Comments on: E-ballot software wins vote of confidence

A second company chooses technology from VoteHere to let voters verify that choices were properly registered.

[BlueInWI]

Steps in the right direction...

I like this approach but still prefer a printed copy of the voter's choices that need to be visually approved by the voter before leaving the booth. These printed copies can then be used in a recount and for an audit/check of the electronic results. All electronic (with no paper trail) systems could be tampered with such that they report one set of votes to the person entering the code to check their votes, and another to the the tabulation routine.

[nealda]

Bad Idea number 2,345,961

Voter verification and voting receipts are two very different things. A paper verification allows the voter to check their vote and also records it for later manual recount. This is good as long as the voter leaves the paper at the polling site.

Receipts are bad (paper or electronic) due to the following two scenarios:

1) Campaign thug: Hey! Yous better vote the way I told you if you don't want a little lead behind the ear! Show me the receipt if you want to live to see the election results.

2) Campaign "entrepreneur": Hey, great! You voted for candidate X! Just show me the receipt and you'll get your $50!

Voting machines should just print the paper and voters should just check it and stick it in a ballot box. What's so difficult about this? Why does everyone want to make is so complicated? Because they want to make a buck off the election process, that's why. Elections should be a non-profit affair.

[Not Bugged]

voter secrecy

There are two principles of voter secrecy. One is that no one knows for whom you voted. The other is that you cannot prove your vote. In this case, the second pronciple is violated.

Those who need to know, know the above mentioned. The problem is that, this year, the trend is the trade of between total secrecy and total verifiability.

[nealda]

Bad Idea number 2,345,961

Voter verification and voting receipts are two very different things. A paper verification allows the voter to check their vote and also records it for later manual recount. This is good as long as the voter leaves the paper at the polling site.

Receipts are bad (paper or electronic) due to the following two scenarios:

1) Campaign thug: Hey! Yous better vote the way I told you if you don't want a little lead behind the ear! Show me the receipt if you want to live to see the election results.

2) Campaign "entrepreneur": Hey, great! You voted for candidate X! Just show me the receipt and you'll get your $50!

Voting machines should just print the paper and voters should just check it and stick it in a ballot box. What's so difficult about this? Why does everyone want to make is so complicated? Because they want to make a buck off the election process, that's why. Elections should be a non-profit affair.

[Not Bugged]

voter secrecy

There are two principles of voter secrecy. One is that no one knows for whom you voted. The other is that you cannot prove your vote. In this case, the second pronciple is violated.

Those who need to know, know the above mentioned. The problem is that, this year, the trend is the trade of between total secrecy and total verifiability.

Bad Idea Number ONE

The whole concept violates the principle of a secret ballot. The originator should be tried for treason!

Why is it Americans are so ready to give away their basic freedoms?

Bad Idea Number ONE

The whole concept violates the principle of a secret ballot. The originator should be tried for treason!

Why is it Americans are so ready to give away their basic freedoms?

[BlueInWI]

Steps in the right direction...

I like this approach but still prefer a printed copy of the voter's choices that need to be visually approved by the voter before leaving the booth. These printed copies can then be used in a recount and for an audit/check of the electronic results. All electronic (with no paper trail) systems could be tampered with such that they report one set of votes to the person entering the code to check their votes, and another to the the tabulation routine.