The Department of Defense's $1 trillion-plus plan to build and deliver multiple versions of the Joint Strike Force (JSF) aircraft to multiple customers is behind schedule, over budget, and upside down, according to a report from the Government Accounting Office (PDF).
Upside down because the military is accelerating procurement of operational aircraft before it has even taken delivery of test units, according to the non-partisan GAO.
(Credit:
Lockheed Martin)
"Procuring large numbers of production jets while still working to deliver test jets and mature manufacturing processes does not seem prudent," the report states.
The JSF program, personified by the F-35 Lighting II, is a joint international venture led by the United States and the United Kingdom. The report calls this the DOD's most complex and ambitious aircraft acquisition and the linchpin of the military's plan to modernize its tactical air forces.
Chronic manufacturing inefficiencies, parts problems, design changes, and a steep learning curve have slowed delivery of test aircraft, according to the watchdog agency, even as DOD wants to ramp up production of line aircraft. Speeding up the delivery of 169 aircraft by 2015 will require billions in additional funding, "magnifying the financial risk to the government" and adding years to the development schedule, according to the GAO.
Contractors say they'll have the problems fixed and all the test aircraft delivered by next year. But by that time, the DOD plans to have already purchased 62 operational aircraft, according to the report. As currently configured, the DOD is at liberty to spend $57 billion on 360 aircraft, even before it completes flight testing. The contractor has extended the manufacturing schedule three times.
In 2007, the DOD decided to cut back on test aircraft and flight tests and rely instead on "state-of-the-art simulation labs, a flying test bed, and desk studies to verify nearly 83 percent of JSF capabilities." Ground testing to this extent is not a proven substitute for actual test flights, the report warns.
The single-seat, single-engine multi-role strike fighter has something for everyone. It does stealth, air-to-air, close air support, tactical bombing, and air defense missions. It can take off and land on conventional runways, do short takeoff and vertical-landing, or land on a carrier. The project features a mixed bag of contractors as well, with Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems leading an international team of suppliers and manufacturers.
(Credit:
GAO)
Soaring cost estimates for protecting US borders against nuclear smuggling arrived at by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) are unreliable and could result in "significant" overruns, according to a Government Accounting Agency (GAO) report.
How significant? The projected cost to implement the Radiation Portal Monitor Program has gone from $399 million in 2003, when the Customs and Border Protection was in charge of the project, to $1.3 billion when DNDO took over in 2005. In 2007 the cost of equipping US ports with portal monitors was $1.7 billion. It's now $2.1 billion. But this latest estimate fails to take into account several major "cost elements". The true cost will be about $3.1 billion, but could go as high as $3.8 billion, according to the GAO.
DNDO did not follow Department of Homeland Security cost-estimating methodology or bother to document the estimating approach it did use, according to GAO. Further, when the GAO requested detailed documentation of DNDO's billion dollar portal monitor strategy, all it received was a one page spreadsheet of summary information, the report notes.(pdf)
Some of the price increase kicked in when DNDO sponsored the development of the next-generation, advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP.) These new portals not only detect radioactive material but also identify the source, thereby minimizing missed threats and greatly reducing false alarms, according to DNDO. The cost of these units has nearly doubled from around $576,400 to $800,000.
This is not first time GAO, (the nonpartisan audit and investigative arm of Congress,) has come down on DNDO, a relatively new agency establishment under the aegis of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2005.
In 2007, the government watchdog accused the office of using biased methods to enhance performance results in testing the new detection portals. When preliminary tests were conducted, the defense contractors who were bidding on the job were allowed access to the results, allowing them to adjust their systems accordingly, GAO charged.
Preventing nuclear and radioactive material from being smuggled into the United States became a major security concern after 9-11. A common fear is that the stuff could be used by terrorists in a nuclear weapon or a "dirty bomb", even though that possibility remains highly theoretical.
The price tag on the Marine Corps' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (PDF) has gone up 168 percent--just one of the military's flagship programs that cost more, take longer to produce, and deliver less, according to a government report.
(Credit:
GDLS)
The military has doubled the amount it will spend on new weapons systems since 2000, but many are behind schedule or cannot deliver on the crucial technological innovations, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) found in an annual review of 72 high-profile programs.
Proposed spending has rocketed from $790 billion to $1.6 trillion since 2000, a 26 percent increase, according to the congressional watchdog agency. But more money has not meant better results. Even at increased costs, the GAO found, weapons programs are failing to deliver promised capabilities and are almost never on time. This means that the military must settle for "suboptimal" acquisitions and late delivery to the battlefield, even though the "warfighter's urgent need" is what's often cited when these weapon systems are pitched.
The average delay is 21 months, according to the report. Of all the programs assessed, none had met the "best-practices standards" for mature technologies, stable design, or mature production, which are essential to meet cost, schedule, and performance targets.
(Credit:
GAO)
Money misspent on weapon systems means not only reduced buying power for defense, but also less money for other priorities--such as the global war on terror and growing entitlement programs, Acting Comptroller General Gene L. Dodaro warned Congress.
The report identified four major problems with the Defense Department's acquisition process: program changes (63 percent of performance requirements changed mid-stream), frequent program manager turnover (making it hard to hold anyone accountable), reliance on private contractors to support and oversee contracts (fox guarding the hen house), and weapon systems dependent on increasingly complex, yet-to-be-developed software (we need more H-1B visas).
(Credit:
Project SHAD)
Thousands of people who may have been exposed to chemical or biological agents during military tests remain unaccounted for, and the Defense Department and Department of Veterans Affairs have given up on tracking them down, according to a new report.
Some of the tests were conducted as part of a weapons testing program known as "Project 112." In others (click here for PDF), individuals were intentionally exposed to hazardous substances such as blister, nerve, and biological agents as well as LSD and PCP, according to a Government Accounting Office report (PDF).
Any veterans who believe they have sustained a disability from exposure during testing may file a claim (PDF) for compensation with the VA.
The DOD stopped actively searching for test subjects in 2003 "but did not provide a sound and documented basis for that decision," the GAO reported. At the time, it had identified 5,842 service members and about 350 civilians as having been potentially exposed during Project 112 alone (PDF). It is estimated that tens of thousands of military and personnel and civilians may have been exposed over the last 60 years.
(Credit:
VFW)
However, in 2004 the GAO reported that there was still a chance that additional test subjects could be located, and it recommended that the DOD determine the feasibility of continuing the search. Instead, the Pentagon determined that it had reached "a point of diminishing returns" and called it off; a decision not supported by an "objective analysis of the potential costs and benefits of continuing the effort," the congressional agency charged.
Further, the GAO found that the Pentagon's efforts lacked oversight, clear and consistent objectives, and most of all transparency, because it had not kept Congress or veterans organizations fully informed of its progress, or lack thereof.
The DOD was pretty much an equal-opportunity employer when it came to its human test subjects--healthy adults, psychiatric patients, and prison inmates were all used. In some instances, service members who consented to serve as test subjects found themselves participating in experiments quite different from the one they had been pitched when they volunteered, according to the report.
Also known as "Project SHAD" ("Shipboard Hazard and Defense"), the highly classified Project 112 was started in 1962 to determine the vulnerability of U.S. warships to chemical and biological attacks. In this case, service members and civilians were not the test subjects, but rather conducted the tests on animals, in some cases with foreign observers present, according to the DOD. Veterans of the tests tell another story.
The same week this GAO report came out, a federal judge ruled, in dismissing a lawsuit brought by individual members of the military, that there is no reason for troops to second-guess the Food and Drug Administration when it comes to the safety of anthrax vaccinations. DOD says the shots are now mandatory. If this means you, make sure you leave a forwarding address.
A new report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office charges that the Department of Homeland Security used biased methods to enhance performance results in tests on a new generation of radiation detectors meant to protect U.S. ports.
At stake are $1.2 billion in contracts to produce advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors and thousands of lives should they fail to work.
Experts from four national laboratories were consulted prior to publication of the report (PDF) by the GAO, the nonpartisan audit and investigative arm of Congress, which was released yesterday.
(Credit:
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office)
The agency found that the DHS' Domestic Nuclear Detection Office "used biased test methods that enhanced the performance of ASPs." Specifically, it conducted preliminary tests and then allowed contractors access to the results, which they then used to adjust systems accordingly.
It is "highly unlikely that such favorable conditions" would be found in a real-world situation, the GAO report deadpanned.
Portals in use today detect radiation but cannot distinguish between different types. This leads to expensive and time-consuming delays at ports of entry when customs officers respond to false alarms, according to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. To remedy this, DHS sponsored research on new technology to enhance detection capabilities at the nation's ports. In 2006, it awarded contracts to three companies based on performance tests in Nevada the previous year: Raytheon, Thermo Electron and Canberra Industries.
The GAO, however, was not convinced that any "additional detection capability provided by the ASPs was worth the considerable additional costs." The accounting agency found that the DHS had no sound basis for spending taxpayer money and "relied on assumptions of anticipated performance instead of actual test data." It recommended further testing and a rigorous cost-benefit analysis.
It wasn't the first time that problems had been found in the procurement process. In a March 2007 report (PDF), the GAO concluded that DHS' decision to procure and deploy the new equipment was not supported by the cost and suggested that the department come up with some "objective" assessments of ASP capability.
The question was whether the new equipment, at six times the cost of current models, was better able to detect radiation through different masking materials, such as a lead. The GAO charged that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office did not test portal limitations or make any effort to replicate the material that would be used to mask a radiation source from detection, a "critical oversight in DNDO's original test plan." Instead, the detection office is attempting to get off the hook by substituting what are essentially computer simulations that are not comparable with "actual testing with nuclear and masking materials," according to the GAO.
The GAO recommended that production of the new portal monitors be delayed until the DHS provides a "sound analytical basis for its decision to purchase and deploy the new technology."
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