The Open Road

The European Commission may be taking its time analyzing the competitive impact of Oracle's proposed acquisition of Sun/MySQL, but the industry can't afford to dither. On Tuesday, MySQL competitor EnterpriseDB announced that Red Hat joined its $19 million Series C funding round, which follows IBM's own investment in EnterpriseDB.

Is the software industry, once devoted to MySQL, preparing to shift allegiances to Postgres?

Probably not, but clouds are forming. On Monday, I talked with EnterpriseDB CEO Ed Boyajian, a former Red Hat executive, and he suggested several reasons for Red Hat's investment of "a significant amount of money" in the open-source database vendor, EnterpriseDB. As he told me:

This is a great step forward for our company and for Postgres. Red Hat has done heroic work bringing commercial open source to mainstream enterprise adoption. And it's making a difference: arguably billions of dollars of spend in operating system and middleware has gone back to customers. You want to talk about returning control to users? That's the real yardstick. That's real disruption.

For EnterpriseDB to have the trust and support of Red Hat as a partner and investor is a huge help to our company and I think it gives another strong indication to enterprise customers challenging their old spending habits, that there is more they can do.

It's important to note that Red Hat has been distributing Postgres for some time. It's in every copy of Red Hat Enterprise Linux and Fedora that Red Hat ships. As such, it's already in the hands of thousands of Red Hat customers and users, and is in heavy demand in some geographies, particularly Latin America. But until now Red Hat has not provided robust support for the database on par with its support for Linux and JBoss.

That's about to change.

The change is good for Red Hat customers, but this isn't the only area in which Red Hat has been seeking to expand its influence. Red Hat has been actively looking for opportunities to invest in a variety of open-source companies, most recently investing in JasperSoft.

Red Hat, once content to go its own way in the software industry, is increasingly concerned with ensuring the vitality of its peers. After all, if Red Hat remains the only sizable open-source vendor, that's an indication of the weakness of the model, not its strength.

Red Hat CEO Jim Whitehurst, however, nicely marries pragmatism with idealism, as suggested by his comments on EnterpriseDB's subscription model:"EnterpriseDB is also working to create customer value through a subscription support model. Clearly, this is a model we see as beneficial."

He's right, but it's interesting to hear him laud a model (i.e., a subscription to proprietary and open-source software, plus maintenance and support) from which he distanced Red Hat in Red Hat's Q1 earnings call. ("I certainly hope for and we certainly like to work with other open source companies out there. But those are fundamentally different business then what we're doing.")

He's right the second time (in the EnterpriseDB news release). They are not fundamentally different business models. I suspect his comments on the earnings call reflected an attempt to get out of an inaccurate and misleading question from the ever-entertaining Trip Chowdhry.

Regardless, Red Hat's investment in Postgres vendor EnterpriseDB suggests that it, along with IBM and others, is prepared to bolster alternatives to MySQL in its larger quest to provide real competition in the database industry.

To be fair, Red Hat's interest in Postgres and EnterpriseDB precedes the EU's intervention in Oracle's proposed acquisition of MySQL. The interest is understandable: Postgres is a great choice for a wide variety of database workloads. It's built for transactions and higher-end use cases, like the Oracle and IBM database workloads that it can replace (or augment).

EnterpriseDB plays into Red Hat's overarching strategy of commoditizing key infrastructure, as Whitehurst has noted. Given that the $20 billion database market is concentrated in just three vendors who control 85 percent of the market, databases are ripe for disruption, disruption that Red Hat can feed from a distance.

Red Hat's investment in EnterpriseDB says more about Red Hat's increasing awareness of its larger role in the open-source ecosystem than it does of any competition with MySQL. It's about time.

As the European Commission continues to evaluate the potentially deleterious effects of Oracle's proposed acquisition of Sun Microsystems and its open-source MySQL database, concern is rising that delay will harm MySQL without helping competition.

One who shares this concern is former MySQL CEO Mårten Mickos. On Thursday, Mickos sent a letter to Neelie Kroes, the European Union's competition commissioner, urging that the deal be approved for the good of the market and MySQL. He also spoke with CNET News' Stephen Shankland on Thursday.

Below is the edited full text of the letter.

---

Helsinki 8 Oct 2009

Mrs. Neelie Kroes
Commissioner for Competition
European Commission, J70
B-1049 Brussels/Brussel
BELGIQUE/BELGIE

Dear Commissioner Kroes,

I am writing to you regarding your review of Oracle's pending acquisition of Sun Microsystems. As I understand it, the EU Commission is concerned about a risk of undue concentration of power in the database market. Having been the CEO of MySQL from 2001 to 2009, and built a business that was serving a new market unmet by Oracle and others, I can agree with the questions posed, but I do not share the concerns that have been expressed. In the following, I will explain why.

In brief, my reasoning is as follows:

1. Oracle has as many compelling business reasons to continue the ramp-up of the MySQL business as Sun Microsystems and MySQL previously did, or even more.
2. Even if Oracle, for whatever reason, would have malicious or ignorant intent regarding MySQL (not that I think so), the positive and massive influence MySQL has on the DBMS market cannot be controlled by a single entity--not even by the owner of the MySQL assets. The users of MySQL exert a more powerful influence in the market than the owner does.

Many expected Oracle to harm MySQL as far back as 2005, when they acquired the InnoDB storage engine that plays a crucial role for many MySQL customers. And yet Oracle increased their investment in InnoDB since that time, making MySQL a stronger player in the market.

For further detail on my views on Oracle's intent, please see this interview with me in Forbes Magazine in April 2009.

It may at first blush seem counterintuitive that control of the MySQL assets does not automatically bestow control of the MySQL installed base. But the free installed base of MySQL--enormous on a planetary scale--is voluntarily but not mandatorily coupled to the commercial market of MySQL. It produces huge benefits to the MySQL business, but it is not controlled by it.

Background

The impetus to write this letter comes from my concern with the talented teams of the MySQL business unit and of Sun Microsystems in general. I am also troubled by certain factual distortions about a subject matter that I am intimately familiar with: MySQL and its business model. Open-source business models are complicated and quite different, and it took many years to fully understand and shape the one of MySQL.

A Finnish citizen, I served as chief executive officer of MySQL from early 2001 to February 2008, when Sun acquired MySQL. After that, I served as senior vice president of the database group at Sun until the end of March 2009. Being the only person to have served as the CEO of MySQL and to have attended every board meeting ever held, I believe I have unique insights into these matters.

To be clear, I resigned from my position in March 2009, and I presently have no commercial or financial interests in the MySQL ecosystem, Sun, or Oracle (or any other vendor in the DBMS market, for that matter), other than my loyalty to Sun employees in general and the MySQL team in particular.

MySQL's Markets and Installed Base

MySQL is the world's most popular open-source relational database, and potentially the most popular relational database of all. It has an enormous influence and impact on the usage and the buying patterns of relational databases (also known as RDBMSs), in particular for Web applications. One might even state that the Internet would not be what it is today, were it not for MySQL. Staffed by a highly talented team of passionate employees, the Swedish company MySQL grew the MySQL business from a small one in 2001 to a massive one in 2008.

"MySQL" refers to two things. On the one hand, there is the huge (community) phenomenon MySQL...On the other hand, there is the business of MySQL...Those two meanings of the term "MySQL" stand in a close mutually beneficial interaction with each other. But most importantly, this interaction is voluntary and cannot be directly controlled by the vendor.

In this discussion, the term "MySQL" refers to two things. On the one hand, there is the huge phenomenon MySQL--an estimated 12 million active installations under a free and open-source software license, millions, if not tens of millions, of skilled users and developers, and tens of thousands of corporations who use MySQL one way or the other.

On the other hand, there is the business of MySQL, which is growing rapidly, thus rewarding the owners of the assets (currently Sun Microsystems).

Those two meanings of the term "MySQL" stand in a close mutually beneficial interaction with each other. But most importantly, this interaction is voluntary and cannot be directly controlled by the vendor.

What I mean is that the vast and free installed base of MySQL is using it of their own free choice, unencumbered by the vendor and under no obligation or restraint. That is the nature of open source. And conversely, the MySQL business is supporting the free installed base of MySQL (by improving the product) voluntarily and in the hope of deriving benefit from the installed base.

This is the paradox of an open-source business, and it took me a long time to truly understand how powerful a force it is. It is unlike any traditional business. The key point is that both the users and the vendors of open source are engaged in a powerful free-market dynamic that cannot be contained by any single entity.

It is in everybody's interest that the two sides of MySQL produce benefit for and derive benefit from each other. But neither group can mandate or control the other one. This is a core philosophy of open-source software and more generally of the "architecture of participation" (as defined by Tim O'Reilly). There is a mutually beneficial voluntary relationship, but there is no control by one group over the other. In more colloquial terms: the owners of MySQL cannot force MySQL users to pay up, and the nonpaying users cannot force the business to subsidize them.

Anyone acquiring the MySQL assets will therefore acquire an ability to control the business aspect, i.e., meaning how MySQL is licensed commercially, but only an opportunity (and no free reign) to derive benefit from the free user base.

This explains how the MySQL business can be valued highly in the market ($1 billion, when acquired by Sun in February 2008) while at the same time providing no way of controlling its installed base. This unusual relationship between market share and installed base is at the core of the topic. The market share is small but controllable, to some degree. The installed base is enormous but not controllable. The installed base is, and can be, hugely beneficial to the owner of MySQL, but only to the extent and for as long as this owner of MySQL enjoys the trust of the installed base.

To put it in numbers, it may be useful to see the usage of MySQL, as divided into three categories:

... Read more

The European Union undoubtedly believes it is taking a principled stance against the specter of antitrust as Oracle attempts to buy Sun Microsystems. As I've written, however, the EU's delay threatens to gift Sun's customers to IBM and other competitors while doing little to no good for its MySQL business. Worse still, the EU may be paving the way for Oracle to drop its bid, only to return to scoop up Sun's software assets at a rock-bottom price.

Think this is far-fetched? Consider the following (increasingly likely) scenario:

Let's say the EU holds up Oracle's acquisition of Sun by four months. In the technology world, this is an eternity. The lack of clarity around the business has already contributed to two woeful quarters from Sun, with Q4 revenue down 31 percent year-over-year.

Sun's revenue drop is bad, but it will almost certainly get worse the longer the EU drags out its "in-depth investigation." How much worse? Perhaps 50 percent. Heck, perhaps as bad as 80 percent. IBM and HP, in particular, have been crowing about hundreds of Sun customers jumping ship in the wake of Oracle's beleaguered acquisition. Thirty-one percent may come to seem like the good ol' days.

The sad thing is that the EU will almost certainly bow to the inevitable and withdraw its objections. It will look silly for holding up a deal on the specious grounds of MySQL's health (it's doing just fine, thank you, and isn't in danger of being lobotomized by Oracle, which likely will prove to be a better manager of this asset than Sun was).

The EU, unfortunately, is likely not to notice just how silly its stance was, and we'll see other companies go through the same rigamarole.

Regardless, Oracle isn't a silly company, and isn't going to pay top dollar for a diminished asset. It would not be surprising to see Oracle drop its offer by as much as 50 percent, claiming it's actually a premium as revenues are down by more than that. (There is precedent for this in Oracle's various offers for PeopleSoft.) Sun, ruined by this point, would have little choice but to capitulate.

All of which would make Oracle's acquisition of Sun's software business even better than before. As Larry Augustin noted, Oracle's $7.4 billion offer for Sun effectively valued the software at $0.00. Getting a better price on the hardware business and still buying the software business for $0.00? That sounds like a sweet deal.

After all, Oracle is primarily interested in Sun's software assets. Getting Sun for $3.7 billion would make it even easier to quickly flip Sun's hardware business to Fujitsu or HP at a profit, which some speculate is waiting in the wings to buy Sun's hardware business and which I noted back in March was considering a joint-bid on Sun with Oracle.

"Angelic" may not be the word most often associated with Oracle. "Shrewd" is more apt, and low-balling Sun after the EU scuppers its value is shrewd business indeed.

EU competition commissioner Neelie Kroes probably means well by holding up Oracle's acquisition of Sun, but the only group she's helping with the investigation is Oracle, which may end up getting Sun for half what it planned to pay. I'm sure Ellison will give her a ride on his yacht for her troubles.

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IBM and Hewlett-Packard could not have planned it any better.

The European Union has launched an in-depth investigation into Oracle's acquisition of Sun, potentially delaying the merger by several more months. In doing so, the EU is actually guaranteeing the demise of Sun's hardware business and gifting it to Sun's competitors by misunderstanding the deal's impact on open source, generally, and on MySQL, specifically.

If you haven't been paying attention, the delay on the merger due to U.S. and EU scrutiny has already resulted in two shockingly bad quarters from Sun. Many enterprise customers are already moving to competitors like IBM because of the uncertainty surrounding the future of Sun products, The Wall Street Journal reports.

Further delay will only compound the problem.

Unlike the U.S., which approved the deal, the EU's Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes is concerned that Oracle's takeover of Sun will end up diminishing competition:

Systems (like MySQL) based on open-source software are increasingly emerging as viable alternatives to proprietary solutions. The Commission has to ensure that such alternatives would continue to be available.

The Commission doesn't have to. MySQL's open-source license already does. It's open source: even Oracle can't put the open-source genie back in the bottle once it has been released, as MySQL has, under the GNU General Public License.

Consider: some of the folks cheering loudest for the EU to clamp down on the proposed merger, like representatives from Monty Program, have already demonstrated Oracle's (and Sun's) lack of control over MySQL. Monty Program has created a significant fork, or derivative, of the MySQL database, and stands to gain much by the EU's obstructionism.

In delaying the merger, the EU isn't helping MySQL. It's helping its competitors, including Drizzle, OurDelta, MariaDB (Monty Program's fork), Percona, etc.

Competition within and around MySQL is alive and well, regardless of Oracle. After all, as former MySQL CEO Marten Mickos has been saying for years, MySQL has never really competed with Oracle, anyway. MySQL serves (and has helped to create) a very different market: the Web database market.

When asked in April if Oracle's bid for Sun would end up hurting MySQL, Mickos responded: "MySQL works for Web-based applications. Oracle is for older, legacy applications." The vast majority of Oracle's revenue comes from enterprise IT. The vast majority of MySQL's revenue comes from Web companies like Facebook, Google, etc.

MySQL and Oracle don't really compete. They live in two very different markets.

So, if anything, Oracle's acquisition of Sun helps it leverage MySQL into a market--the growing Web database market--that its own technology is ill-equipped to manage. It also gets a lower-cost product with which to bludgeon its real enemy, Microsoft, coupled with a greater footprint in the rising open-source developer community.

Open source is not the enemy in this deal. Microsoft is.

The EU, however, has made itself an enemy to Oracle, Sun, and MySQL by holding up the merger, a situation that will only get worse due to its glacial pace, as CIO.co.uk's editor Martin Veitch suggests. Customers are not the beneficiaries of its intervention: Sun's server competitors like IBM are.

Though the EU purports to be in tune with open source, its meddlesome muddling reveals a surprising ignorance of open source, and shows a complete disregard for MySQL's true market opportunity.

UPDATE @ 6:59 Pacific on 9/4/09: I solicited comment from Gartner vice president and Distinguished Analyst, Donald Feinberg, who had this to say:

The EU does not understand open source. This is clear by using DBMS (MySQL) to extend the deadline. It also is clear that this is an attempt to use MySQL as a cover-up to a political agenda. It is protectionism at its worst.

The EU is entering deep water here, water that it clearly does not adequately understand.

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For all the rancor between opposing technology camps--Microsoft vs. the open-source community, Apple vs. Microsoft, etc.--there's a lot more symbiosis going on than meets the eye. In fact, it's hard to imagine Apple without Microsoft, open source without Microsoft, and so on, as Harry McCracken suggests in MacWorld (not online at time of writing).

PC users...have long benefited hugely from the existence of Macs. Microsoft and PC manufacturers have cribbed so many of Apple's good ideas that it's tough to imagine what Windows machines would look like today if the Mac had never existed.

For years, however, that debt went largely unpaid. The PC platform finally started giving back in 2006, when the first Intel-based Macs shipped and the Mac essentially became a PC--and a really good one at that. Intel's mammoth investments in chips are sustainable only because its processors end up in most of the world's Windows PCs. Mac users reap the same technological windfall even though it's the Windows majority that provides the economies of scale.

Of course, Microsoft also propped up Apple's waning fortunes back in 1997 with a $150 million investment and, more importantly, a commitment to build Mac versions of Office and Internet Explorer. Without Microsoft's software on Apple's machines, they arguably would have been much less palatable to the general public.

Not that these two companies are alone in their curious symbiosis. For example, where would open source be without Microsoft? After all, it is Microsoft that helped to create a standardized hardware platform (Intel) for both "desktops" and servers, which paved the way for Linux, but it is also Microsoft that consistently sets the bar, at least on the "desktop," that open-source projects strive to meet and exceed.

Microsoft, in turn, owes a growing debt to open source, and is increasingly getting involved with open source, most recently releasing an open-source software development kit for Bing to help developers write Mac OS X and Cocoa Touch (iPhone) applications. Linux is pushing Microsoft to innovate again in the server and mobile markets, while a host of open-source applications, databases, and middleware challenge it on the Web, "desktop," and mobile.

Open source, whether in Mozilla's (Firefox) hands or Google's (Chrome), is also challenging Apple and Microsoft to innovate again in browser technology, which, in turn, Apple is enabling, at least, in Google's case, through its own open-source WebKit technology.

Strange world, technology. On the ground, there are ideological skirmishes between rival camps of customers. In the boardroom, plots are hatched to ridicule the competition.

But in reality, Microsoft needs Apple needs open source needs Google needs....You get the picture.

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While TechDirt experiments with optimal configurations of digital media business models, Rob Walling has unwittingly landed on a sure-fire way to build billion-dollar open-source companies.

I say "unwittingly" because Walling's post is all about "How to Compete Against Open Source Competition." In the process, he does a fair job of describing how to build an exceptional open-source business.

Walling starts with a reprise of a classic Marten Mickos quote: "open-source software is free if your time is worth nothing." It's pithy and somewhat true, but it's not as rich as Mickos' commentary, which points to an opportunity in Walling's accusation.

Mickos said:

There are two types of people, those who will spend money to save time, and those who will spend time to save money. Striking a balance is important for any open-source company getting into one of the new markets now emerging on line.

With this in mind, Walling deprecates open source for failing to make software easy and intuitive for its users. While this may be true of community-led open source, it's emphatically not true of commercial open source, which has arisen to fill the functional and procedural gaps Wallings points to as ways to beat open source.

In fact, Walling's suggestions for proprietary competitors to open-source projects turn out to be great advice for commercial open-source projects, too:

1. Save your users' time. Ensure a painless installation process, top notch documentation, top notch support, and a minimal learning curve for getting started using your application.
2. Market hard. You have a marketing budget; odds are high your open source competitor does not. If you can position your product well and build a reputation for good documentation, support and usability, you will sell software.
3. Focus on features for your demographic. Your open-source competitor is going to win when it comes to college students, hobbyists, and other groups where time is worth a lot less than licensing cost. You will have an edge with business users since time is highly monetized for entrepreneurs and enterprises. Build features for people who are likely to buy your product.

Again, great advice, but unfortunately for Walling's thesis, there's already a breed of company that is actively following this advice, and it's the commercial open-source projects like JBoss, MindTouch, Openbravo, Pentaho, etc., as well as foundation-led efforts like Eclipse and Mozilla. Such organizations already know how to add the polish, documentation, and features that an organic community may lack.

Just look at how Acquia has boomed as it complements the Drupal community: 200 new customers in the past six months alone, including The Economist, Intuit, Sony Music, Adobe, and more.

Beyond this, and unfortunately for Walling, open-source products also have something that virtually every proprietary product will never have: free distribution and the flexibility and security that comes from source-code access.

In other words, provided that open-source companies can fill the revenue hole with premium features or some other value-added service that compels payment, then the other advantages of open source trump that of proprietary products.

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For years, Microsoft had it easy. The two busiest groups within the software behemoth were the accountants, adding up all the billions in profits, and the CD/DVD burning team, which simply had to burn more copies of Windows and Office to keep up with demand.

Today, life is a little less rosy for Microsoft, as it calls out in its recent 10-K filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. As TechFlash highlights, Google Android is now called out by Microsoft as a competitor, as are Apple, Opera, and Google in browsers, whereas only Mozilla was deemed worthy of Microsoft's competitive glare in 2008.

Even more interesting to me, however, is Microsoft's acknowledgment of its increasing competition with Red Hat, Canonical (Ubuntu), and other open-source companies given the different business models these companies use to undermine Microsoft. Yes, Red Hat has made Microsoft's hit list for years, and it has also called out open source as a threat, but there's a far greater variety of open-source threats for it to worry about now.

Accordingly, Microsoft's annual report for its fiscal year 2009 reads like open-source Whac-A-Mole.

Microsoft highlights its 'desktop' competitors...

Client faces strong competition from well-established companies with differing approaches to the PC market. Competing commercial software products, including variants of Unix, are supplied by competitors such as Apple, Canonical, and Red Hat. Apple takes an integrated approach to the PC experience and has made inroads in share, particularly in the U.S. and in the consumer segment. The Linux operating system, which is also derived from Unix and is available without payment under a General Public License, has gained some acceptance, especially in emerging markets, as competitive pressures lead OEMs to reduce costs and new, lower-price PC form-factors gain adoption. Partners such as Hewlett-Packard and Intel have been actively working with alternative Linux-based operating systems.

The Windows operating system also faces competition from alternative platforms and new devices that may reduce consumer demand for traditional PCs. Competitors such as Apple, Google, Mozilla, and Opera Software Company offer software that competes with the Internet Explorer Web browsing capabilities of Windows products. User and usage volumes on mobile devices are increasing around the world relative to the PC. OEMs have been working to make the Google Android mobile operating system more compatible with small form-factor PCs or netbooks.

...and server competitors...

Our server operating system products face intense competition from a wide variety of server operating systems and server applications, offered by companies with a variety of market approaches....Nearly all computer manufacturers offer server hardware for the Linux operating system and many contribute to Linux operating system development. The competitive position of Linux has also benefited from the large number of compatible applications now produced by many leading commercial and non-commercial software developers. A number of companies supply versions of Linux, including Novell and Red Hat....

Our Web application platform software competes with open source software such as Apache, Linux, MySQL, and PHP, and we compete against Java middleware such as Geronimo, JBoss, and Spring Framework.

...and even office productivity application competitors:

Competitors to the Microsoft Office system include many software application vendors such as Adobe, Apple, Corel, Google, IBM, Novell, Oracle, Red Hat, Zoho, and local application developers in Asia and Europe....The OpenOffice.org project provides a freely downloadable cross-platform application that also has been adapted by various commercial software vendors to sell under their brands, including IBM, Novell, Red Hat, and Sun Microsystems.

One should assume that Microsoft exaggerates the impact of competition in order to stave off further antitrust inquiries, but it's telling that it calls out so much open-source competition for its broad product portfolio.

Of course, open source is also increasingly a tool used by Microsoft to distribute and develop software. Microsoft must choose whether to be a friend or foe to open source, especially as it seeks to build its next billion-dollar businesses.

But given that Microsoft opts to call out the fact that "Certain 'open source' software business models challenge our license-based software model" and that "To the extent open source software gains increasing market acceptance, our sales, revenue, and operating margins may decline," it seems that Microsoft is preoccupied with open source as a threat, rather than as an opportunity. That's unfortunate.

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It's a good thing that Mozilla is profitable, because the open-source foundation would likely struggle to get venture funding.

For any Sand Hill venture capitalist, Mozilla fails to tick any of the correct boxes. While it does have a world-class development organization, Mozilla also relies on an external, unpaid workforce to contribute up to 40 percent of its code. Also, 88 percent of its revenues come from one source, Google, which also happens to be a competitor.

Speaking of competitors, it has three big ones--gargantuan ones. Google, Microsoft, and Apple. Tell a VC that you want to go up against one of these and you're likely to be turned away. Tell them you want to take on all three and, well, they might just make a full-on sprint for the safety of their Aston Martins.

And yet, Mozilla may be superbly positioned to compete with these big competitors precisely because it isn't anything like them: at its core, Mozilla is a nonprofit foundation that wants to save the world more than it wants to make a buck.

The New York Times highlights Mozilla's challenges in a searching review, but it falls just short of highlighting the fact that Mozilla's success derives from its unique mission, which encourages broad development and adoption, and is a direct byproduct of its nonprofit structure.

Because it is a nonprofit, Mozilla can lobby governments differently, and it has. Because it is a nonprofit, Mozilla can focus on delivering an unparalleled user experience, not on figuring out how to monetize the Web, hardware, etc.

Because it is a nonprofit, Mozilla can be truly disruptive in a way that its competitors cannot.

I'm sure there's not a day that goes by that John Lilly, Mitchell Baker, and the other Mozilla executives and employees don't wish that they had the resources their biggest competitors do. I'm equally sure there's not a day that goes by that they don't benefit from the decisions their resource constraints force upon them.

Firefox is as good as it is because of all that Mozilla has...and has not.

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Waiting for Google to crush Microsoft to powder? You might be waiting a long time, as The Wall Street Journal's Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. suggests in a compelling but surprising argument.

Maybe Google and Microsoft don't really want to beat each other up.

Sure, Google has Google Apps to wave in front of Microsoft's face when it gets too serious with Bing, and Microsoft keeps pressing on its online-ad business to keep Google from thinking too hard about Chrome OS. But is Jenkins right?

Do these two rivals really want to upset their cozy corners of dominance in order to take on profit margin-busting forays into their competitors' markets?

Jenkins writes:

Microsoft and Google...have the power to damage each other, and are better off if they don't. They spend a lot of money on deterrence....Even more than the Cold War superpowers, they have every incentive quietly to agree to be deterred without investing quite so much on an arms race....

Their little secret is that neither Google nor Microsoft really have an interest in challenging each other's core franchises, if it means risk to their own. Their posturing is primarily defensive--fear of loss is greater than hope of gain.

And both companies by now have a well-earned reputation for being willing to invest large sums simply to threaten the profits of companies that potentially threaten theirs.

This doesn't mean that the two aren't actually trying to hurt each other. They are. This isn't the World Wrestling Federation, with simulated attacks meant to impress the crowd but not damage the fighters.

But I think Jenkins is right: every move either takes against the other is almost certainly meant to warn more than draw serious blood.

The real opportunities for both companies are not in carving up past markets, but in discovering and profiting from new ones. I can't see Google, for example, wasting much time trying to displace Microsoft Office, because there simply isn't much of an advertising market there, and it's unlikely that Google is going to more efficiently reap what Microsoft has sowed.

Instead, Google is investing in dramatically redefining collaboration and e-mail with Wave, which promises to put Google, not Microsoft, in control of the future "office productivity" market.

Yes, it's exciting to watch the two take swipes at each other. But I wonder, along with Jenkins, if we're seeing feints rather than kidney punches.

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