Report: Social Security numbers can be predicted
It is possible to use publicly available data on state and date of birth to predict someone's Social Security number, particularly if they were born after 1988 and in smaller states, according to an article published Monday in The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
The ability to use statistic inference to predict the sensitive data exposes the Social Security numbers to identity fraud risks on "mass scales," the article said.
Social Security numbers "were designed as identifiers at a time when personal computers and identity theft were unthinkable; today, abused as authentication devices, they enable an 'architecture of vulnerability,' in which losses are incurred even in absence of fraud, because of costs caused by attempts to defend, and exploit, the system," the article concluded.
The researchers from Carnegie Mellon University analyzed Social Security numbers of people who have died to detect statistical patterns in the assignment of numbers. They were then able to use those patterns to predict a range of values likely to include a living person's Social Security number. Birth data, meanwhile, can be inferred from data brokers, voter registration lists, online white pages, and social-networking profiles, the report said.
The researchers identified in a single attempt the first five Social Security digits for 44 percent of the records of the people listed as dead from 1989 to 2003 and the complete Social Security numbers in fewer than 1,000 attempts for 8.5 percent of those records.
On average, the researchers matched on the first attempt the first five digits for 7 percent of all records for people born nationwide between 1973 and 1988.
"Extrapolating to the U.S. living population, this would imply the potential identification of millions of SSNs for individuals whose birth data were available," the article says.
The report goes on to give an example of how someone could get the entire Social Security number by renting a botnet to apply for credit cards impersonating 18-year-old West Virginia-born residents. Following numerous assumptions, including that the attacker can find birth data for 50 percent of the potential targets and that inquiries with the correct first seven of nine digits are sufficient for a credit reporting agency to answer a positive match in half of the cases, an attacker could potentially harvest credentials at rates as high as 47 per minute, obtaining 4,000 credentials within two hours before the IP addresses used in the botnet were blacklisted, the article said.
Elinor Mills covers Internet security and privacy. She joined CNET News in 2005 after working as a foreign correspondent for Reuters in Portugal and writing for The Industry Standard, the IDG News Service, and the Associated Press. E-mail Elinor. 






Tougher laws against the criminals would be a good start.
I completely agree. Making tougher and tougher punishment on those who actually cause harm to others makes a lot more sense than making those who have done nothing wrong pile on more and more security or identification.
A constitutionally sound approach needs to be taken to make it extremely difficult to steal ones identity. What does it look like? I am not sure, but tougher sentences is a laughable "solution".
Tougher laws can work, but only if they are/can be enforced. If the risk of being caught and prosecuted is small, even capital punishment is rarely a sufficient deterrent. However, not having tough laws is silly in the extreme as there would be no way to punish those caught. It is not laughable.
There's a slight difference. This article is talking about the possibility of someone stealing your identity by applying some computer resources to data readily available about you. With a new number handed out to people across the country, you eliminate the date/place of birth key to the number, thereby requiring compromise or outright theft to get the ID.
Seriously. I noticed a pattern just by doing tax returns for a few people in my family. Way to go "researchers" from Carnegie Mellon University- you really came up with a breakthrough didn't you?
Unfortunately, if we switch to another ID number, what's stopping criminals from just using that number? The first thing to do would be require a PIN along with the ID number, but even that would be a low-level of security. Anything we have to verify against a databsae (PIN, Fingerprint scan, DNA, whatever) can be hacked into and forged. How many people sign up for a credit card in person versus online or via the mail? Anything physical (token, mag strip) can be stolen. We need a good trifecta of those options to come up with something halfway decent; but I doubt anything will be 100% bulletproof.
OMG WE'RE ALL GONNA DIE!!!!!!!!!
Seriously.... *yawn* BFD. This doesn't worry me at all.
Seems you are in no position to talk about braincells, or the lack there of.
- by beachbum70 August 2, 2009 12:12 PM PDT
- Todd Davis is a lucky dude to have such a crappy service that made him rich. His info is out there and this link prooves it http://www.blogtalkradio.com/OptOutDetectives/blog/2009/07/24/Todd-Davis-from-Lifelock-Not-So-Protected-To-much-info-on-public-data-bases-Opting-out-would-ha
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