Comments on: Senators request $5 billion for emergency networks
Proposal urges "immediate" funds following disunity of the radio network used by first responders during Hurricane Katrina.
Proposal urges "immediate" funds following disunity of the radio network used by first responders during Hurricane Katrina.
December 30, 2009 4:14 PM PST
December 30, 2009 2:31 PM PST
December 30, 2009 1:33 PM PST
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Races and Ares both are mobilezed within hours of a disaster, if not minuites to start communication efforts in areas.
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The better solution is to have local government bother themselves with better/any planning. More money and more toys won't fix these problems, which were at the heart of the mixup in Katrina's wake.
BTW, wasn't this kind of system weakness, identified after 911, supposed to have been taken care of by now? There seemed to be enough money to go around to put up hidden cameras all over the place, and to buy police departments fancy new patrol cars. I guess those projects were done under a different no bid contract.
Conventional telephone systems didn?t work for lack of power, downed lines, and flooded cables. Nor did cellular telephone systems, because their towers had blown down, their power was out, and the conventional telephone network on which they depend was out-of-service. Television, radio, newspapers, the INTERNET -- all mass media were crippled for lack of power, labor, supplies, distribution capability, even markets. With conventional telephone and cellular systems inoperable, police, fire, ambulance, and other public safety organizations had to deal with a communications infrastructure breakdown.
In short, Katrina had blown the residents of 90,000 square miles (an area twice the size of Pennsylvania) from the 21st century to a stone-age flood plain in less than a day.
The question becomes, ?Do legitimate alternatives exist?? Telephone and cellular companies will leap forward to assure us that they are best equipped to fill the need. Right!
Let?s look at how the military (both National Guard and conventional forces) ?came equipped? with their own tactical communications infrastructure. The Department of Defense (DoD) has learned from sad experience that an inability to communicate -- among service branches and up-and-down the chain-of-command -- costs lives. DoD now relies on systems that utilize, among other assets, satellite transmission resources and long-loiter communications and reconnaissance platforms. By using solar-powered, self-contained switching stations at high altitude and in near-, medium-, and geosynchronous earth orbit, DoD needn?t fret about flooding, power interruptions, or other inconveniences of nature. A derivative: DoD maintains end-to-end quality, security, and bandwidth control.
Of course, such do-dads are expensive. And every state, county, and local police and fire department will whine that such a system isn?t secure enough (how foolish), isn?t available in a color that matches its squad cars (maybe DoD can gin-up something in a multi-camo motif); that there aren?t enough (or there are too many) buttons for them to use. They?ll want both right- and left-handed models. The ******** could be endless.
But, by leading the specification/standardization/acquisition process, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA can put a national disaster response communications system in place.
No doubt; it WILL BE expensive, but there?s context. Katrina?s everything-included cost to the taxpayer could approach $500 Billion ? double what the U. S. has spent to date in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the $5 Billion earmarked in Stabenow?s bill is anywhere near accurate, I?ll sleep a little better knowing that we?re ready for the next Big One by investing a mere 1% of Katrina?s recovery cost in a legitimate national capability.
However, you are close to the issues:
1. Dispatch to dispatch message standards are needed. Systems have to be able to failover to the neighbors CAD/EOC.
2. On failover, mobile units as assignable assets have to inteoperate with the new center.
3. Asset identification and catalog management has to be interoperable. This means getting the asset database schemas for assets at the level of standardization and implementation as say, GJXML. We overfocused on criminal investigation and interdiction and neglected emergency response.
4. Asset management may include the call lists. Note that these have to be worked BEFORE the storm strikes. Not having enough bus drivers makes having pre-positioned buses worthless. Standards for alerting such as OASIS CAP and EDXL are fine as long as they continue to useful on low-capacity, low-bandwidth devices. Be sure the use cases for the standard recognize the need to operate in a degraded mode.
But Federal budget or no, the buy cycle for public safety is about twelve years. Yes the local requirements that force excessive customization make the systems far more expensive than they should be. At 10,000 feet, each State is a separate market. Comments from Governors about insisting on their turf being locally controlled do not augur well for changing that. At the very least, the procurements have to think regionally which is what transportation system bids such as Metropolitant Transit Authority (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania) and Amtrak are doing.
Smarter RFPs with more emphasis on regional interoperation are necessary or all of the funds being appropriated will only buy more of the same.
A Cat 5 into a coastal area will still kill and dismember a community. The response can be improved but I doubt it can be made perfect or that any serious legislator doubts that either.
- Green Electricity (GEL) Initiative
- by 207796398873175208235380528963 September 21, 2005 5:09 AM PDT
- Text of the Green Electricity (GEL) Initiative: http://www.alexanderbell.us/Initiative/GEL.htm
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(7 Comments)Read more here: http://www.alexanderbell.us/Project/GreenElectricity.htm