Comments on: E-voting hobbled by security concerns

Nearly all electronic voting machines in use today effectively remain black boxes without external methods of verifying the results.

e voting

If this is so good, then why is security so lacks!
Companies that have personnel infomation cannot secure your personnel info. then how can e voting secure the vote so that theirs no compermise of your vote? if the black box vote machines uses windows base most of that has back door entry, could this be so someone can change your vote? Who dose the elite want in office?

[Gerald Quaglia]

E voting should never use Windows

Given the problems that exsist with Windows, which M$ is unable to get a grasp on, this POS should never, ever be used for something as important as an election. Use some type of proprietary system used only on voting machines.

Democracy is at stake

Why so many states put their faith in non-auditable eVoting machines is astounding. Using such a device with known programming & security flaws is akin to opening the results to gross manipulation by the man behind the curtain in The Wizard of Oz.

How can there be a fair & democratic election when someone can connect to a county's vote tabulator via an insecure "back door" and rather quickly alter the vote results? And the sad part is without real tracking mechanisms, no one would know.

Sure, you may have the right to vote, but what if your vote is never counted? With these flawed devices, vote-thefts can run rampant (as have been shown repeatedly in recent years). The whole notion of Democracy is at stake.

Check out www.votergate.tv for an eye-opening account on what's really happening with the man behind that curtain.

[My-Self]

It's not a bug, it's a feature !

pradeep P wrote:
> Why so many states put their faith in non-auditable eVoting machines is astounding.

It's not a bug, it's a feature !
Why do you think they buy those machines ...

a bit of humor ...
http://www.boomchicago.nl/Section/Videos/BoomChicagoVotingMachine

[My-Self]

The real value of e-voting for politicians...

The real value of e-voting for politicians is when the seller can assure the buyer that with his machines, the next vote outcome will satisfy the buyer.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_U.S._Election_controversies_and_irregularities

SUCID Licenses Single Use Credit Card Number For E-Voting

SUCID Licenses Single Use Credit Card Number For E-Voting

EDIS the owner of the July 22 2003 Patent to the Single Use Credit Card Number ID Patent licensed earlier this year a Canadian Company, Single Use Credit Card ID, LTD, or "SUCID".

SUCID is joint venturing with a US Company, Single Use Voter ID, or "SUVID", to license entities for legal Internet gaming and voter ID uses of the Single Use Credit Card Number ID on ID theft protection EDI platforms respectively.

Simply put, this means the use of ID theft protection technology to assist voter protection is developing quickly. These companies will be moving quickly into the marketplace as the platform completes construction within the next six months.

[Abdul Tawala Ibn Ali Ali]

Changes in EDI Secure LLLP ownership changed above SUCID response

Changes in EDI Secure LLLP ownership changed above SUCID response...


A year ago, January 2006, EDI Secure LLLP was purchased by IDPixie LLC which owns the patent US 6,598,031 B1 granted on July 22, 2003 for APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR ROUTING ENCRYPTED TRANSACTION CARD IDENTIFYING DATA THROUGH A PUBLIC TELEPHONE NETWORK from inventor Jeffrey Ice. So to update EDI Secure LLLP's place in the marketplace, I add the above and below data.

My Pledge

I, Mr. Abdul Tawala Ibn Ali Alishtari, pledge my Foundation to halt child slavery activities including his Global Peace Film Festival, Inc., at www.peacefilmfest.org. I pledge moral support of legal, peaceful activities and my non-profit gifts offshore, onshore and globally, primarily with philantrophy from my personal investment to help halt all fraud, violence and scams hurting innocent children, women and families so help me God.

Shamos's objections to paper trail not entirely valid

Prof. Michael Shamos is described as objecting to providing
electronic voting machines with voter-verified paper trails
because printing vote records on long strips of paper could
enable someone to discover the identities of the voters who cast
them.
This problem is easily solved by not printing ballots on long
strips. Instead, each printed ballot would be torn off by the voter
and placed in a conventional ballot box, completely obscuring
the connection between ballots and voters.
In this variant of the voter-verified paper trail (promoted by
the Open Voting Consortium [1]), ballots would be officially cast
only when placed in the box. The electronic voting machine
would then be better described as an electronic ballot printer,
and any vote totals it produced would be no more than early,
unofficial estimates.
The paper ballots could be counted manually, of course (as
they are in many European countries), but because they are
printed by machine they would be reliably readable by
independent vote-counting scanners.

According to the article, Prof. Shamos also maintains that
"mandating paper trails will halt experimentation with better
techniques". Yes, laws can be too specific-- it's possible that
paper ballots may someday be superseded by superior
technology. Nevertheless, we have a serious problem here and
now, and it's one we can't afford to leave unsolved just because
the solution at hand is not provably optimal.
Instead of mandating paper trails specifically, voting-machine
laws should merely require that vote-verification technology be
transparent, i.e., understandable by the average voter. This
requirement is satisfied by paper ballots, whether filled in by
hand or printed by machine, but it leaves the door open to
superior technologies (it would appear to close the door,
however, to the sophisticated encryption technology proposed
by Chaum and Neff).

Finally, the article attributes to Prof. Shamos the indisputable
observation that paper records have a long history of tampering
by both major parties. Such tampering is possible only at the
retail level --attackers must interfere physically with each of the
ballot boxes they wish to corrupt-- and defenses against such
attacks, while not perfect, are well developed.
Voting-machine software, however, provides opportunities for
tampering at the wholesale level. A single malefactor can hide
vote-corrupting features in software that is installed in
thousands of voting machines, resulting in vote corruption far
removed in time and place from the original tampering, and on a
scale that retail vote tamperers could only dream of.
If paper trails or machine-printed ballots can transform the
election-tampering threat from wholesale to retail, it's one of
the best deals on offer.

Reference
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1. http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/