The Open Road

Despite the broad and deep trend toward open-source software, it's telling that Red Hat remains the only large, pure-play open-source vendor.

Without a strong, standalone open-source leader, will commercial open source endure?

The obvious answer is yes, but there are reasons to think that the industry would benefit from a billion-dollar open-source company. Actually, several.

It might seem counterintuitive to suggest that open source, which by its very nature tends to be decentralized and bottom-up in its growth, would benefit by concentrating wealth in a few hegemons.

David is nice, but the fact is that Goliath generally wins.

Take baseball, for example. The New York Times on Monday reported on the importance of the spending power of the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox to the overall strength of the American League. A rising tide may raise all boats. But in the case of baseball, a few dominant teams force the rest of the league to follow suit or die, a curse/blessing that the National League doesn't share.

The stronger Red Hat is, by analogy, the better-positioned it is to set the pace of spending and innovation for other open-source companies.

The same is true in football, i.e. soccer. "Soccernomics" traces the importance of the Manchester Uniteds, Arsenals, and Real Madrids for pulling in fans: fans flock to watch the big teams, either to cheer for them or against them. The prospect of cheering on Hull City to best Bolton simply isn't that appealing.

In a similar manner, Red Hat serves as a beacon for would-be open source buyers. It may be hard to get excited about buying into No-Name Open-Source Vendor X, but buying from an established brand-name vendor like Red Hat? Much more appealing.

The problem, however, is that Red Hat is still a minnow in the global software pool, and its fixed focus on baseline infrastructure leaves it ill-equipped to lead the open-source market. Most open-source start-ups simply don't need Red Hat to thrive, and they derive little value from a partnership with the company.

A lot of companies make money in the shadow of Microsoft. Not so in Red Hat's.

Nor is Red Hat a viable exit for most open-source companies. Google, IBM, and others actively contribute to open-source projects--and arguably contribute even more to the continued health of the commercial open-source ecosystem by offering healthy exits for open-source start-ups.

Tim O'Reilly called out this phenomenon years ago when he suggested that the likely exit for most open-source companies would be acquisitions by proprietary software vendors. This is good for the open-source companies, but it may not be good for open source.

It would be ideal to have a large open-source applications vendor, but it's unlikely we'll get one anytime soon, particularly since successful open-source companies keep getting swallowed by proprietary vendors before they can crack the $100 million mark, much less than $1 billion mark.

It's also possible that we don't need IBM-sized, pure-play open-source companies. After all, we have IBM and its ilk already funding open source.

It's equally likely that getting to such a size with a pure-play open-source model simply isn't possible.

But I think we need a few open-source hegemons, companies that can offer a clear alternative to Oracle and Microsoft for both buyers looking for open-source software solutions and vendors looking for open-source software partners. Such hegemons can also help to fund the growth of the next generation of open-source innovation.

But from where will they come? I'm not sure. Your thoughts, please.

The day open source became big business is the day that open-source development exploded. Yes, open source predates the moneyed interests hankering to use it to competitive advantage, but it really wasn't until IBM dropped $1 billion on Linux that companies began paying employees to write free software that the movement saw broad adoption.

That's when open source became more than an efficient way to develop software, and also became a great way to build a business.

However, adding open source to one's business is not magical pixie dust that guarantees its viability. As IBM's Bob Sutor explains:

The basic principles around revenue, profit, loss, taxes, payroll, overhead, accounting, sales, incorporation, health care, and human resources all apply. You can be a starving open source software entrepreneur as easily as a starving proprietary software entrepreneur. No one will excuse basic business failures and screw-ups just because you use open source. Make sure that you will produce a product that people want and in some way will pay for, no matter how indirectly.

Sutor's counsel applies to any company or individual that wants to build a business around open-source software, but arguably some of the industry's best projects are not the product of any one company, but rather of several. Linux, Mozilla, Apache Software Foundation, Eclipse, and other collaborative communities represent an interesting way to use open source to competitive advantage.

In many ways, open source has become a critical component of the software industry because the market has largely moved from vertical businesses (i.e., companies controlling all aspects of production, distribution, etc.) to horizontal markets (i.e., companies focusing on their core competencies and depending on others for complementary functions).

As Gartner's Brian Prentice astutely points out, however, horizontal markets have a flaw:

But this business control system has a inherent risk. Should an organization monopolize a specific segment of a value chain system they can extract a higher percentage of its total proceeds. If the product, or service, in question is price elastic than those additional proceeds will come from other participants in the value chain system.

Case in point? Windows. By owning the operating system, Microsoft threw a wrench into the collective cogs of horizontally oriented software firms like Intel, IBM, and others.

The industry's response--Linux--is a classic example of the open-source approach to mitigating individual choke holds within an industry, as Prentice goes on to write:

What then does a CEO do when facing a squeeze on their profits because a direct, or downstream, supplier is dominating a segment of the value chain system? Besides negotiating a better deal - if they can - they've been left with little choice but to get directly into that segment of the value chain system themselves. But by doing so their organization is distracted from focusing on its own core competency.

The risk of such an undertaking can be mitigated if there is a collective response by similarly affected members of the value chain system. After all, it is usually a shared problem. But collective responses have always had an inherent, and often fatal, flaw. Who owns the resulting assets? Either organizations enter into complex joint venture agreements to sort this out or run the risk of shifting the distortion in the value chain system to another organization.

Again, Linux offers the perfect example. IBM, Intel, Red Hat, and others aren't investing in Linux because they're all chums at the country club together, but rather because they're looking for ways to reduce Microsoft's hold on their own businesses through its control of personal computer and server operating systems.

As an added benefit, it's a great way for companies to collaborate without running afoul of antitrust laws. It's collusion without the collusion.

Intriguingly, even Microsoft is getting into this game. Microsoft's partnership with open-source ad serving company OpenX indicates that Microsoft, too, is figuring out how to use open-source complements to loosen strangleholds competitors like Google may be hoping to throw in its way.

This is why open source is growing so much faster than the rest of the industry, as IDC finds. It's not because we love each other more. Quite the opposite. It's because proprietary vendors have figured out that open-sourcing key complements to their core businesses can be strategically decisive in hurting competitors while helping themselves.

Lost in the news of Zimbra's release of version 6.0 of its collaboration suite is the importance of one very big number: 50 million. That's how many paid mailboxes Zimbra claims now, a number that puts it within spitting distance of IBM Lotus Notes (approximately 145 million paid mailboxes) and Microsoft Exchange (approximately 175 million paid mailboxes). Whatever the truth to rumors that Zimbra is up for sale, Zimbra is an appreciating asset for Yahoo, not a depreciating one.

For one thing, it's important to consider just how explosive this growth has been. In January 2009, Zimbra was at 20 million paid mailboxes. By March, that number had jumped to 40 million paid mailboxes, perhaps a consequence of Comcast mailboxes coming online. (Comcast chose Zimbra to power its Web mail service in 2007.)

That's a lot of growth in a very short period of time. Zimbra appears to have more than doubled its business in the past year.

In fact, if you track the paid-user data for Zimbra, it's very apparent that Zimbra's momentum has been increasing since its Yahoo acquisition, not decreasing.

Such momentum is built on a vibrant, growing community. Zimbra has roughly 10,000 active members on its forums, growing from 5,000 total forum registrations in 2006 to more than 20,000 in December 2008, the last date for which I have accurate data.

At the time of its acquisition in 2007, Zimbra was generating approximately 30,000 downloads per month, a number that has held constant even as a greater proportion of its community elects to pay for Zimbra's Professional Edition.

Yahoo may not know whether it wants to be an enterprise software company (Hint: it doesn't), but Zimbra definitely stands out as an enterprise software product. While the company used to mainly find traction with universities and SMBs, its customer list now includes companies like Bechtel, Century21, H&R Block, Raytheon, and more.

Perhaps as a sign of this growing enterprise clout, Zimbra has caught the eye of Red Hat, which works closely with Zimbra, most recently jointly selling to the Peruvian government.

ZDNet's Larry Dignan may be right in suggesting that Zimbra's news appears to package the company for a sale but, again, even if so, it's clearly because Yahoo doesn't know the way to sell enterprise software, and not because Zimbra can't. If Zimbra continues to grow as it has, within a year it will be taking significant market share from industry leaders IBM and Microsoft.

Zimbra has already caught Microsoft's attention. With Zimbra's 50 million paid users, apparently Redmond is not the only one to notice the company.

Update @ 3:29 Pacific on September 30, 2009:

It's true, as reflected in the comments, that at least some of this growth is due to more and more Comcast subscribers coming online. Surely such users are, on average, not as active as IBM or Microsoft email customers, which tend to be corporate users. Point taken.

But I think this is also a complaint that makes less and less difference as a greater share of Zimbra's customers are enterprises, as reflected in its recent Bechtel deal. There are only so many Comcasts (though I doubt Zimbra would be disinclined from signing up more), but that's not the future for Zimbra, anyway. Enterprises are.

Hence, it may be momentarily inaccurate to compare apples (Zimbra) with oranges (IBM/Microsoft), Microsoft's own internal positioning against Zimbra, as linked to above, suggests that Zimbra's competitors recognize the threat and don't pooh-pooh its numbers as "just Comcast."

Red Hat is generally credited as the industry's leading open-source company, but it's a distinction that is as meaningless as it is incorrect. While Red Hat's revenue directly derives from the open-source software it develops and distributes, other companies like Sun, IBM, and Google actually write and contribute far more open-source code. It may be time to stop talking about open-source companies and get back to the importance of open-source code.

Open source is increasingly the foundation upon which software and Web companies depend. MySpace made waves on Tuesday by open sourcing Qizmt, a distributed computation framework (running on Windows Server, intriguingly) that currently powers MySpace's "People you may know" feature. But MySpace, as VentureBeat notes, was simply playing catch-up to Facebook's recent open sourcing of Tornado.

Neither move is an attempt to score brownie points with the "in" crowd. Both moves are motivated by self-interest, self-interest that increasingly requires inviting developer communities to embrace and extend one's Web services/software through open source.

It's also a way to improve software quality. By embracing open-source projects as a foundation for a company's software, and then extending it through its own open-source projects, the collective quality of open source is strong and growing, as Accenture's Kit Plummer notes.

It's this enlightened self-interest and the quality is engenders that has turned open source into essential infrastructure for virtually all commercial software, and which means Red Hat and other pure-play open-source companies are no longer the center of the open-source universe.

The Linux kernel is comprised of 11.5 million lines of code, of which Red Hat is responsible for roughly 12 percent (measured in terms of lines of code changed). Even if we add in JBoss Application Server (another 2 million lines of code or so) and other Red Hat projects, we're still left with far less open-source code from Red Hat than from others.

Take Sun, for example. Sun is the primary developer behind Java (more than 6.5 million lines of code), Solaris (over 2 million lines of code), OpenOffice (approximately 10 million lines of code), and other open-source projects.

Or IBM, with 12.5 million lines of code contributed to Eclipse alone, not to mention Linux (6.3 percent of total contributions), Geronimo, and a wide variety of other open-source projects.

Google, however, is the most interesting company of all, as it's not a software company, per se. I asked Chris DiBona, Google's open source and public sector program manager, about Google's open-source contributions. His response:

Conservatively, we've released about 14 million lines of code. Android tops 10 million lines of code, and then you have Chrome (2 million lines of code), GWT (300,000 lines of code), and about a project released every week over the last five years. Then you have a couple hundred Googlers patching on a weekly or monthly basis.

While DiBona was quick to suggest that Google doesn't claim the crown for Open Source Top Contributor ("We'd say we're 'among' the largest [contributors]"), it almost certainly is the world's largest open-source code contributor, especially when one considers its other open-source activities, including hosting perhaps the world's largest repository for open-source projects, with more than 250,000 hosted projects, at least 40,000 of which are actively contributed, not to mention its Summer of Code. After all, lines of code, while useful, is not necessarily the best measure of the value of open-source contributions.

In fact, Patrick Finch of the Mozilla Foundation speculates that Google's best open-source contribution may have nothing to do with writing new code at all:

Google's biggest contribution to open source is arguably not code, but proving that you can scale Linux on whitebox hardware.

It's a great point, and one that underscores the fact that the "open-source company" distinction is somewhat useless. Google doesn't call itself an open-source company, and rightly so. Open source is simply part of its strategy for distributing software that will help it sell more advertising.

Sun attempted to turn itself into an open-source company, but once Oracle completes its acquisition of Sun, Oracle certainly won't take on that label. Not because it's a bad label, but because it's simply not a useful one anymore.

We are all open-source companies now. Which also means that none of us are. Open source is simply a way that we enable some aspect of our businesses, whether we're Red Hat or Microsoft or Google or Facebook.

And given that Web companies like Google don't need to directly monetize open source, we may actually see far more open-source code emerge from these Web companies than we ever have or ever will from traditional "open-source software companies" like Red Hat, MySQL, or Pentaho.

Virtualization may offer a significant advantage to Linux in the decade-old debate over Linux vs. Windows total cost of ownership (TCO). A new Gabriel Consulting Group survey (PDF) of mostly mixed-environment (that is, Windows and Linux) enterprises reveals significantly higher adoption of virtualization technology, with all the cost savings that go with it: less money spent on hardware and licensing fees.

It's an interesting conclusion, but leads to an even more interesting question: why don't Windows administrators take advantage of virtualization to the same extent as Linux administrators? The answer--licensing cost and complexity--is something that Microsoft has the ability, but not the interest, to change.

According to the survey, enterprises that predominantly use Linux virtualize roughly 30 percent more than those that prefer Windows, and heavier virtualization users do so much more aggressively on Linux systems than on Windows:

The survey's author reports that "Linux users have clearly both adopted virtualization at a greater rate and embraced it to a greater extent than customers who have standardized on Microsoft operating systems," but why?

Perhaps the primary reason is that Microsoft didn't really start to promote virtualization until long after the Linux crowd. This isn't surprising: Microsoft has much to lose from virtualization. The fewer Windows server licenses an enterprise has to buy, the worse it is for Microsoft.

Microsoft has now jumped into the virtualization market with both feet, giving its Hyper-V product away for free...but not really. Indeed, it is the pricing strategy Microsoft has for its servers that may go furthest in explaining its lack of appeal to Windows users, as noted in Gabriel Consulting Group's report:

There are also licensing differences that bear directly on comparative costs. With Microsoft, users who don't have volume agreements or who haven't purchased the more expensive Enterprise or Datacenter editions will have to purchase licenses for every system and each of the virtual machines running on those systems. Linux, on the other hand, can be essentially free, meaning that companies can deploy it on multiple systems or in virtual machines at no cost.

While the survey also lists the benefits of source code access to Linux administrators, I suspect that this is of minimal value to the big majority of Linux adopters. Very few will care to "get intimate with the code," to use the report's language, preferring instead to stick to the more tangible (and easily accessed) cost savings from Linux virtualization.

There are other benefits to those who primarily adopt, or standardize on, Linux, as the report suggests:

• 77 percent of survey respondents reported greater hardware utilization rates through Linux virtualization, versus 56 percent of Windows users.
• Those who standardize on Linux find Linux virtualization much more manageable (62 percent) than Windows administrators who standardize on Windows virtualization (48 percent). More telling, four times as many Windows standardizers (23 percent) find Windows virtualization hard to manage than the Linux standardizers, only 6 percent of whom find Linux virtualization hard to manage.
• Linux translates into higher server utilization and, hence, less power consumption and more physical space: 59 percent of Linux administrators disagreed with the "We are rapidly running out of data center electrical capacity" statement, compared to 38 percent of Windows administrators. When presented with the statement "We are rapidly running out of data center floor space", 60 percent of Linux administrators disagreed versus 45 percent of Windows administrators.

While enterprises could realize even bigger cost savings by simply using free Linux versus paid Windows, most enterprises will buy commercial support for Linux through Red Hat, Novell, or Canonical. Even factoring in this cost, however, Linux seems to lend itself more readily to virtualization and, hence, to cost savings that result therefrom.

Microsoft has it in its power to turn the tide relative to Linux's superior virtualization TCO, and it probably has little to do with the cost of Windows Server, and certainly not with the cost of its Hyper-V virtualization technology, which is now $0.00.

Rather, it's likely a matter of simplifying its famously Byzantine pricing, and making Windows Server licensing friendlier to virtualization. For example, Microsoft doesn't allow migration of its products to a new physical server more than once every 90 days. This may ensure customers buy licenses with fewer restrictions, but it also appears to mean they simply buy fewer Microsoft licenses, period.

Given that commercial Linux isn't free, Microsoft doesn't need to make Windows free to make its Hyper-V virtualization more competitive with Linux virtualization. Simplification, it seems, would go quite far toward the goal of making Windows virtualization more palatable.

Oracle has much to say to Sun Microsystems customers in a front-page advertisement it placed in Thursday's European edition of The Wall Street Journal.

The advertisement commits to greater investments in Sun hardware and Solaris software, but has absolutely nothing to say about MySQL. Is this a necessary omission to appease European regulators, or is it a sign of Oracle's intentions?

In the advertisement, Oracle commits to the following:

IBM, which has been cleaning up at Sun's expense, gets a warning from Oracle CEO Larry Ellison: "We're in it to win it. IBM, we're looking forward to competing with you in the hardware business."

Sun's business has tanked in the ongoing uncertainty over Oracle's takeover bid. The advertisement is clearly intended to placate customers that might otherwise flee to the apparent security of a relationship with IBM or Hewlett-Packard.

It's interesting, therefore, that Oracle gives no assurances about MySQL. This could simply be a politic action designed to sidestep the ire of the European Union, which has been investigating the effects an Oracle acquisition might have on Sun's MySQL business.

Or it could simply be a recognition that assuaging the fears of MySQL's customers is a comparatively unimportant task. MySQL was doing roughly $100 million in sales at the time Sun acquired the company. Given that Sun stands to lose billions in its hardware business the longer the Oracle bid drags on, losing a few tens of millions from MySQL is pocket change.

Besides, it's not at all clear that Oracle's decision to snag Sun has done anything to slow MySQL adoption. A vocal minority within the open-source development community has wrung its hands over the deal, but I've yet to hear MySQL's customer base, which skews toward the technology-savvy Web crowd, fretting about Oracle's impact on MySQL's business.

Oracle's advertisement is designed to shore up confidence in the CIO crowd that still buys Sun and probably has no clue that their organizations are running MySQL throughout the enterprise. At some point they'll know. But by that time, Oracle's acquisition of Sun should be complete.

Follow me on Twitter @mjasay.

Open-source proponents have traditionally been anti-patent, and for good reason. Patents are tough to track and can hinder the very innovation they're designed to encourage. Oddly, therefore, IBM argues that patents have fueled the growth of open source.

Can this be right, or is IBM simply serving the two masters that fuel its software strategy: a mix of open source and proprietary software?

Patents have the potential to become a minefield for innovators. Companies like ex-Microsoft executive Nathan Myhrvold's Intellectual Ventures (IV) arguably make things worse by turning patent licensing into a standalone business, as Timothy Lee writes in a blog post:

The fundamental question we should be asking about [IV's] business strategy is how it benefits anyone other than [founder Nathan] Myhrvold and the patent bar. Remember that the standard policy argument for patents is that they incentivize beneficial research and development. Yet IV's business model is based on the opposite premise: produce no innovative products, spend minimal amounts on research and development, and make a profit by compelling firms that are producing products and investing in R&D to pay up.

Not only does this enrich Myhrvold at everyone else's expense, but it also reduces the incentive to innovate, because anyone who produces an innovative product is forced to share his profits with Intellectual Ventures. Patents are supposed to make innovation more profitable. Myhrvold is using the patent system in a way that does just the opposite.

Despite such abuses of the system, have patents been kind to open source? That's a hard argument to credibly make, but it's precisely the argument IBM makes in its amicus brief for the Bilski case (PDF).

Bilski, a U.S. federal circuit court decision now before the Supreme Court, strikes down business method patents and also seriously threatens the validity of software patents, and hence seems a curious place for IBM to state its pro-patent and pro-open-source case.

IBM argues that "patent protection has promoted the free sharing of source code...which has fueled the explosive growth of open source software development."

Here's the full context:

Given the reality that software source code is human readable, and object code can be reverse engineered, it is difficult for software developers to resort to secrecy. Thus, without patent protection, the incentives to innovate in the field of software are significantly reduced. Patent protection has promoted the free sharing of source code on a patentee's terms--which has fueled the explosive growth of open source software development.

Really?

IBM's point obscures the reality of open-source development. as TechDirt points out:

The situations where a patent makes a developer more comfortable showing source code are clearly cases of proprietary software, where the developer/patent holder is worried about the software being copied. With open source software, there's no such "worry" because that's actually a feature of the system.

Patents may not be quite the Great Satan that open-source advocates sometimes suggest, but they haven't been the foundation upon which open source has been built, either. It's unclear why IBM makes this point, as few companies could claim to understand and advance open source as much as IBM.

It's particularly odd in light of the company's own statement of non-assertion of patents pledge (PDF) against open-source developers. If patents are helpful to open-source developers, why bother giving assurance that IBM won't litigate against them?

IBM makes over $1 billion each year with its patent portfolio, but this doesn't explain why it would make such a curious argument regarding open source. Anyone have ideas as to a plausible explanation?

Follow me on Twitter @mjasay.

Open source, despite its community roots, often doesn't become mainstream until corporations get involved. There are notable exceptions--Mozilla Firefox and the Apache Web server being just two--but often it is corporate self-interest that provides the mechanism to deliver the value of community-developed open source to a mainstream audience.

While the mobile market remains highly fragmented, therefore, I take it as a very encouraging sign that Google has thrown its considerable heft behind Android, its open-source mobile operating platform.

Sure, we've had mobile open-source companies for years. I was part of one of the first: Lineo, an embedded Linux vendor that distributed an optimized Linux distribution for PDAs like the Sharp Zaurus. More recently, Funambol has proved popular as a mobile application server, specializing in synchronization technology.

But just as Linux's big moment on the server came with IBM's $1 billion commitment to fund its development and marketing, so, too, will the mobile open-source market come into its own with Google Android.

Android has recently pulled ahead of Microsoft's Windows Mobile in the smartphone market, according to data from AdMob, hitting a global 5 percent market share (in terms of access to mobile ads, not units shipped), while continuing to grow 25 percent month over month.

While Microsoft dominates on the desktop, with even its not-yet-released Windows 7 beating Linux, according to W3C data, Linux, and increasingly Google's Android flavor of Linux, is making a big push on smartphones.

To fuel this, Google has been upping its commitment to developers, most recently with an upgrade to its Android Market, but also pushing its handsets into an ever-widening array of handset manufacturers and wireless carriers, most recently Sprint.

I've suggested that the only way to beat Apple's iPhone is with a big commitment of resources. Google appears to be doing this, but in an intelligent way: it is trying to attract a wide community of developers to share the burden of beating the iPhone.

InfoWorld's Neil McAllister thinks it's not working, but I'm more sanguine. So long as Google invests marketing and development resources to Android, the open-source operating platform has a good chance.

And, importantly, so long as Google remains committed to mobile, there's a very good opportunity for other mobile open-source players to draft on its momentum. An entire open-source industry has grown up in the shadow of IBM's original $1 billion commitment to Linux.

The same can happen in mobile, and this time it will be Google's turn to lead.

Follow me on Twitter @mjasay.

The European Union undoubtedly believes it is taking a principled stance against the specter of antitrust as Oracle attempts to buy Sun Microsystems. As I've written, however, the EU's delay threatens to gift Sun's customers to IBM and other competitors while doing little to no good for its MySQL business. Worse still, the EU may be paving the way for Oracle to drop its bid, only to return to scoop up Sun's software assets at a rock-bottom price.

Think this is far-fetched? Consider the following (increasingly likely) scenario:

Let's say the EU holds up Oracle's acquisition of Sun by four months. In the technology world, this is an eternity. The lack of clarity around the business has already contributed to two woeful quarters from Sun, with Q4 revenue down 31 percent year-over-year.

Sun's revenue drop is bad, but it will almost certainly get worse the longer the EU drags out its "in-depth investigation." How much worse? Perhaps 50 percent. Heck, perhaps as bad as 80 percent. IBM and HP, in particular, have been crowing about hundreds of Sun customers jumping ship in the wake of Oracle's beleaguered acquisition. Thirty-one percent may come to seem like the good ol' days.

The sad thing is that the EU will almost certainly bow to the inevitable and withdraw its objections. It will look silly for holding up a deal on the specious grounds of MySQL's health (it's doing just fine, thank you, and isn't in danger of being lobotomized by Oracle, which likely will prove to be a better manager of this asset than Sun was).

The EU, unfortunately, is likely not to notice just how silly its stance was, and we'll see other companies go through the same rigamarole.

Regardless, Oracle isn't a silly company, and isn't going to pay top dollar for a diminished asset. It would not be surprising to see Oracle drop its offer by as much as 50 percent, claiming it's actually a premium as revenues are down by more than that. (There is precedent for this in Oracle's various offers for PeopleSoft.) Sun, ruined by this point, would have little choice but to capitulate.

All of which would make Oracle's acquisition of Sun's software business even better than before. As Larry Augustin noted, Oracle's $7.4 billion offer for Sun effectively valued the software at $0.00. Getting a better price on the hardware business and still buying the software business for $0.00? That sounds like a sweet deal.

After all, Oracle is primarily interested in Sun's software assets. Getting Sun for $3.7 billion would make it even easier to quickly flip Sun's hardware business to Fujitsu or HP at a profit, which some speculate is waiting in the wings to buy Sun's hardware business and which I noted back in March was considering a joint-bid on Sun with Oracle.

"Angelic" may not be the word most often associated with Oracle. "Shrewd" is more apt, and low-balling Sun after the EU scuppers its value is shrewd business indeed.

EU competition commissioner Neelie Kroes probably means well by holding up Oracle's acquisition of Sun, but the only group she's helping with the investigation is Oracle, which may end up getting Sun for half what it planned to pay. I'm sure Ellison will give her a ride on his yacht for her troubles.

Follow me on Twitter @mjasay.