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280. Four days before Case was due to arrive at Microsoft''s campus, Gates sent an E? mail outlining Microsoft''s goals in negotiating a deal with AOL to the responsible Microsoft executives. He wrote: What we want from AOL is that for a period of time --- say 2 years --- the browser that they give out to their customers and the one they mention and put on their pages and the one they exploit is ours and not Netscape['']s. We need for them to make our browser available as the browser to existing and new customers. We have to be sure that we don''t allow them to promote Netscape as well. We want all the hits that come off of AOL to register on servers as our browser so people can start seeing us as having measurable browser share. Gates understood that if AOL gave assurance that its subscribers used Internet Explorer when browsing the Web, the measure of browser usage share data to which application developers paid most attention --- i.e., server ``hit'''' data --- would show a significant rise in Internet Explorer''s usage share. Gates also realized that such a commitment by AOL was worth seeking even if it lasted for only a couple of years.

281. On January 18, 1996, Case arrived at Microsoft''s campus with three other AOL executives. During the first meeting, Microsoft described the componentized architecture of Internet Explorer 3.0 that would allow AOL to embed the browsing software into AOL''s access software. The AOL executives viewed componentization as a highly attractive feature, because AOL wanted its subscribers to feel they were using an AOL service whether they were viewing proprietary AOL content or browsing content on the Web. In fact, Case and the other AOL representatives told their Microsoft hosts that AOL wanted total control over the ``browser frame'''' (the windows in which Web content is displayed) to make it distinctive to AOL. In other words, AOL wanted no menus, dialog boxes, or other visible signs that would alert AOL users to the fact that they were using Web browsing software supplied by a company other than AOL.

282. At the end of the meeting, Case expressly acknowledged the attractiveness of Microsoft''s componentized approach. Notably, Netscape had not yet developed a componentized version of Navigator. Netscape had assured AOL that it would do so, and AOL believed that Netscape was capable of eventually making good on its pledge, but the fact remained that Microsoft had already completed a componentized version of Internet Explorer. Case was impressed enough with Internet Explorer 3.0 that when he returned to AOL he told a number of fellow executives that, when it came to AOL''s technical considerations, Microsoft perhaps enjoyed an edge over Netscape. Still, the AOL executives saw Navigator as enjoying better brand recognition and demonstrated success in the marketplace.

283. Later in the day on January 18, Case and his team also met with Gates, Chase, and Chase''s direct superior, Brad Silverberg, to discuss the business aspects of a potential AOL? Microsoft alliance. At one point during the meeting, Case again told Gates that AOL needed inclusion of its client software in Windows and prominent placement on the Windows desktop if there was to be a closer relationship between the two companies. Gates expressed frustration that Case continued to insist on getting an AOL icon on the Windows desktop in addition to the technology, engineering assistance, and technical support Microsoft was offering AOL. Despite the obvious importance that Case attached to desktop placement, Gates said he would not agree to that condition.

284. A week after the January 18 meeting, Chase and Silverberg met with Gates. They reiterated that, whether Gates liked it or not, an AOL icon already appeared on the desktop of the major OEMs'' PCs. Given that fait accompli, they argued, Microsoft would gain much more than it would lose by agreeing to place AOL on the Windows desktop in exchange for AOL''s commitment to promote and distribute Internet Explorer. This time, Gates agreed to give AOL some sort of promotion in Windows. He continued to insist, however, that Microsoft not place an AOL icon directly on the Windows desktop. Rather, Gates agreed to include AOL, along with other OLSs, in a generic ``Online Services Folder,'''' an icon for which would reside on the desktop. Since MSN enjoyed a branded icon directly on the desktop, including AOL in the OLS folder would maintain its inferior status to Microsoft''s service.