and more. I used to be able to count every open-source company on two hands. Galoppini mentioned four of which I've never heard.
I'll feel a lot better, however, when we hear less about vendors writing open-source software and more about enterprise IT releasing open-source code.
You have nothing to lose...
While some governments (the U.K. most notable among them, as Glyn Moody highlights) fear coloring outside the lines of proprietary software, others, like the Mongolian government, which has moved all of its Web sites to open-source Joomla, have embraced open source as a way to lower costs and increase vendor independence.
The companies and governments that get the most from open source, however, are those that view technology as a competitive differentiator and look to open source to deliver "high productivity, flexibility, robustness and considerably lower costs," like the London Stock Exchange recently discovered in its move to Linux.
For such organizations, it's time to start contributing back. No, not because doing so is somehow morally superior to using but not writing open-source software, but rather because there are tangible business benefits to contributing open-source code.
Take The New York Times, for example, which is releasing its Document Viewer under an open-source license within the next few weeks. According to BayNewser, Aron Pilhofer, the Times' editor for interactive newsroom technologies, said this is:
"a recognition that news organizations are slowly but gradually becoming more and more like technology companies." The shift toward open source software will strengthen journalism and transparency, Pilhofer said, because it enables news companies to leverage the smarts of large communities of software developers and technologically skilled journalists outside of the Times to continually improve the software...
[T]he Times expects that other organizations that use the tool will build new functionality on top the Times' code and then, in true open source spirit, share their enhancements back so that all organizations using of the Document Viewer will benefit.
This is precisely the sort of thinking that could lead the media industry out of its current struggles and into a more productive, collaborative future. Open source is no panacea for struggling newspapers, but it does offer a compelling way to increase outside contributions, improve user interaction, and help make its future a communal effort.
Red Hat CEO Jim Whitehurst has been calling on enterprise IT to contribute back to open-source projects. His is not a plea for charity. It's a call to recognize and fuel self-interest.
Follow me on Twitter @mjasay.
At the recent Red Hat Summit, company CEO Jim Whitehurst quipped that "flat is the new up," but he clearly wasn't referring to Red Hat. On Wednesday Red Hat announced another strong quarter, with revenue of $183.6 million for the company's second fiscal quarter of 2010.
That's a rise of 12 percent compared with the same period last year. Despite the company's against-the-grain performance in a weak market, however, it may need to invest more in its middleware business to ensure future growth.
But first, the good news. Of Red Hat's total revenue, roughly 85 percent, or $156.3 million, came from subscription revenue. That's an increase of 15 percent compared with the year-ago period. Putting this into context, IDC projects Linux subscription revenue to top $1 billion by 2012. Red Hat should claim virtually all of this at its current pace of growth.
Customers seem content to pay Red Hat for free software that they could get more cheaply elsewhere. While recent IDC data hint at hard times to come for commercial Linux vendors, it hasn't hit Red Hat. Not yet. The company is still a darling with CIOs.
And it may not for some time, with Red Hat reporting deferred revenue of $581 million, up 17 percent compared with the same period last year. The company is increasingly profitable, too. It reported net income of $28.9 million, or 15 cents a share, compared with $21.1 million, or 10 cents a share, for the year-ago quarter.
As part of its quarterly earnings call, Red Hat executives revealed a range of reasons to think its business is on track:
- All top-25 customer accounts renewed, and at 120 percent of the prior year's value. Most customers are expanding their adoption of Red Hat, and more and more are upgrading to Advanced Platform.
- Only three of its top-300 customers up for renewal didn't renew in the quarter, and two of those have returned to Red Hat after the quarter closed.
- Two deals were over $5 million, while 10 deals hit $1 million. Red Hat EMEA (Europe, Middle East, Africa) closed its biggest deal ever in the quarter.
- Of the top 30 deals, 23 included Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Advanced Platform, and five included a JBoss component. This suggests that Red Hat's big customers are upgrading to Advanced Platform, according to Red Hat CFO Charlie Peters.
- JBoss continues to grow much faster than the core RHEL business.
- Deal length extended to 22 months from 19 months last quarter, reflecting
- One former Red Hat customer, a large financial services company (almost certainly Credit Suisse), dropped Novell's SUSE Linux and returned to Red Hat with a big order in the quarter. Credit Suisse is one of the companies Novell pulled away from Red Hat by using Microsoft-subsidized coupons, but Peters indicated that the customer had returned because of Red Hat's superior value. It appears that Red Hat is a better value than free.
- Red Hat is taking share from its competitors rather than seeing an increase in net new server purchases.
Despite the mostly sunny skies, Red Hat's slowing revenue growth remains a concern. The trend kicked off in 2005 and has continued apace since then despite a brief respite in 2007, as The 451 Group reports.
Of course, as Red Hat gets bigger, and as the economy remains stagnant, it's normal that Red Hat's revenue growth will slow.
But it's also normal that as it slows, companies like Red Hat will look for increased growth beyond their core businesses. Oracle is perhaps the most obvious example of this.
Red Hat doesn't need to get into video game consoles (e.g., Microsoft's Xbox) or hardware (e.g., Oracle's pending acquisition of Sun) or a variety of businesses far afield from its core infrastructure business. After all, Red Hat clearly has a lot of room to grow its JBoss/middleware business, and arguably needn't acquire its way to that growth.
But it does need to significantly change the way it views its channel partners.
Red Hat's traditional Linux partners are absolutely the wrong group to be selling its middleware offerings, a fact that took Red Hat some time to digest. Now, however, Red Hat seems to be getting the picture and has launched its Catalyst Program to sell turnkey open-source solutions through a growing ecosystem of value-added resellers (VARs).
Catalyst, however, is still in its infancy. It remains to be seen whether this program will stick, as Red Hat has moved away from ecosystem efforts like its Red Hat Exchange in the past.
For Red Hat's sake, it should stick with this one. Through Catalyst and other means, Red Hat needs to place more emphasis on the world outside of Linux. The company believes that virtualization and cloud computing are big opportunities, and they are, but these are mostly ways to build upon RHEL, rather than ways to extend its reach into fast-growing, diverse markets.
Red Hat is an execution machine and will undoubtedly be able to continue to grow its Linux business, and possibly to accelerate that growth again through enhanced investments in virtualization and cloud computing. But the real growth for the company is a bit higher up the stack in its middleware business.
Peters said that the company is investing significantly more in JBoss than RHEL, proportionate to the revenue each brings. That's good, but also obvious, given that Red Hat's JBoss business is comparatively small to its RHEL business. It may be time to invest even more in JBoss.
A large percentage of IT projects fail, and one big reason is the nature of the traditional software acquisition process. Buyers typically purchase software based on faith (demoware), with acceptance periods built into contracts to provide escape clauses if the software doesn't work as advertised. Open-source software, however, with its "try-before-you-buy" option, provides a better way to increase the odds of a successful IT project, while simultaneously lowering costs.
Enterprise software is hard, and made doubly so when million-dollar decisions must be made about software that has not been tried beyond a sales engineer's slideshow. It's therefore not surprising that Gartner Research Vice President Tony Bell recently suggested that "more than 50 percent of large Enterprise Content Management (ECM) projects fail if less than six months are spent on vendor choice and planning."
The real surprise is that any such projects succeed. Faith is great in religion, but it's a poor policy for enterprise software projects.
Now consider the open-source alternative. Sales cycles for open-source companies routinely average 60 to 90 days, versus the six to nine months (or longer) that proprietary software sales cycles last.
The process for open-source companies is so fast because the prospects start using the software long before they contacted the vendor. On average, I'd put this pre-evaluation duration at three to six months.
In traditional software sales cycles, you have to invent prospects' interest, nurture it along, and then close the deal, all without the customer really getting to experience the software. This can result in very expensive failures.
In open-source sales cycles, you don't really interact with a prospective customer until she has experienced the software for herself and wants something more, like a support subscription.
This is a tremendously powerful side effect of open source.
No, not all open-source software will be right for a given enterprise's requirements. But given the transparency of open-source software, would-be buyers should know well before they write a check and, worst case, they can stop paying their subscriptions if project priorities change or the software stops fitting their needs.
Red Hat announced a range of cool new products and technologies last week at Red Hat Summit, but the most potent message emerging from the conference may well have been 'Diplomacy be damned!' Red Hat has generally opted to publicly ignore competitors, but not anymore. The company singled out Microsoft and Oracle, in particular. Is this a new, combative Red Hat?
Red Hat's DeltaCloud was the big technical news, offering a "common API to blend public and private clouds." It also announced a new Catalyst program to corral a partner ecosystem around its infrastructure products.
But for me, it was Red Hat's swipes at its competitors that are possibly more momentous. It's not that Red Hat never criticizes competitors: in 2006, for example, Red Hat declared the imminent death (wrongly, as it turns out) of Novell.
But there's a difference between criticizing pure competitors and those companies, like Oracle, that Red Hat both competes with in some markets and partners in others.
Hence, when Red Hat's executive vice president of products and technologies, Paul Cormier, singled out Microsoft Azure for its potential to lock in customers, this was an easy jab at a company that drives no Red Hat revenue.
Red Hat CEO Jim Whitehurst's scorn for Oracle's technology strategy, however, has the potential to damage the companies' partnership:
Do you want to buy into Larry Ellison's vision of what your IT infrastructure should be and what functionality you should provide to your customers, or should you listen to your customers and be flexible?
This second critique has more sting because Red Hat and Oracle partner as much as they compete. Oracle first caused waves in the partnership by cloning Red Hat Enterprise Linux and undercutting Red Hat's pricing, but Red Hat's response ("It's a fork and not a particularly good one") was relatively muted. It had to be: Oracle's database certification for RHEL has long been a driver of RHEL sales.
Is this a sign of a new Red Hat, one that will not only talk down competitors but also be willing to take them down by entering competitor-partners' product markets?
I hope so. There's no way for Red Hat to grow without stepping on partners' toes. I'm not suggesting Red Hat should declare war on its partners, but it certainly needs to be willing to make partners uncomfortable, as it did by acquiring JBoss. It's a sign of a more competitive Red Hat.
Follow me on Twitter @mjasay.
