Warning: Dan Rather may be unsafe
I finally got around to watching the recent episode of HDNet's Dan Rather Reports titled "Plastic Planes," about alleged safety problems with Boeing's new 787 "Dreamliner" passenger jet. I was interested in the story for two reasons. As I've said here before, I want to buy one of these planes someday-- and secondly, I've long been fascinated with composite materials.
Boeing rolls out the 787 Dreamliner.
(Credit: The Boeing Company)Vince Weldon, a former Boeing engineer, alleges that the composites used in the 787-- principally forms of carbon-fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP)-- are brittle, insufficiently tested, dangerous in a fire, and vulnerable to lightning strikes.
Boeing, for its part, says the Dreamliner development process has included many physical tests and simulations covering all of these issues, and that the 787 meets all relevant FAA standards.
Although Weldon worked for Boeing for 46 years, his engineering duties apparently never involved designing with composite materials. He offered no facts in support of his allegations, but Rather was happy to let Weldon present his accusations without supporting evidence (literally: Rather was all smiles during the Weldon interviews).
Boeing, in response, referred Rather to vast amounts of engineering test data, although it did not release much (if any) of the actual test data to the show for competitive reasons. (I see nothing wrong with that; if any random crank can force a company to disclose confidential engineering data by making unsupported public accusations, there'd be no such thing as confidentiality for any engineering project.)
The FAA, however, does have the test results, and says that if the tests don't show the 787 is safe within the limits of today's engineering knowledge, and indeed that it's at least as safe as existing jetliners, the 787 simply won't be certified.
I have some experience with designing and building composite structures myself (as an enthusiast, not professionally-- sometimes using materials purchased from Boeing's retail surplus store, in fact).
In my opinion, Weldon seemed to be trying to mislead Rather and his viewers. He was using terms (such as "brittle") that have meanings in an engineering context that are different from, and sometimes contrary to, their ordinary conversational meanings, which would inevitably lead Rather and his viewers to false conclusions.
For example, Weldon's claims would give most people the impression that the 787's composite materials are "brittle" the way a ceramic tile is-- in particular, I think Rather reached this conclusion during the interview-- but in fact, modern composites aren't like that; they break down in a progressive way that absorbs energy, exactly contrary to Weldon's claim.
In fact, the ability of CFRP to absorb energy is one of the biggest advantages of a carbon-fiber structure over a traditional aluminum structure. Both CFRP and aluminum structures will crumple in an impacts, but because CFRP is so much stronger, it can absorb more energy. Look at this YouTube video of the testing of a CFRP nose section from a Formula One car:
Starting two minutes into the video, there's a closeup of the nose as it collapses against a solid barrier. Although the individual carbon fibers shatter quite sharply, the structure as a whole breaks down gradually, just as the designer intended, dissipating the energy of the crash as the car slows to a stop-- very quickly, but smoothly. The chassis of the race car further back from the nose suffers no apparent damage, and the driver's compartment is totally undeformed. Obviously an airplane crash would produce different effects, but the video contradicts Weldon's first claim.
Similarly, Weldon's other specific claims about carbon-fiber composites are either wrong or just don't justify his conclusions.
I was particularly surprised to see Mary Schiavo, famous for writing a grossly sensationalized book about aviation safety following a brief stint at the US Department of Transportation, brought in by Dan Rather Reports to say that CFRP structures can't conduct the energy of a lightning strike away from the site of the strike because... "They're plastic! And so there is nothing to direct the lightning around [a fuel tank] rather than into it."
But Schiavo is clearly in over her head on this one; she has no business posing as an expert in materials science. CFRP is mostly carbon, not "plastic," and carbon is conductive. While CFRP isn't as conductive as aluminum, it isn't an insulator as the word "plastic" would suggest to most viewers.
Ultimately, if Weldon was correct about the behavior of carbon-fiber composites, these materials simply wouldn't be as widely used as they are in racing cars, military and civilian aircraft, and other systems that operate in high-stress, high-risk environments.
Weldon also seemed to be deliberately taking Boeing's statements out of context. For example, Boeing was quoted as saying that it would be performing regular visual inspections of the 787. In a long section of the program, Weldon and Rather interpreted this statement to mean that Boeing was ruling out non-visual inspections-- but I simply don't believe that's true, and they apparently never asked Boeing to confirm if it is true.
Rather brought in independent experts to describe other inspection techniques, implying that Boeing was not aware of, or was not going to use, these other techniques. But I know from my own reading (I have read several books on this subject, and I subscribe to some of the trade magazines in the composites industry) that these other techniques are already widely used in the aviation industry and would inevitably be part of Boeing's periodic inspection processes. The fact that Boeing did not happen to mention these processes doesn't mean it's decided not to use them.
I think the overwhelming weight of the engineering evidence on Boeing's side in this matter is enough to justify dismissing Weldon's claims out of hand, but there are some troubling personality issues involved in this case as well.
According to OSHA, as reported by the Seattle Times, Weldon was fired for threatening the life of a supervisor. Dan Rather never mentioned this fact, which greatly undermines Weldon's credibility.
The omission, and the uncritical use of claims from people like Weldon and Schiavo who lack the professional credentials to justify them, undermines Rather's own credibility, which was fragile enough in the wake of his bizarre report on 60 Minutes Wednesday about the Killian memos allegedly describing George W. Bush's service in the Texas Air National Guard. Like thousands if not millions of others, I was flabbergasted by Rather's personal insistence that the obviously computer-typeset memos were actually produced on a typewriter in 1972.
It was apparent to me at the time that Rather had lost the ability to evaluate the credibility of his sources, which is an essential skill for any reporter-- certainly for one operating at the national level.
And now, of course, Rather is suing CBS and Viacom for... well, I can hardly tell what for; the complaint is not very clear. But if I was running HDNet, I'd be very concerned about Rather making such strong accusations with such weak support. If he continues, the network may be forced to dismiss him, which could well lead to yet another lawsuit...
Peter N. Glaskowsky is a computer architect in Silicon Valley and a technology analyst for the Envisioneering Group. He has designed chip- and board-level products in the defense and computer industries, managed design teams, and served as editor in chief of the industry newsletter "Microprocessor Report." He is a member of the CNET Blog Network and is not an employee of CNET. Disclosure. 


This only proves it to me. I'm sure Bush, aliens, Freemasons and the CIA also had something to do with it.
I am an engineer that has worked both with metal and non-metal synthetics and I would love to fly on a 787.
So not to bore anybody with technical jargon, I'll give you an example of what composites can do...
*The entire wing (and most everything else) of the F/A-22 is made of carbon-fiber based composites. The Raptor sees a bit more stress than a commercial airliner and yet they're not falling out of the sky...hmm!
All composite synthetics designs are everywhere in the aerospace and automotive world, any "engineer" that would suggest this is an unsafe or untested material is an outright LIER and fool!
Personally, I'd trust my safety more to synthetic composites than to aluminum, magnesium or ferrous metals.
That's what I did, and I explained the factual basis for my opinions. I feel no malice toward Weldon, Rather, or Schiavo. I simply believe they were wrong in what they said.
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The Basics of Composite components.
1 Incorporating composite construction into aircraft design is not new, Boeing are not introducing some fabulous new technology into aircraft design composites have been used extensively to manufacture aircraft for decades, what?s new is Boeing?s leap of faith in composites as PRIMARY STRUCTURE ( if it breaks you are dead type structure ) then burying the said structure in the guts of an airframe where eventually it will fail ! no ifs or buts about it by there very nature composite materials deteriorate and will inevitably fail eventually, stick your head inside any composite fuselage of any age and you will notice the smell of solvents in the air this smell is OUT GASSING of the volatile components of the composite material and it is these very volatiles that hold the structure together, at some point in time depending on the local environment and stress applied the structure WILL fail catastrophically, composites don?t give any prior warning before they fail they do not deform or crack like aluminium they shatter like glass or delaminate.
2 If you pay peanuts you get monkeys !! Having had the dubious pleasure to work with the top three US aircraft manufacturers I know that they regard the operators who actually manufacture their aircraft as an inconvenient necessity they have no regard for the roots of there success, the company was built on the back of its engineering staff who were the best of the best they were well trained and took personal responsibility to ensure the safety of the end user of their aircraft, now the bean counters run the show safety is only considered if it is cost effective, the staff on the factory floor are as a rule untrained in the deeper aspects of aircraft manufacture or yes men who are only there to make a living, the contempt that Boeing management show towards the staff on the factory floor is reflected in the low wages paid to manufacture the supposedly most technically advanced aircraft in the world, it is impossible to maintain quality control when even the quality control department is staffed by inexperienced yes men,
when manufacturing composite components procedure is everything ! The timing cleanliness, temperature, mix ratio, humidity, light, and many other factors have to be considered and compensated for on the fly! Monkeys WILL screw it up, you only have to look at the mess Hawker De Havilland made of manufacturing the Eurocopter composite cockpit, the procedure specified for the composite lay up was not followed correctly consequently there was extensive delaminating of the composite layers on every lay up, the specifications were correct but it was going to require more than a monkey to fully understand and carry out the process. I think in the end they put the project in the too hard basket.
3 The devil is in the detail !! Composite components present some extreme problems when it comes to the simple act of joining two or more components, the proper installation of the joining fasteners is critical and requires diligent skilled operators to successfully complete the process any deviation from the recommended installation procedure WILL result in the fastener failing under load, from personal experience I know that monkeys are being employed to carry out this critical but boring task, I personally tested a composite assembly produced for the RAAF Orion P3c I was stunned when more than 25% of the fasteners in the assembly FAILED ! In fact it was almost impossible to disassemble because the fasteners had failed and were rotating within the composite material, these fasteners must have failed as the unit was being assembled ! The unit had not even been fitted the aircraft fortunately the assembly was not primary structure but never the less it presented a clear and present danger to the aircrew and was subsequently rejected by the RAAF.
- by algorithm eng December 14, 2008 9:29 AM PST
- Installing fasteners in composite material requires a skilled diligent operator to repetitively carry out a seemingly simple task 100s of times a day, there is no room for error composite components are only as strong as there weakest fastener they must be 100%, it may look like s simple task but if you ask any engineer familiar with installing fasteners in composite materials they will tell you there are all sorts of near miss ways to install a fastener and only one way to guarantee 100% integrity and it takes a trained eye to spot the near miss ! Monkeys just don?t cut it.
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(5 Comments)4 THERMAL CYCLING ! Now if by some miracle Boeing manage to successfully assemble the 787 and they get everything 100% right ( dream on ) there is still the problem that composite materials have a fatal flaw which makes them particularly dangerous when used in aircraft construction.
Unlike formula 1 cars !!! Aircraft airframes are constantly subjected to thermal cycling, on the ground -20C to +50C is quite normal in flight the outside air temperature can be as low as -60C, it only requires one defect in the surface finish or fasteners installation of the composite material to allow moisture to enter the matrix of the material, at that point the clock is ticking and the component is already starting to fail, as the aircraft completes its day to day tasks inside the matrix the moisture is constantly being frozen and thawed , as you know as water phase changes to ice it expands so every time the water thaws there is a little more room in the matrix to take on more water and so it goes on until the matrix is eventually ripped apart in a catastrophic failure at normal flight loads, No ifs no buts as soon as the first drop of moisture enters the matrix failure at normal flight loads is eventually inevitable.
Yes composites have a very important roll to play in the design and manufacture of 21st century aircraft but not as PRIMARY STRUCTURE !! ( I define PRIMARY STRUCTURE as - if it brakes you are DEAD ! )
Boeings 787 Dreamliner in my opinion will turn into their worst nightmare, they should have listened to their real experts the engineers not the bean counters and marketing staff, when the customers airline engineers start to freak out about their inability to inspect primary structural parts therefore rendering them incapable of assessing the structural integrity of the aircraft, Boeing will be forced to guarantee the structural integrity of the said parts for the life of the aircraft or develop an NDT method which will enable engineers to assess the condition of the component.
Until such times as a reliable NDT program is developed for the entire primary structure of the 787 airframe you will be playing Russian roulette if you fly in one.
If Boeing think expertise is expensive TRY IGNORANCE !!
Boeing will no doubt dispute all of the above and they will as usual shoot the messenger ! my time here will be short but if it opens the mind of even one individual I am happy.
As for the toy Raptor F22 at the price it should be machined from a solid billet of titanium ! and I am betting that the primary structure of a F22 is metal just like the F 18. Yes it does have a lot of composites employed in its secondary and superstructure but the primary structure is still metal exotic maybe but nevertheless metal ! Mostly titanium alloys in the wings I am told.
So you can not compare the conventional airframe of a F 22 with the leap of faith Boeing has taken .