Updated on Monday, June 15 at 2:20 p.m. PDT: adding multi-core discussion to earlier Windows update.
It's been four years this month since Apple announced it would drop the PowerPC architecture and switch to Intel's x86 design. One person involved in the back-and-forth between Apple and IBM at the time provides some insight into why it happened.
Apple laptop using the PowerPC G3 processor
(Credit: CNET Networks)When Apple made the watershed announcement in June 2005 ending its longstanding relationship with IBM and Motorola, Apple CEO Steve Jobs attributed the switch to a superior Intel roadmap.
"Looking ahead Intel has the strongest processor roadmap by far," Jobs said in a statement at the time. "It's been ten years since our transition to the PowerPC, and we think Intel's technology will help us create the best personal computers for the next ten years."
One oft-cited reason was that Apple didn't believe it could get the requisite performance per watt from processors being supplied by IBM and Freescale--formerly Motorola's chipmaking arm. Translation: Apple was worried about IBM's and Motorola's ability to deliver competitive processors for laptops. (Update: Another reason often put forward is that Apple simply wanted to be able to run Windows.)
A former IBM executive, who worked at IBM at the time and was involved in discussions with Apple, offered his perspective in a conversation we had during dinner at a recent technology conference. Let me emphasize that this is one person's opinion, not necessarily the gospel truth. I will not publish his name or title.
While he acknowledged the public reasons put forward by Apple, there was more to it--not surprisingly--than that. The upshot: Apple wanted better pricing, according to this person.
Apple was paying a premium for IBM silicon, he said, creating a Catch-22. IBM had to charge more because it didn't have the economies of scale of Intel, but Apple didn't want to pay more, even though it supposedly derived more from an inherently superior RISC design as manifested in the PowerPC architecture.
Here's what Jobs said in 2003: "The PowerPC G5 changes all the rules. This 64-bit race car is the heart of our new Power Mac G5, now the world's fastest desktop computer," Jobs said in a statement. "IBM offers the most advanced processor design and manufacturing expertise on earth, and this is just the beginning of a long and productive relationship." (Sounds suspiciously similar to what Jobs said about Intel after Apple made the switch.)
Despite the praise heaped on IBM's technology in 2003, Apple believed, by 2005, that it couldn't compete on cost, according to this person.
... Read moreAn Advanced Micro Devices executive claims that Intel and Apple cut a deal in 2005 that made Intel an exclusive supplier of processors to Apple, preventing AMD from gaining Apple business.
No AMD CPUs are currently used in Apple computers.
(Credit: Apple)The claim, made in a phone interview with Tom McCoy, AMD's senior vice president of legal affairs, earlier this week, holds that Intel has had a longstanding deal to be Apple's sole supplier of microprocessors. To date, Apple has not used an AMD central processing unit (CPU) in any of its products. Currently, only Intel CPUs populate Apple's laptop, desktop, and server lineups.
This assertion by AMD comes in the wake of the EU decision last week to fine Intel $1.45 billion for violating antitrust legislation. Last week's EU decision centered on whether Intel used illegal tactics to deny processor business to AMD at PC makers.
McCoy said that a deal was struck when Apple moved from the PowerPC (IBM-Motorola) chip architecture to the x86 (Intel-AMD) architecture. The transition was announced by Steve Jobs at the Worldwide Developers Conference in 2005.
"They made a deal when they were porting over from PowerPC to x86 as to how much Intel was willing to pay for that port. My guess is that Intel asked for and won exclusivity in return for the help that they gave Apple to port," McCoy said.
McCoy continued: "That deal will not be exclusive forever and when that exclusivity is over, I'm sure they (Apple) will choose on the merits. We'll have a chance to compete for Apple's business when Apple is ready," he said. Intel denies this allegation.
Though McCoy did not make any direct charge of illegal activity regarding such a deal, the assertion is not that far removed from charges made in the July 2005 AMD complaint against Intel. AMD, in that filing, cited Dell, among other examples of exclusive Intel deals with PC makers. "In its history, Dell has not purchased a single AMD x86 microprocessor despite acknowledging Intel shortcomings and customer clamor for AMD solutions, principally in the server sector...Dell has been and remains Intel-exclusive. According to industry reports, Intel has bought Dell's exclusivity with outright payments and favorable discriminatory pricing and service." (Note: Dell, in 2005, offered no AMD-based products, though it does today.)
Whether the deal is exclusive doesn't in itself constitute a legal argument, according to Joshua D. Wright of the George Mason University School of Law, who has written about the EU decision in a blog, "Truth on the Market." "Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show that the exclusive dealing arrangement harmed competition in the form of higher prices, lower output, or reduced innovation," Wright said, responding to an e-mail query.
... Read moreIn the wake of reported merger talks with IBM, Sun Microsystems executive vice president John Fowler talked about Big Blue as a rival.
Sun Microsystems executive vice president John Fowler
(Credit: Sun Microsystems)Fowler, in a phone interview Friday, discussed IBM as a competitor in the server computer market and the competitive differences between Intel and Advanced Micro Devices.
"IBM is obviously a classic competition space where we bring to bear all of our technology innovation," Fowler said. "In this particular case, how we've incorporated and done networking technology, how we've incorporated and done flash (memory). The fact that we have an open operating system that runs across our RISC platforms and our x86 platforms and that we have an open storage offering on the 7000," he said.
Fowler continued, "Those are all great discussions to go have with IBM customers. Those are all things that IBM just doesn't have and represent a significant amount of value."
In a question about comparing IBM--which also offers a RISC architecture server platform (PowerPC) as well Intel and AMD--to other competitors like Hewlett-Packard and Dell, Fowler said: "They (IBM) are more similar (to Sun) than the others and interested in more of the same things."
And how does Sun compete with larger rivals? "We have for decades now innovated in a marketplace where companies like HP and IBM have been consistently bigger than us. What we do is incorporate new technologies or invent new technologies more quickly," he said.
Fowler also spoke of some of the differences between Sun offerings on AMD and Intel platforms. He began by saying that a recent Intel Nehalem server chip announcement covers only two-socket (a socket accommodates one processor) servers and that Intel's product is an "entry level" product. "It's a solid product but it really applies to the volume entry-level systems in the world today," he said.
Fowler continued: "Obviously, AMD and (Sun) SPARC cover a much broader range of application scale. In AMD's case, extending up to eight-socket servers and in SPARC's case up to 64-socket servers," he said.
Updated at 3:45 p.m. PST with correction of Motorola, IBM executives' names.
Even the biggest chip companies churn out their share of flops. But the hype that surrounds these chips is more fascinating than the failures.
It's been almost a year since I posted A brief history of chip hype--and flops (part 1). Consider this Part 2.
Itanium
First, I have to revisit Intel's Itanium. Simply because it's still around and still missing production target dates.
Intel's Itanium has been relegated to obscurity if not practical oblivion
(Credit: Intel)The hype: "This design philosophy will one day replace RISC and CISC. It is a gateway into the 64-bit future." This copy was, at one time, posted on Hewlett-Packard's Web site. And analysts were drinking the Kool-Aid too. "I expect Itanium to replace Xeon, but not until 2003," one analyst said back in 2001. (Xeon is Intel's successful, lucrative line of server processors that doesn't include Itanium.)
The reality: Yes, Itanium is still warm, still breathing in the rarefied very-high-end server market--where it does have a limited role. But its architecture will never live in a desktop or laptop or even 99 percent of the servers as once thought. And it certainly hasn't remade the computer industry. And it is still chronically late. This time it's Tukwila that's tardy. The quad-core version of Itanium is late because Intel had to make "some engineering enhancements to the Tukwila platform," according to an Intel statement earlier this month. I can only guess that one day Intel will finally let this failed research project go cold and die quietly.
PowerPC
IBM's original PowerPC platform never lived up to the hype. Even when Motorola and IBM processors populated Apple computers.
The hype: "The PowerPC G5 changes all the rules. This 64-bit race car is the heart of our new Power Mac G5, now the world's fastest desktop computer," said Apple CEO Steve Jobs back in 2003. Jobs, a master of hype (also referred to as a Svengali-like reality-distortion field), continued with this precious quote. "IBM offers the most advanced processor design...and this is just the beginning of a long and productive relationship." (Emphasis added.)
The reality: Apple dumped IBM, Motorola, and the PowerPC in 2005 and it was revealed later that the Mac operating system had been leading "a secret double life" for about five years. But the PowerPC platform had really failed long before 2005. Look no further than these comments from an IBM marketing manager in this 1997 Electronic News article: "Many business school case histories will be written about this failure," Jesse Parker, marketing manager at IBM Micro, said at that time. "No one of the three companies involved in PowerPC executed on their plans. IBM didn't. Motorola didn't. And Apple didn't," he said.
The original PowerPC project was conceived by John Sculley, president and CEO of Apple, and Jack Kuehler, vice chairman of IBM. Phil Hester, an IBM manager at the time, and David Mothersole, a Motorola executive, where also instrumental in starting the project, known initially as "Somerset." But as the PowerPC came to market, Mr. Sculley was pushed out of Apple (and) Mr. Kuehler retired. Their replacements did not have the same enthusiasm for the PowerPC alliance, dooming the project.
In short, the PowerPC failed to challenge Intel in the PC market in a big way. (Though it has been reincarnated as IBM's Cell processor that powers Sony's PlayStation and the architecture still powers IBM servers.)
And I have my own vignette to relate that illustrates one reason why Apple eventually dropped the PowerPC. When Apple first began to crow about the dual-processor Power Mac (circa 2003), a neighbor of mine at the time bought into the hype and purchased an Apple Power Mac tower with two IBM G4 processors (this preceded the dual-processor G5 tower that followed soon after). This thing was a furnace. It quite literally raised the temperature in the room it was in, had about five fans too many, and was deafening, to boot. That was the first time I fully understood the magnitude of Apple's fabrications about IBM's "superior" PowerPC designs. (IBM's less-than-impressive--at that time--chip manufacturing process that was used for PowerPC processors also contributed to the problem.)
AMD Puma
Lastly, turning to Advanced Micro Devices, I'll try to look beyond the botched Barcelona launch in September of 2007 (as I've already covered this in Part 1) and focus instead on AMD's mobile "Puma" platform. Though I can't leave Barcelona entirely out of the discussion because there are some disturbing parallels. (Note: AMD's upcoming Yukon and Congo platforms offer some hope for mobile redemption.)
The hype: Like Barcelona, AMD had too much to say about Puma too long before it was real. AMD started pumping Puma back in April 2007 when the company did one of its many (infamous) soft launches (a PR strategy that it has thankfully ditched). This prompted some editorializing from me as well as other publications. "It is questionable whether...Puma will meet the hype AMD is currently trying to generate though these early announcements," according to a rare editorial from DigiTimes in 2007.
Things got even more dicey at the financial analyst day in December 2007 when AMD said Puma would be delayed until the second quarter of 2008.
It's not so much that Puma (aka Turion X2 Ultra coupled with ATI graphics) is a failure of epic proportions like Itanium, it's that the CPU component (separate from the ATI GPU component) fell so far short of the long, ballyhooed build-up it got.
And it is beaten consistently by Intel in the mobile marketplace. Here's an October 2008 CNET review of laptops with AMD's Turion X2 Ultra. "Turning to AMD's 2.0GHz Turion X2 Dual-Core RM-70 CPU might be an option if you're looking to keep costs down and have only basic computing needs," the review said. "The Acer Aspire 5735-4624 costs only $499 and uses a 2.0GHz Intel Pentium Dual Core T3200; it completed our multitasking benchmark test in one-third the time the HP G60 did. The HP G60 wasn't the last-place performer in our mainstream midprice holiday retail laptop roundup. That dubious distinction goes to the Toshiba Satellite L355D-S7825, also an AMD-powered system."
And there are more unfavorable comparisons. This review at Hexus.net of a Toshiba Satellite 300D with AMD Turion X2 Ultra ZM-80 said the Turion X2 Ultra CPU was "found wanting when compared to Centrino 2." The one bright spot was the ATI Mobility Radeon HD 3650 graphics card--but this speaks more about solid ATI technology than AMD's shaky Turion processor.
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