UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ)
MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
Defendant.

____________________________________

STATE OF NEW YORK, ex rel.

Attorney General ELIOT SPITZER,
et al.,
Plaintiffs and
Counterclaim-Defendants,
v.Civil Action No. 98-1233 (TPJ)
MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
Defendant and
Counterclaim-Plaintiff.

____________________________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT..........................................................................................................1

PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ............................................................................................1

A. California State Law Claims ...............................................................................................................2

B. Connecticut State Law Claims ............................................................................................................5

C. District of Columbia Law Claims ........................................................................................................8

D. Florida State Law Claims ....................................................................................................................9

E. Illinois State Law Claims ..................................................................................................................13

F. Iowa State Law Claims .....................................................................................................................14

G. Kansas State Law Claims .................................................................................................................16

H. Kentucky State Law Claims .............................................................................................................18

I. Louisiana State Law Claims ..............................................................................................................19

J. Maryland State Law Claims .............................................................................................................22

K. Massachusetts State Law Claims .....................................................................................................24

L. Michigan State Law Claims ..............................................................................................................26

M. Minnesota State Law Claims ........................................................................................................... 27

N. New Mexico State Law Claims ....................................................................................................... 29

O. New York State Law Claims ............................................................................................................31

P. North Carolina State Law Claims .....................................................................................................33

Q. Ohio State Law Claims .....................................................................................................................35

R. Utah State Law Claims .....................................................................................................................37

S. West Virginia State Law Claims .......................................................................................................38

T. Wisconsin State Law Claims ............................................................................................................40

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................................42

15 U.S.C. § 1 and §2 (1994) (Sherman Act) passim
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994) 6, 21
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994) (Federal Trade Commission Act § 5) passim
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994) 1
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 10/11 (West 1999) 13
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 10/3(2) (West 1999) 14
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 10/3(3) (West 1999) 13, 14
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 10/3(4) (West 1999) 13, 14
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720 (West 1999) 2-5
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16726 (West 1999) 2-5
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16727 (West 1999) 3
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (West 1999) 3-5
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-26 (1999) 5-8
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-27 (1999) 5, 7
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-28 (1999) 6-8
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-29 (1999) 6
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-44b (1999) 5
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-24, et seq. (1999) (Connecticut Antitrust Act 5
D.C. Code Ann. § 28-4502 (1996) 8, 9
D.C. Code Ann. § 28-4503 (1996) 8, 9
D.C. Code Ann. § 28-4515 (1996) 8
Fla. Stat. ch. 501.201 et seq. (1999) (Florida Antitrust Act of 1980) 11
Fla. Stat. ch. 501.204(1) (1999) 11
Fla. Stat. ch. 501.204(2) (1999) 11
Fla. Stat. ch. 542.16 (1999) 10
Fla. Stat. ch. 542.18 (1999) 12
Fla. Stat. ch. 542.19 (1999) 12
Fla. Stat. ch. 542.25 (1999) 10
Fla. Stat. ch. 542.32 (1999) 10
Iowa Code § 553.2 (1997) 15
Iowa Code § 553.4 (1997) 15, 16
Iowa Code § 553.5 (1997) 15, 16
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-101 (1994) 16, 17
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-132 (1994) 16, 17
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-101 et seq. (1994) 17, 18
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.170 (Michie 1996) 18, 19
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.175(1) (Michie 1996) 18, 19
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.175(2) (Michie 1996) 18, 19
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:122 (West 1986) 19-21
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:123 (West 1986) 20, 21
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:124 (West 1986) 21
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:132 (West 1986) 20
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:133 (West 1987) 20 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1401 et seq. (West 1986) (Unfair Trade and Consumer Protection Law) 20, 22
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1405 (West 1986) 20, 21
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1406(4) (West 1986) 20
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A 25, 26
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, sec. 2. 24
Md. Com. Law II Code Ann. § 11-202(a)(2) (1990) 22
Md. Com. Law II Code Ann. § 11-204(a)(1) (1990) 22, 23
Md. Com. Law II Code Ann. § 11-204(a)(2) (1990) 22, 23
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.772 (1989) 27
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.773 (1989) 26
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.784(2) (1989) 26
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 445.771 to .788 (1989) 26
Minn. Stat. § 325D.51 (1998) 27
Minn. Stat. § 325D.52 (1998) 28
Minn. Stat. § 325D.53 (1998) 27
Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.49 to .66 (1998) 27
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1 (1999) 33-35
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (1999) 33-35
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-2.1. (1999) 33-35
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-1 (Michie 1995) 29, 30
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-15 (Michie 1995) 29, 30
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-2 (Michie 1995) 29, 30
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-1-1 to 57-1-19 (Michie 1995) (New Mexico Antitrust Act) 29
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 340 et seq. (McKinney 1988) (Donnelly Act) 31-33
Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1331.01 to .99 (Anderson 1993) (Valentine Act) 35-37
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-914 (1999) 37, 38
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-926 (1999) 37
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-911 to 926 (1999) (Utah Antitrust Act) 37
W.Va. Code State R. tit. 142, § 15-3 (1991) 39
W.Va. Code § 47-18-3 (1999) 38-40
W.Va. Code § 47-18-4 (1999) 38, 39
W.Va. Code §§ 47-18-1 to -23 (1999) (West Virginia Antitrust Act) 38, 39
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 133.03(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998) 40, 41
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 133.03(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998) 40, 41
Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 133.01 to 133.18 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998) (Wisconsin Trusts and Monopolies Act) 40

The plaintiff States (the "States") respectfully submit this Memorandum and Proposed Conclusions of Law pursuant to this Court's Scheduling Order No. 7, filed November 5, 1999. This memorandum, which is limited to claims asserted under state antitrust and unfair competition laws, supplements the memorandum submitted jointly by the United States and the States, which treats the plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims, and which the States incorporate herein by reference.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

As this Court has observed, state antitrust laws "are based upon and largely emulate the federal scheme." United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14231 at *90 (D.D.C. 1998), (citing California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989)). Accordingly, there has largely been no need, in the Proposed Conclusions of Law set forth below, to duplicate the extensive showing made in the plaintiffs' joint memorandum that this Court's Findings of Fact, issued November 5, 1999, establish multiple violations of both federal and state antitrust laws. Instead, the Proposed Conclusions of Law are supported largely by authorities establishing, for each State, the extent to which the standard of liability under that State's antitrust or unfair competition law runs parallel to its federal counterparts.

1. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994) over those claims by the States (including the District of Columbia) based on alleged violations of the state antitrust and/or unfair competition laws of each state. Microsoft's anti-competitive practices in violation of federal and state antitrust, or related, laws have caused, and threaten to cause, damage to the general welfare and economies of each of the plaintiff States.
2. The Court, having made findings of fact and stated its conclusions of law with respect to the Sherman Act claims (sections 1 and 2) (15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 (1994)) of the United States and the States, has applied said findings and conclusions to the state law claims of each state, and on that basis states certain additional conclusions of law with respect to each State, as follows:

1. California's antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, provides

2. It shall be unlawful for any person to lease or make a sale or contract for the sale of goods, merchandise, machinery, supplies, commodities for use within the State, or to fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, merchandise, machinery, supplies, commodities, or services of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of trade or commerce in any section of the State.

   Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §16727 (West 1999).

3. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is also a violation of (i) California's antitrust law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16720, 16726 and 16727), People v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 174 Cal.Rptr. 728, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) ("under section 16727, (and the Clayton Act), a tie-in is illegal if the seller (1) enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the tying product or if a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product is restrained . . . . while sections 16720 and 16726 (and Sherman Act) tyings are not illegal unless both conditions exist . . . ."), and (ii) California's Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (West 1999)), first, because a violation of federal antitrust law is also a violation of section 17200, Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("Virtually any state, federal or local law can serve as the predicate for an action under Business and Professions Code section 17200"); Saunders v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr.2d 438, 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("practices prohibited by section 17200 are any practices forbidden by law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state . . . or court made"); People v. McKale, 602 P.2d 731, 733 (Cal. 1979) ("anything that can properly be called a business practice and at the same time is forbidden by law" (citations omitted)); accord Schwartz v. Upper Deck, 967 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Cal. 1997); Ballard v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (E.D. Cal. 1998), and, second, because a violation of California antitrust law is also a violation of section 17200. People v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 735-737.
4. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, is also a violation of California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, first because a violation of federal antitrust law is also a violation of section 17200, as set forth in para. 4, supra, and, second, because Microsoft's conduct in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also an "unfair" business practice in violation of section 17200. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone, 973 P.2d 527, 544 (Cal. 1999) (violation of section 17200 based on conduct which "threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.")
5. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, first because a violation of federal antitrust law is also a violation of section 17200 as set forth in para. 4, supra, and second, because Microsoft's conduct in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also an "unfair" business practice in violation of section 17200. Cel-Tech Communications, 973 P.2d at 544.
6. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs (Internet service providers), OLSs (on-line service providers) and ICPs (Internet content providers), found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of (i) California's antitrust law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16720 and 16726), Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc., 484 P.2d 953, 961 (Cal. 1971) (Court adopts rule of reason as set forth in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)) and (ii) California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, first because they are in violation of federal antitrust law and second, because they are in violation of California's antitrust law, as set forth in para. 4, supra.
7. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), are also in violation of (i) California's antitrust law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16720 and 16726), Saxer v. Philip Morris, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) and (ii) California's Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), first because they are in violation of federal antitrust law and second, because they are in violation of California's antitrust law, as set forth in para. 4, supra.

B. Connecticut State Law Claims

8. The Connecticut Antitrust Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-24 to 35-49 (1999)) was intentionally patterned after the antitrust law of the federal government. See generally Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, 664 A.2d 719 (Conn. 1995); State v. Hossan-Maxwell, Inc., 436 A.2d 284 (Conn. 1980); Roncari Development Co. v. GMG Enterprises, Inc., 718 A.2d 1025, 1031-1032 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997) ("We follow federal precedent when we interpret the act unless . . . other pertinent state law, requires us to interpret it differently" (citations omitted).) Indeed, the Connecticut legislature has expressly provided that "the courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the federal courts to federal antitrust statutes." Conn. Gen. Stat. §35-44b.
9. Section 35-26 makes unlawful "[e]very contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of any part of trade or commerce . . ." Section 35-27 provides "Every contract, combination, or conspiracy to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or monopolization of any part of trade or commerce is unlawful." Section 35-28 has no direct counterpart in the federal antitrust laws. It is a codification of federal case law pertaining to per se violations of the Sherman Act. The section states in relevant part:

[E]very contract, combination, or conspiracy is unlawful when the same are for the purpose, or have the effect, of... (b) fixing, controlling, maintaining, limiting, or discontinuing the production, manufacture, mining, sale, or supply of any part of trade or commerce; ... or (d) refusing to deal, or coercing, persuading, or inducing third parties to refuse to deal with another person.

Section 35-29 is the Connecticut counterpart to Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994). The law applies to both commodities and services and makes unlawful "[e]very lease, sale or contract . . . on the condition or understanding that the lessee or purchaser shall not deal in the services or commodities of a competitor . . . ."

10. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is also a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-26 and 35-29. Because Connecticut's Antitrust Act is patterned after and interpreted consistently with federal law, a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act constitutes a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-26. Under Conn. Gen. Stat. §35-29, which is patterned after §3 of the Clayton Act, a tying arrangement will be deemed unlawful if the tying product and the tied product are distinct; the seller conditions its sale of the tying product on the buyer's purchase of the tied product; and either the seller has sufficient economic power in the tying product or the arrangement has a not insubstantial effect on commerce in the tied item. State v. Hossan-Maxwell, 436 A.2d at 288.

1. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §35-27 because, as set forth in para. 9, supra, Connecticut's statute is patterned after and interpreted consistently with federal law. Westport Taxi Service, 664 A.2d at 729, states, "Monopolization requires possession and willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power. . . . Monopoly power is power to fix or control prices or to exclude or control competition in the relevant market." (citations omitted).

11. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of the Connecticut Antitrust Act because, as set forth in para. 9, supra, it is patterned after the antitrust law of the federal government, and because Microsoft's conduct is also in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-27. Westport Taxi Service,664 A.2d at 729, provides, "[A]ttempt to monopolize requires a showing of predatory or anti-competitive conduct directed at accomplishing an unlawful purpose."
12. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs and ICPs found by this court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Connecticut's antitrust law, first, because Connecticut antitrust law follows federal antitrust law, as set forth in para. 9, supra, and second, because they are in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-26 and 35-28. Microsoft's exclusive dealing arrangements violate these sections of the Connecticut Antitrust Act in addition to violating federal antitrust law. See Elida, Inc. v. Harmor Realty Corp., 413 A.2d 1226 (Conn. 1979) (indicating that a rule of reason analysis should be applied to an exclusive dealing arrangement).
13. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEM's or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Connecticut's antitrust law because Connecticut antitrust precedent, as set forth in para. 9, supra, holds that Connecticut looks to federal law in the interpretation of its Antitrust Act, and because this conduct is in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-26 and 35-28, as set forth in para. 14, supra. The restraints imposed by Microsoft were patently unreasonable. In assessing the reasonableness of commercial conduct, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held:

To satisfy th[e] requirement of reasonableness, we have stated that the restraint must be limited in its operation with respect to time and place and afford no more than a fair and just protection to the interests of the party in whose favor it was to operate, without unduly interfering with the public interest.

Elida, Inc.,41 A.2d at 1230. The restrictions imposed by Microsoft unreasonably restrain trade in violation of Sections 35-28(b) and 35-29 of the Connecticut Antitrust Act.

C. District of Columbia Law Claims

14. The District of Columbia Antitrust Act states that, in construing its provisions, a court "may use as a guide interpretations given by federal courts to comparable antitrust statutes." D.C. Code Ann. § 28-4515 (1996). Section 1 of the Sherman Act is comparable to section 28-4502 of the D.C. Code, which declares to be illegal "[e]very contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce all or any part of which is within the District of Columbia." Section 2 of the Sherman Act is comparable to section 28-4503 of the D.C. Code, which makes it unlawful "for any person to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce, all or any part of which is within the District of Columbia." Johnson v. Greater Southeast Community Hospital Corp., 951 F.2d 1268, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (describing D.C. Code §§ 28-4502 and 28-4503 as "comparable" to §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act); Johnson v. Greater Southeast Community Hospital Corp., 903 F. Supp. 140, 145 (D.D.C. 1995) (same).
15. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is also a violation of D.C. Code Ann. § 28-4502, as set forth in para. 16, supra.
16. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of D.C. Code Ann. § 28-4503, as set forth in para. 16, supra.
17. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of D.C. Code Ann. § 28-4503, as set forth in para. 16, supra.
18. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of D.C. Code Ann. § 28-4502, as set forth in para. 16, supra.
19. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of D.C. Code Ann. § 28-4502, as set forth in para. 16, supra.

D. Florida State Law Claims

20. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute violations of federal antitrust laws also constitute violations of the antitrust and unfair competition laws of the State of Florida. "The [Florida] Legislature declares it to be the purpose of [the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980] to complement the body of federal law prohibiting restraints of trade or commerce in order to foster effective competition. It is the intent of the [Florida] Legislature that this act be liberally construed to accomplish its beneficial purpose." Fla. Stat. ch. 542.16 (1999). Accordingly, "[i]t is the intent of the [Florida] Legislature that, in construing this chapter, due consideration and great weight be given to the interpretations of the federal courts relating to comparable federal antitrust statutes." Fla. Stat. ch. 542.32 (1999). Accord St. Petersburg Yacht Charters, Inc. v. Morgan Yacht, Inc., 457 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ( "[T]he Florida legislature has, in effect, adopted as the law of Florida the body of antitrust law developed by the federal courts under the Sherman Act.") Furthermore, a final judgment entered against a defendant "in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by the United States Department of Justice under comparable federal [antitrust] laws, shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any civil action or proceeding under [the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980]." Fla. Stat. ch. 542.25 (1999).
21. Section 542.18 of the Florida Antitrust Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce." This section is "the counterpart of section 1 of the Sherman Act." St. Petersburg Yacht Charters, Inc. v. Morgan Yacht, Inc., 457 So.2d at 1032. Section 542.19 makes it "unlawful for any person to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce." This section is "the counterpart of section 2 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 1032.
22. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to its operating system constitutes a violation of The Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, because a violation of §1 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Fla. Stat. ch. 542.18 (1999) for the reasons set forth in paras. 22 and 23 supra, and the elements of a tying claim under Fla. Stat. ch. 542.18 parallel the elements of a tying claim under the Sherman Act. See Day v. Le-Jo Enters., Inc., 521 So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
23. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to its operating system constitutes a violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), Fla. Stat. ch. 501.201, et seq. (1999). Section 501.204(1) states: "Unfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."

Section 501.204(2) provides that in determining what constitutes an "unfair method of competition" under subsection 501.204(1), "due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)." Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act encompasses violations of the antitrust laws. See FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454-55, 106 S.Ct. 2009, 2015-16, 90 L.Ed.2d 445 (1986) (finding that antitrust violations are unfair methods of competition under the FTC Act).

Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Thus, the acts proscribed by subsection 501.204(1) include antitrust violations. Because the tying arrangement is an antitrust violation, it is also a violation of the FDUTPA. Furthermore, the proscribed conduct independently constitutes an "unfair" business practice in violation of the FDUTPA. No specific rule or regulation is needed in order to find that a business practice is unfair or deceptive for the purposes of the FDUTPA. See Department of Legal Affairs v. Father and Son Moving & Storage, Inc., 643 So.2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). "A practice was 'unfair' under the federal statute when it 'offends established public policy and when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.'" Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citations omitted).

24. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal maintenance of Microsoft's monopoly in PC operating systems constitutes a violation of The Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, because a violation of §2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Fla. Stat. ch. 542.19 (1999) for the reasons set forth in paras. 22 and 23 supra.
25. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal maintenance of Microsoft's monopoly in PC operating systems also constitutes a violation of the FDUTPA, because 1) the conduct constitutes a violation of §2 of the Sherman Act, and 2) the conduct constitutes an"unfair" business practice in violation of the FDUTPA, for the reasons set forth in para. 25 supra.
26. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers constitutes a violation of (a) the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, because a violation of §2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Fla. Stat. ch. 542.19 (1999) for the reasons set forth in paras. 22 and 23 supra; and (b) the FDUTPA, because 1) the conduct constitutes a violation of §2 of the Sherman Act, and 2) the conduct constitutes an "unfair" business practice in violation of the FDUTPA, for the reasons set forth in para. 25 supra.
27. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs and ICPs constitute violations of (a) the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, because a violation of §1 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Fla. Stat. ch. 542.18 (1999) for the reasons set forth in paras. 22 and 23 supra; and (b) the FDUTPA, because 1) the conduct constitutes a violation of §1 of the Sherman Act, and 2) the conduct constitutes an "unfair" business practice in violation of the FDUTPA, for the reasons set forth in para. 25 supra.
28. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEM's, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints of trade, constitute violations of (a) the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, because a violation of §1 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Fla. Stat. ch. 542.18 (1999) for the reasons set forth in paras. 22 and 23 supra; and (b) the FDUTPA, because 1) the conduct constitutes violations of §1 of the Sherman Act, and 2) the conduct constitutes "unfair" business practices in violation of the FDUTPA, for the reasons set forth in para. 25 supra.

E. Illinois State Law Claims

29. Illinois law provides that federal court interpretations of federal antitrust laws containing language the same as or similar to the Illinois Antitrust Act shall be used as a guide in interpreting the Illinois Antitrust Act. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/11 (West 1999). The Illinois Antitrust Act provides, in part, that it is a violation of the Act to:

Lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise.....or other commodities, or services.....whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, enjoyment, or resale, or fix a price charged thereof, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise . . . or other commodity or service . . . of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale or contract for such sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.

740 Ill. Comp. Stat. §10/3(4) (West 1999). Section10/3(3) of the Illinois Antitrust Act also provides that it is a violation of the Act to "maintain, use, or attempt to acquire monopoly power over any substantial part of trade or commerce of [Illinois] for the purpose of excluding competition or of controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in such trade or commerce." See People v. Crawford Distrib. Co., 291 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. 1972).

30. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is a violation of Illinois' Antitrust Act, 740 Ill Comp. Stat. 10/3(4). See People ex rel. Scott v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 315 N.E.2d 124 (Ill. App. Ct.1974); Maywood Sportservice, Inc. v. Maywood Park Trotting Ass'n, 302 N.E.2d 79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); People ex rel. Scott v. Schwulst Bldg. Ctr., Inc. 432 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. 1982).
31. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of a monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. §10/3(3), as set forth in para. 31, supra.
32. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is a violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act (740 Ill. Comp. Stat. §10/3(3)), as set forth in para. 31 supra. Weinberg v. Chicago Blackhawk Hockey Team, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 1322 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
33. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/3(4), as set forth in para. 31, supra.
34. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also violations of the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/3(2) and 10/3(3), as set forth in para. 31, supra.

F. Iowa State Law Claims

35. Iowa's antitrust laws are to be "construed to complement and be harmonized with the applied laws of the United States which have the same or similar purpose as this chapter. . . . This construction . . . shall be made to achieve uniform application of the state and federal laws prohibiting restraints of economic activity and monopolistic practices." Iowa Code § 553.2 (1997). Iowa Code § 553.4 (1997) provides "A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons shall not restrain or monopolize trade or commerce in a relevant market." Iowa Code § 553.5 (1997) prohibits monopolization, stating "A person shall not attempt to establish or establish, maintain, or use a monopoly of trade or commerce in a relevant market for the purpose of excluding competition or of controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices." See, e.g., Double D Spotting Service v. Supervalu, Inc., 136 F.3d 554, 558 (8^th Cir. 1998) (Finding of inadequate allegation of per se violations of federal antitrust laws and product market applied to claims under Iowa statutes which "mirror [the] federal prohibitions [Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2], absent the interstate commerce element,") Davies v. Genesis Medical Center, 994 F. Supp. 1078, 1103 (S.D. Iowa 1998) (Failure to allege antitrust injury, lack of standing, failure to establish relevant product or geographic market result in dismissal of federal claims and therefore state claims under Iowa Competition Law); Federal Land Bank v. Tiffany, 529 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa 1995) (Defendants found to be exempt from application of federal antitrust law are therefore also exempt from Iowa Competition Law); Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 477 N.W.2d 678, 684-86 (Iowa 1991) (State action exemption applicable to federal antitrust laws found to be applicable to Iowa Competition Law claims based on required congruency with federal scheme); Iowa v. Cedar Rapids Bd. of Realtors, 300 N.W.2d 127, 128 (Iowa 1981) (Refusal to deal found not violative of Iowa Competition Law based on authorities interpreting and applying federal antitrust law).
36. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is also a violation of Iowa Code § 553.4, as set forth in para. 37, supra.
37. Microsoft=s illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of the Iowa Competition Law, Iowa Code § 553.5, as set forth in para. 37, supra.
38. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of the Iowa Competition Law, Iowa Code § 553.5, as set forth in para. 37, supra.
39. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs, and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of the Iowa Competition Law, Iowa Code §553.4, as set forth in para. 37, supra.
40. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of the Iowa Competition Law, Iowa Code § 553.4, as set forth in para. 37, supra.

G. Kansas State Law Claims

2. Kansas law provides that it is illegal to combine or conspire to "create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce, or aids to commerce, or to carry out restrictions in the full and free pursuit of any business authorized or permitted by the laws of this state;" to "prevent competition in the manufacture, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or commodities, or to prevent competition in aids to commerce" and to "preclude a free and unrestricted competition . . . in transportation, sale or manufacture of any such article or commodity." Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-101 (1994). Section 50-132 prohibits persons doing business in the state from conspiring or combining with any person within or without the state "for the purpose of monopolizing any line of business." Kan. Stat. Ann. §50-132.

41. The conduct which the court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is also a violation of Kansas Antitrust Law, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-101 et seq., because the effect of Microsoft's actions was to restrain commerce, fix or control prices, or prevent competition.
42. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this court to be a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. §50-132. Patterson v. Imperial Window Glass Co., 137 P. 955, 957 (Kan. 1914) (contract was held invalid because "by it and other similar contracts, the company sought to control the output and price of window-glass factories throughout the country" and court has "no hesitation" in finding it violates federal and state laws.)
43. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Kansas Antitrust Law (Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-101 et seq.), Microsoft's conduct in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is a "restriction on trade" in violation of §50-101, Patterson v. Imperial Window Glass, 137 P. 955.
44. The exclusive dealings arrangements between Microsoft and the ISPs, OLSs and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Kansas Antitrust Law (Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-101 et seq.), Southwest Kansas Oil & Gas Co. v. Argus Pipe Line Co., 39 P.2d 906, 910 (Kan. 1935) (The Kansas Supreme Court generally applies the rule of reason, "a bargain in the restraint of trade is illegal, not if there is restraint, but if the restraint be unreasonable.").
45. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Kansas Antitrust Law (Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-101 et seq.), Southwest Kansas Oil & Gas, 39 P.2d at 910.

H. Kentucky State Law Claims

46. Kentucky's antitrust law, is analogous to the Sherman Antitrust Act and declares unlawful " [e]very contract, combination in the form of trust and otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce. . . ." Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.175(1) (Michie 1996). It also makes illegal monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.175(2) (Michie 1996). In general, Kentucky courts view federal court interpretations of the Sherman Act as persuasive authority for interpreting section 367.175, the analogous Kentucky statute. Mendel v. Golden-Farley of Hopkinsville, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (Kentucky antitrust statute construed in light of and consistent with Sherman Antitrust Act); Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 502 (E.D. Ky. 1996) ("The parties agree that the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act is virtually identical to the Sherman Antitrust Act and has been interpreted as such.") Furthermore, violations of Kentucky's antitrust statute also constitute a "false, unfair, misleading or deceptive practice" prohibited by the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.170 (Michie 1996).
47. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is also a violation of Kentucky's antitrust law, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.175 and Consumer Protection Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.170 for the reasons set forth in para. 49, supra.
48. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 367.175 and 367.170 for the reasons set forth in para. 49, supra.
49. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 367.175 and 367.170 for the reasons set forth in para. 49, supra.
50. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs and ICPs, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 367.175 and 367.170 for the reasons set forth in para. 49, supra.
51. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also are in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 367.175 and 367.170 for the reasons set forth in para. 49, supra.

I. Louisiana State Law Claims

52. Louisiana's antitrust law is analogous to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 51-122 of Louisiana's antitrust law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:122 (West 1987), provides "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in this state is illegal." Section 51-123, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §51:123 (West 1987), provides "No person shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine, or conspire with any other person to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce within this state." "Because La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:122 is a counterpart to § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act should be a persuasive influence on the interpretation of our own state enactment." Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 493 So.2d 1149, 1158 (La. 1986). Sections 51:132 and 133 provide that a final judgment in any criminal or civil proceeding brought by the United States under its antitrust laws shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of Louisiana law and evidence in the record of any court of the United States shall be received by a Louisiana judge as evidence in a Louisiana proceeding. Louisiana's Unfair Trade and Consumer Protection Law includes a counterpart to section 5 of the FTC Act, which declares unlawful "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §51:1405 (West 1986).
53. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is also a violation of (i) Louisiana's antitrust law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:122, for the reasons set forth in para. 55, supra; and (ii) Louisiana's Unfair Trade and Consumer Protection Law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1401, et seq., first, because Louisiana's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law is modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA") and the federal jurisprudence under the FTCA is incorporated into the Louisiana statute, State v. Orkin Exterminating Company, Inc., 528 So.2d 198, 202 n.3 (La. App. 1988), see also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1406(4); and second, because unfair methods of competition are condemned under the Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1405.
54. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of (i) La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:123, Louisiana's counterpart to the section, as set forth in para. 55, supra; and, (ii) is also an unfair method of competition condemned by La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 51:1405, as set forth in para. 56, supra.
55. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of (i) La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:123, Louisiana's counterpart to the section, as set forth in para. 55, supra; and, (ii) is also an unfair method of competition condemned by La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 51:1405, as set forth in para. 56, supra.
56. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs, and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of (i) La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:122 as set forth in para. 55, supra, (ii) La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 51:124, the Louisiana counterpart to Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which forbids exclusive dealing arrangements, International Salt Co., Inc., v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947), quoting Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, aff'd 312 U.S. 457 (1941) ("It is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market.") ; and (iii) La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1405, as set forth in para. 56, supra.
57. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of (i) La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:122 for the reasons set forth in para. 55, supra; and (ii) La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1401 et seq., for the reasons stated in para. 56, supra.

J. Maryland State Law Claims

58. Maryland's Antitrust Act, Md. Com. Law II Code Ann. § 11-204(a)(1) (1990), which provides that a person may not "[b]y contract, combination, or conspiracy with one or more other persons, unreasonably restrain trade or commerce...", is an analogue of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Natural Design Inc. v. Rouse Co., 485 A.2d 663, 666 (Md. 1984). Section 11-204(a)(2), which provides that a person may not "[m]onopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with one or more other persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce within the State, for the purpose of excluding competition or of controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in trade or commerce..", is an analogue of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Natural Design Inc. v. Rouse Co., 485 A.2d 663, 673 (Md. 1984) (citing, inter alia, MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983)). Maryland's General Assembly expressed its intent that where, as here, a federal statute deals with the same or similar matters, the courts should be guided by the interpretation given by the federal courts to the federal statute. Md. Com. Law II Code Ann. §11-202(a)(2) (1990); Natural Design Inc. v. Rouse Co., 485 A. 2d 663, 666 (Md. 1984); Quality Discount Tires, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 382 A.2d 867, 869 (Md. 1978).
59. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is also a violation of Maryland's Antitrust Act, Md. Com. Law II Code Ann. §11-204(a)(1)(1990). In Greenbelt Homes, Inc. v. Nyman Realty, Inc., 426 A.2d 394, 398 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) the Court found that § 11-204(a)(1) was analogous to section 2 of the Sherman Act and relied on federal tying cases in its analysis. Consequently, because Microsoft's tying violated a federal analogue of Maryland's Antitrust Act, Microsoft's tying is also a violation of Maryland law.
60. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Maryland's Antitrust Act, Md. Com. Law II Code Ann. §11-204(a)(2)(1990). As set forth in para. 61, supra, because Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly violated a federal analogue of Maryland's Antitrust Act, Microsoft's conduct is also a violation of Maryland law.
61. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Maryland's Antitrust Act, Md. Com. Law II Code Ann. §11-204(a)(2)(1990), for the reasons set forth in para. 61, supra, because Microsoft's attempted monopolization violated a federal analogue of Maryland's Antitrust Act, Microsoft's conduct is also a violation of Maryland law.
62. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs, and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Maryland's Antitrust Act, Md. Com. Law II Code Ann. §11-204(a)(1)(1990), which is an analogue of section 1 of the Sherman Act. For the reasons set forth in para. 61, supra, because Microsoft's exclusive dealing arrangements violated a federal analogue of Maryland's Antitrust Act, Microsoft's conduct is also a violation of Maryland law.
63. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEM's, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Maryland's Antitrust Act, Md. Com. Law II Code Ann. §11-204(a)(1)(1990), which is an analogue of section 1 of the Sherman Act. For the reasons set forth in para. 61, supra, because Microsoft's restrictions on OEMs violated a federal analogue of Maryland's Antitrust Act, Microsoft's conduct is also a violation of Maryland law.

K. Massachusetts State Law Claims

64. The Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act declares unlawful "unfair methods of competition" or "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93A, sec. 2. The statute is construed broadly, and violations of the substantive standards in other statutes are violations of chapter 93A. See Calimlim v. Foreign Car Center, Inc., 467 N.E.2d 443, 448 (Mass. 1984); Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1975); Piccuirro v. Gaitenby, 480 N.E.2d 30, 33 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
65. Chapter 93A is a "little FTC Act," the provisions of which mirror the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 45(a)(1) (FTCA). See Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney General, 407 N.E.2d 297, 304 n.11(Mass. 1980); Brennan v. Carvel Corp., 929 F.2d 801, 811 (1st Cir. 1991). Chapter 93A expressly states that the courts should follow interpretations of unfair trade practices given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts under the FTC statute. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, sec. 2(b). Any conduct unlawful under the FTC Act is accordingly unlawful under chapter 93A. See, e.g., PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1980); Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d 297; Commonwealth v. Fall River Motor Sales, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 1205, 1211 (Mass. 1991). Violations of the Sherman Act are also violations of the FTC Act, See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1947) ("all conduct violative of the Sherman Act may likewise come within the unfair trade practice prohibitions of the Trade Commission Act") Indeed, a variety of acts and practices that would not amount to violations of the Sherman Act have nevertheless been held "unfair" under the FTCA. See, e.g., Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369-71 (1965) (FTCA violated by practice that has the effect of a tie, even if no actual agreement or required exclusivity exists); Triangle Conduit and Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175, 181 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd 336 U.S. 956 (1949)(individual use of pricing structure, without agreement, can violate FTCA) Because a violation of the FTC Act provides a basis for liability under chapter 93A, a violation of the Sherman Act (which is also an FTCA violation) is a violation of the state law. See Parikh v. Franklin Medical Center, 940 F. Supp. 395, 407-408 (D. Mass. 1996) (held that violations of the Sherman Act could also be violations of chapter 93A); Action Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Atlanticare Health Services, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 33, 38-39 (D. Mass. 1993).
66. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is also a violation of Mass Gen. Laws ch. 93A for the reasons set forth in paras. 67 and 68, supra.
67. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Mass Gen. Laws ch. 93A for the reasons set forth in paras. 67 and 68, supra.
68. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Mass Gen. Laws ch. 93A for the reasons set forth in paras. 67 and 68, supra.
69. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs, and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Mass Gen. Laws ch. 93A for the reasons set forth in paras. 67 and 68, supra.
70. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEM's, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, for the reasons set forth in paras. 67 and 68, supra.

L. Michigan State Law Claims

71. The conduct which the Court found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser is also a violation of Section 2 of the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA), Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.771 to .788 (1989). Section 2 of MARA is comparable to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and Section 14(2) of MARA provides that "courts shall give due deference to interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable antitrust statutes..." Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.784(2). "Michigan antitrust law is identical to federal law and follows the federal precedents..." Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. v. Gary Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 898 (E.D.Mich. 1995) (dismissing state antitrust tying claim based upon federal antitrust law); see ETT Ambulance Service Corporation v. Rockford Ambulance, Inc., 516 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (applying federal case law under the Sherman Act to state attempted monopolization claim).
72. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Section 3 of MARA, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.773 for the reasons set forth in para. 74, supra.
73. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Section 3 of MARA, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.773, for the reasons set forth in para. 74, supra.
74. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs, and ICPs, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act are also a violation of Section 2 of MARA, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.772, for the reasons set forth in para. 74, supra.
75. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Section 2 of MARA, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 445.772 for the reasons set forth in para. 74, supra.

M. Minnesota State Law Claims

76. The Minnesota antitrust law, Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.49 to .66 (1998), is analogous to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Minn. Stat. § 325D.51 (1998) prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies "between two or more persons in unreasonable restraint of trade." Minn. Stat. § 325D.52 (1998) prohibits the "establishment, maintenance, or use of, or any attempt to establish, maintain, or use monopoly power . . . for the purpose of affecting competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices . . . ." Finally, Minn. Stat. § 325D.53 (1998) lists conduct which constitutes a per se violation of Minnesota antitrust law.
77. Further, Minnesota antitrust law is interpreted consistently with the federal courts' construction of federal antitrust law, unless state law clearly conflicts with federal law. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1993). See also State ex rel. Humphrey v. Road Constructors, Inc., 474 N.W.2d 224, 225 n. 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) ("Minnesota antitrust law is interpreted consistently with federal case law under the Sherman [Antitrust] Act."); Keating v. Philip Morris, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 132, 136 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) ("Minnesota courts have consistently held that Minnesota antitrust law is to be interpreted consistently with the federal courts' construction of federal antitrust law.").
78. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system also violates Minn. Stat. § 325D.52 (1998) (prohibiting the establishment, maintenance, or use of monopoly power). Because Minnesota antitrust law is interpreted consistently with federal antitrust law, the elements of a tying arrangement are the same under both the Sherman Act and Minnesota antitrust law, and where these elements exist (except for the interstate commerce requirement), they also constitute a violation of Minn. Stat. § 325D.52 (1998).
79. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act also violates Minn. Stat. § 325D.52 (1998), which provides that the use of monopoly power for the purpose of controlling prices or otherwise affecting competition is unlawful. See, e.g., Prestressed Concrete, Inc. v. Bladholm Bros. Culvert Co., 498 N.W.2d 274 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing that Minnesota antitrust law, like federal antitrust law, provides for a cause of action against monopolistic conduct).
80. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act also violates Minnesota antitrust law. See Minn. Stat. § 325D.52 (1998) (prohibiting the establishment, maintenance, or use of monopoly power). See also Prestressed Concrete, 498 N.W.2d at 276 (interpreting Minn. Stat. § 325D.52 as prohibiting attempted monopoly, consistent with federal law).
81. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act also violate Minnesota antitrust law. See Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.51 and 325D.53, subd. 1(3) (1998). See also Hough Transit, Ltd. v. National Farmers Org., 472 N.W.2d 358, 360-61 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that Minn. Stat. § 325D.51 codifies the "rule of reason" standard, and that treatment of exclusive dealing arrangements under Minnesota law is consistent with federal law.)
82. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs"), or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also violate Minn. Stat. § 325D.51 (1998). See Hough Transit, 472 N.W.2d at 360 (quoting International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1267 (8th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted) (Minnesota courts examine "the purpose, the market power, and the anticompetitive effects of a restraint" so as to "arrive at a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the restraint.")

N. New Mexico State Law Claims

83. The New Mexico Antitrust Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§57-1-1 to 57-1-19 (Michie 1995), is analogous to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 57-1-1 of the Act prohibits "every contract, agreement, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce," any part of which is in the state. Section 57-1-2 makes it unlawful for "any person to monopolize or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, trade or commerce . . ." New Mexico's Antitrust Act "shall be construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws. This construction shall be made to achieve uniform application of the state and federal laws prohibiting restraints of trade and monopolistic practices." N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-15.
84. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is also a violation of Section 57-1-1 of the New Mexico Antitrust Act. Smith Machinery Corp. v. Hesston, Inc., 694 P.2d 501, 505 (N.M. 1985) (looking to federal law, Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), to define tying).
85. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Section 57-1-2 of the New Mexico Antitrust Act; see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-15 (New Mexico Antitrust Act to be construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws).
86. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Section 57-1-2 of the New Mexico Antitrust Act; see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-15 (New Mexico Antitrust Act to be construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws).
87. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs and ICPs, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Section 57-1-1 of the New Mexico Antitrust Act; see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-15 (New Mexico Antitrust Act to be construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws).
88. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEM's (original equipment manufacturers), or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Section 57-1-1 of the New Mexico Antitrust Act; see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-15 (New Mexico Antitrust Act to be construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws).

O. New York State Law Claims

89. New York State's antitrust law, the Donnelly Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 340 et seq. (McKinney 1988), "was modeled on the Federal Sherman Act of 1890." People v. Rattenni, 613 N.E.2d 155, 158 (N.Y. 1993). The Donnelly Act declares illegal "[e]very contract, agreement, arrangement or combination whereby

1. A monopoly in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state, is or may be established or maintained; or

2. Competition or the free exercise of any activity in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is or may be restrained; or

3. For the purpose of establishing or maintaining any such monopoly or unlawfully interfering with the free exercise of any activity in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state any business, trade or commerce or the furnishing of any service is or may be restrained."

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340. New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals, has repeatedly ruled that "the Donnelly Act should generally be construed in light of Federal precedent and given a different interpretation only where State policy, differences in the statutory language or the legislative history justify such a result.") See, e.g., X.L.O. Concrete Corp. v. Rivergate Corp., 634 N.E.2d 158, 161 (N.Y. 1994) (omitting citations and quotations).

90. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system also violates the Donnelly Act, New York State's Antitrust Law (N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 340 et seq.), Pyramid Co. of Rockland v. Mautner, 581 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) ("The requirements for pleading 'tying' claims are identical under both the Donnelly Act and the Sherman Act"); Posa, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 642 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (identical tying analysis applied under both Sherman and Donnelly Acts).
91. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems, found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, also violates the Donnelly Act. Columbia Gas, Inc. v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 268 N.E.2d 790, 796 (N.Y. 1971) ("The purpose of section 340 of the General Business Law is to prohibit 'Every contract (or) agreement...whereby a monopoly . . . may be established or maintained, or whereby competition or the free exercise of any activity . . . is or may be restrained'") (holding that a monopoly utility's practices of imposing restrictive contractual arrangements violates the Donnelly Act if shown to restrain competition).
92. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act also violates the Donnelly Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340(1). (Prohibiting conduct by which a monopoly "is or may be established or maintained"); Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Adler, 1988 WL 13725, 1988-1 Trade Cases ¶ 67,907 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Sherman and Donnelly Acts "require identical basic elements of proof for claims of . . . attempt to monopolize")
93. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs, and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also violate the Donnelly Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 340 et seq. See Alexander's Department Stores, Inc. v. Ohrbach's, Inc. 42 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943) (exclusive dealing arrangement under which department store induced manufacturer not to sell to the department store's competitor held unlawful): Gold Star Ice Cream Co. v. Haagen-Dazs Ice Cream, Inc. 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 64, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (ice cream manufacturer enjoined from terminating distributors which sold competing brands).
94. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEM's, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also violate the Donnelly Act., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340 et seq. Columbia Gas of New York Inc. v. New York State Electric and Gas Corp., 268 N.E.2d 790 (agreements between monopoly utility and its customers alleged to restrict the freedom of municipalities to choose among competing energy sources unlawful under the Donnelly Act if shown to restrain competition).

P. North Carolina State Law Claims

95. North Carolina's state law claims are based on N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1.1, 75-1, and 75-2.1. (1999) Section 75-1.1 is an umbrella provision that prohibits not only unfair and deceptive practices, but also unfair methods of competition. It is identical to Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1), which encompasses everything covered by federal antitrust law and "public values beyond simply those of the . . . antitrust laws." Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); Federal Trade Commission v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Curtis Universal Corp. v. Sheboygan Emergency Medical Services, Inc., 43 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 1994). Because, as a general matter, North Carolina courts look to federal interpretations of Section 5 in interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 266 S.E.2d 610, 620 (N.C. 1980), N.C. Gen. Stat. §75-1.1 applies to monopoly maintenance, attempted monopolization, tying and other conduct or agreements prohibited by federal antitrust law. See, e.g., Itco Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 722 F.2d 42, 48 (4^th Cir. 1983) aff'd 742 F.2d 170 (4th Cir., 1984) (en banc) (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 encompasses Sherman Act violations). Violation of a public policy designed to protect consumers is a per se violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. "A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers." Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (N.C. 1981). Public policies encompassed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 include not only state but also federal policies. See, e.g., Itco Corp., 722 F.2d at 48 (Sherman Act); Eastern Roofing & Aluminum Co. v. Brock, 320 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1984) (FTC rule). Accordingly, proof of the federal claims in this case also demonstrates violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.
96. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1 is North Carolina's analogue to Sherman Act Section 1, 15 U.S.C. 1. It prohibits any contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce. North Carolina courts look to Sherman Act precedents when interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1. Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 194 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. 1973); Hester v. Martindale-Hubbel, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 335 (E.D.N.C. 1980), aff'd, 659 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 981 (1982). Therefore, to the extent that Sherman Act, Section 1, violations have been shown in this case, violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1 have also been shown.
97. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-2.1 prohibits monopolization and attempted monopolization. It has not yet been interpreted by a North Carolina court. However, North Carolina precedents regarding state law analogues to FTC Act Section 5 and Sherman Act Section 1 strongly indicate that this provision would be interpreted consistent with its federal law counterparts, Sherman Act Section 2 and Clayton Act Section 7.
98. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system is also a violation of (i) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; and (ii) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-2.1, for the reasons stated in paras. 98 and 100, supra.
99. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems, found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, also violates (i) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; and (ii) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-2.1, for the reasons stated in paras. 98 and 100, supra.
100. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act also violates (i) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; and (ii) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-2.1, for the reasons stated in paras. 98 and 100, supra.
101. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs, and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also violate (i) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; and (ii) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1 for the reasons stated in paras. 98 and 99, supra.
102. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEM's, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also violate (i) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; and (ii) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1 for the reasons stated in paras. 98 and 99, supra.

Q. Ohio State Law Claims

103. Ohio's Valentine Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§1331.01 to .99 (Anderson 1993), while broader and stronger than the federal law, was patterned after the Sherman Act, and decisions under the Sherman Act are used as guidelines in the courts' determination of a finding of legality or illegality under the Valentine Act. See, e.g., C.K. & J.K., Inc., v. Fairview Shopping Center Corp., 407 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ohio 1980); Child World, Inc. v South Town Centre, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1121, 1129 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
104. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying is also a violation of the Valentine Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§1331.01 to .99 (Anderson 1993). See State ex rel. Brown v. NAPCO, 336 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
105. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly power in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Ohio's Valentine Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§1331.01 to .99., and the common law of Ohio. State antitrust "legislation is aimed to prevent monopoly." List v. Burley Tobacco Growers Coop. Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. 361, 382 (1926). A corporation may be found to have illegally created and maintained a monopoly under the Valentine Act. State ex rel. Denman v National Cash Register Co., 21 Ohio Cir. Dec. 637 (Cir. Ct. 1910). Furthermore, monopolies have always been regarded as contrary to the spirit and policy of the common law of Ohio. State v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, 290 (1892).
106. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of the Sherman Act is also a violation of Ohio's Valentine Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§1331.01 et seq., and the common law of Ohio for the reasons set forth in para. 106 and 108, supra.
107. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Act are also in violation of Ohio's Valentine Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§1331.01 to .99. See, e.g., Huebner-Toledo Breweries v. Singlar, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (n.s.) 49 (Cir. Ct. Lucas Cty. 1906). Ohio law is to be read in accordance with the Sherman Act, and exclusive dealing contracts that are unreasonable under the Sherman Act are unreasonable under the Valentine Act. Furthermore, given that the tendency of these contracts was to help create or maintain Microsoft's monopoly, they are against public policy and violate Ohio's common law. Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 672 (Ohio 1880).
108. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs, or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of Ohio's Valentine Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§1331.01 to .99, for the reasons set forth in para. 110, supra.

R. Utah State Law Claims

109. Section 76-10-914 of the Utah Antitrust Act, Utah Code Ann. §§76-10-911 to 926 (1999), is analogous to §§1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. It makes unlawful contracts combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce and monopolization, attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-926 provides that the state antitrust act is to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Sherman Act. The elements of a claim under the state antitrust law are the same as the elements under the Sherman Act. American Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 414 (10^th Cir. 1992) (the Utah Antitrust Act is "essentially identical" to the Sherman Act, is to be interpreted the same way).
110. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system also is a violation of Utah's antitrust law, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-914 (1998) (because under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-926 the state antitrust act is to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Sherman Act - meaning the elements of a claim under the state antitrust law are the same as the elements under the Sherman Act).
111. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act also is a violation of the Utah Antitrust Act, § 76-10-914, for the reasons set forth in paras. 112 and 113, supra.
112. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act also is a violation of the Utah Antitrust Act for the reasons set forth in paras. 112 and 113, supra.
113. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs and ICPs, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also are in violation of the Utah Antitrust Act for the reasons set forth in paras. 112 and 113, supra.
114. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restrains in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also are in violation of the Utah Antitrust Act for the reasons set forth in paras. 112 and 113, supra.

S. West Virginia State Law Claims

115. The West Virginia Antitrust Act, W.Va. Code §§47-18-1 to -23 (1999), prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, W.Va. Code §47-18-3, and "the establishment, maintenance or use of a monopoly or an attempt to establish a monopoly of trade or commerce, any part of which is within [West Virginia], by any persons for the purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing or maintaining prices . . . ." W.Va. Code §47-18-4. A violation of federal antitrust law is also a violation of W.Va. Code §47-18-1 et seq., Precision Piping & Instruments, Inc. v. E.I. duPont De Nemours & Company, 707 F. Supp. 225, 226 n.1 (D.W. Va. 1989) ("Rulings on the federal claims will be equally applicable to the corresponding state law claims"); Gray v. Marshall County Board of Education, 367 S.E.2d 751, 755 (W.Va. 1988) (". . . we are directed by the legislature to apply the federal decisional law interpreting the Sherman Act to our own parallel anti-trust statute").
116. Microsoft's use of its monopoly power in PC operating system software to maintain and extend its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act also is a violation of W.Va. Code 47-18-4 for the reasons set forth in para. 118 supra.
117. Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also a violation of W. Va. Code §47-18-4 for the reasons set forth in para. 118 supra.
118. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system also is a violation of West Virginia's antitrust law. Under the West Virginia Antitrust Act and Code of State Rules, W.Va. Code State R. tit. 142, § 15-3 (1991), the practice of conditioning the sale of a product or service on the sale of another product or service is unlawful in West Virginia. Additionally, a violation of federal antitrust law is also a violation of W. Va. Code §§ 47-18-1 to 18-23, as set forth in para. 118 supra.
119. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs and ICPs found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act are also in violation of W. Va. Code §47-18-3, for the reasons set forth in para. 118 supra.
120. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, are also in violation of W.Va. Code § 47-18-3, for the reasons set forth in para. 118 supra.

T. Wisconsin State Law Claims

121. Wisconsin's antitrust law, Wisconsin Trusts and Monopolies Act, codified at Wis. Stat. Ann. §133.01 to 133.18 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998), is analogous to the Sherman Act and makes illegal every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Wis. Stat. Ann. §133.03(1). It also makes illegal monopolization, attempts to monopolize and conspiracies to monopolize. Wis. Stat. Ann. §133.03(2). In general, Wisconsin courts view federal court interpretation of the Sherman Act as persuasive authority for interpreting the analogous Wisconsin statute, Section 133.03. See, e.g., Grams v. Boss, 294 N.W.2d 473, 480 (Wis. 1980). Specifically, the Wisconsin Supreme Court assumed but did not ultimately hold that a tying arrangement could violate § 133.03(1). Town of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 314 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Wis. 1982).
122. The conduct which the Court has found to constitute illegal tying by Microsoft of its Internet browser to the operating system also is a violation of Wis. Stat. Ann. §133.03(1) for the reasons set forth in para. 124 supra.
123. Microsoft's illegal maintenance of its monopoly in PC operating systems found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act also is a violation of the Wisconsin Act, § 133.03(2). A recent circuit court opinion held that "[t]he focus [of this section] is monopolization achieved through predation or an attempt at it." Pillar Corp. v. Enercon Indus. Corp., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 67,187 at 63,116 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1986).
124. Similarly, Microsoft's attempted monopolization of the market for Internet browsers found by this Court to be in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act also is a violation of the Wis. Stat. Ann. § 133.03(2) for the reasons stated in para. 124 supra.
125. The exclusive dealing arrangements between Microsoft and ISPs, OLSs and ICPs, found by this Court to be unreasonable restraints in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also are in violation of Wis. Stat. Ann. § 133.03(1), for the reasons set forth in para. 124 supra.
126. The first-boot and start-up screen restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs or agreed to between them, found by this Court to be unreasonable restrains in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, also are in violation of Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1) for the reasons set forth in para. 124 supra.

For all of the reasons set forth above, and in the plaintiffs' joint memorandum, which is incorporated herein by reference, the States respectfully request that this Court adopt the Proposed Conclusions of Law set forth above.

Of Counsel:

Richard L. Schwartz
Assistant Attorney General
Deputy Chief, Antitrust Bureau
New York State Attorney General's Office
120 Broadway
Suite 26-01
New York, New York 10271
212) 416-8284

I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the attached States' Memorandum and Proposed Conclusions of Law to be served by hand on December 6, 1999 addressed to the following:

John L. Warden, Esq.
Sullivan & Cromwell
1701 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

James R. Weiss
Preston Gates Ellis & Rouvelas Meeds
1725 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

A. Douglas Melamed, Esq.
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

and one copy to be sent by overnight delivery, postage prepaid, to:

William H. Neukom, Esq.
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, Washington 98052

Richard J. Urowsky, Esq.
Sullivan & Cromwell
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004

Phillip R. Malone, Esq.
Antitrust Division
U.S. Department of Justice
450 Golden Gate Avenue, Room 10-0101
San Francisco, CA 94102

________________________________

Emily B. Myers
Antitrust Counsel
National Association of Attorneys General
750 First Street, N.E.
Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20002
202-326-6015

Dated: Washington, D.C.
December 6, 1999