The Open Road

Is Apple an enterprise software or hardware company? That's the question Gartner's Nick Jones asks, ultimately answering with "you have to have a pretty relaxed definition [of enterprise] before Apple fits it."

It strikes me, however, that "enterprise" isn't something you define. It's just what gets used within the enterprise.

With this definition in mind, Apple clearly fits the "enterprise" moniker, whether Apple wants it or not. As BusinessWeek reported back in 2008, the Mac is finding its way into enterprise computing, with or without the IT department's blessing. Ditto the iPhone.

Is it somehow less enterprise because the CIO didn't issue a policy giving permission?

Maybe "enterprise" means something more than "gets used a lot within the enterprise." In fact, Jones points out a few reasons he, personally, doesn't feel Apple is an enterprise vendor:

Apple does the bare minimum for enterprises, they aren't deeply committed to security, management, road maps, low TCO and so on. And they don't open up the architecture of iPhone enough for third parties to fill the holes.

But, again, is this really how we should define "enterprise?"

It reminds me of the criticisms leveled at open-source software early in its adoption. Originally Linux, for example, wasn't considered "enterprise grade" or "enterprise ready," presumably because it didn't meet Jones' hurdles above.

Now, however, Linux is considered an essential enterprise technology. What changed? Nothing...except adoption.

Here's a test for Jones: while Gartner pooh-poohs Apple's iPhone as an enterprise mobile device, perhaps for a variety of good definitional reasons, will it hold to such a rationale once the iPhone's market share within the enterprise dwarfs that of Windows Mobile, which has lost a third of its market share since 2008?

Seriously, at some point it won't be enough to listen to Microsoft's Ray Ozzie deprecate the iPhone's enterprise credentials because its 100,000-plus applications are "not very deep" and lack the "thousands of man years" that have gone into the applications that run on Windows. It won't make sense. Why? Because no matter how "enterprise grade" those Windows Mobile applications are, few within the enterprise are using them.

Enterprise is as enterprise does. Would you rather work for the company that builds software for the enterprise, or would you prefer to work for the company whose software gets used by the enterprise?

If you can have both, great. But it's silly to say Apple isn't an enterprise company simply because it sells to the enterprise without even trying.

There was a time when Microsoft could skimp on Internet Explorer innovation. Having trounced its Netscape rival, Microsoft rested on its IE laurels for years, barely updating the browser.

Today, Microsoft can't afford to rest on any laurels, least of all with IE.

In part this is due to rising competition. The open-source Mozilla Firefox browser, for example, now tops 24 percent market share and it, along with the Google Chrome browser, and Apple's Safari browser, regularly push well beyond IE's comparatively glacial development.

However, the biggest challenge to Microsoft's IE development inertia is Microsoft itself. As Mozilla's Asa Dotzler posits:

That [IE] team has some really strong people and they're not going to let another release go by where they're still seen as badly trailing. Not with Office moving to the Web. Not with Search and other web services becoming huge revenue opportunities.

Falling short with IE 9 would be the last straw for Web developers' little remaining faith in Microsoft and so they won't miss this opportunity.

The browser used to be a sideshow to Microsoft's Windows and Office cash cows. In the future, however, the browser is the gateway to the next generation of Microsoft dominance...or irrelevance.

As the world moves online, how well Microsoft delivers an innovative browser experience will largely determine the future of the company.

At the same time, how well Mozilla delivers a neutral, innovative Firefox is the industry's best defense against Microsoft and Google too tightly coupling their browsers to their Web services.

It's therefore time for Facebook, IBM, Oracle, Salesforce, and others with a vested interest in an open gateway to an open Web to put their development resources where their mouths are. Contribute to Firefox. Microsoft (and Google) has an interest in building a better browser, yes, but to ensure that browser runs others' services as well as Microsoft's, Microsoft must be kept honest.

Firefox is the best way to accomplish this.

Despite the broad and deep trend toward open-source software, it's telling that Red Hat remains the only large, pure-play open-source vendor.

Without a strong, standalone open-source leader, will commercial open source endure?

The obvious answer is yes, but there are reasons to think that the industry would benefit from a billion-dollar open-source company. Actually, several.

It might seem counterintuitive to suggest that open source, which by its very nature tends to be decentralized and bottom-up in its growth, would benefit by concentrating wealth in a few hegemons.

David is nice, but the fact is that Goliath generally wins.

Take baseball, for example. The New York Times on Monday reported on the importance of the spending power of the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox to the overall strength of the American League. A rising tide may raise all boats. But in the case of baseball, a few dominant teams force the rest of the league to follow suit or die, a curse/blessing that the National League doesn't share.

The stronger Red Hat is, by analogy, the better-positioned it is to set the pace of spending and innovation for other open-source companies.

The same is true in football, i.e. soccer. "Soccernomics" traces the importance of the Manchester Uniteds, Arsenals, and Real Madrids for pulling in fans: fans flock to watch the big teams, either to cheer for them or against them. The prospect of cheering on Hull City to best Bolton simply isn't that appealing.

In a similar manner, Red Hat serves as a beacon for would-be open source buyers. It may be hard to get excited about buying into No-Name Open-Source Vendor X, but buying from an established brand-name vendor like Red Hat? Much more appealing.

The problem, however, is that Red Hat is still a minnow in the global software pool, and its fixed focus on baseline infrastructure leaves it ill-equipped to lead the open-source market. Most open-source start-ups simply don't need Red Hat to thrive, and they derive little value from a partnership with the company.

A lot of companies make money in the shadow of Microsoft. Not so in Red Hat's.

Nor is Red Hat a viable exit for most open-source companies. Google, IBM, and others actively contribute to open-source projects--and arguably contribute even more to the continued health of the commercial open-source ecosystem by offering healthy exits for open-source start-ups.

Tim O'Reilly called out this phenomenon years ago when he suggested that the likely exit for most open-source companies would be acquisitions by proprietary software vendors. This is good for the open-source companies, but it may not be good for open source.

It would be ideal to have a large open-source applications vendor, but it's unlikely we'll get one anytime soon, particularly since successful open-source companies keep getting swallowed by proprietary vendors before they can crack the $100 million mark, much less than $1 billion mark.

It's also possible that we don't need IBM-sized, pure-play open-source companies. After all, we have IBM and its ilk already funding open source.

It's equally likely that getting to such a size with a pure-play open-source model simply isn't possible.

But I think we need a few open-source hegemons, companies that can offer a clear alternative to Oracle and Microsoft for both buyers looking for open-source software solutions and vendors looking for open-source software partners. Such hegemons can also help to fund the growth of the next generation of open-source innovation.

But from where will they come? I'm not sure. Your thoughts, please.

It's a convenient fiction that Microsoft is the source of all evil in the technology world, particularly for a vocal minority within the open-source community.

For such people, Microsoft hate is an excuse for a distinct lack of introspection, and credits Microsoft with far better execution and strategy than it actually possesses.

Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer has a goofy laugh. I'm not sure it's an evil one.

I mention Microsoft because some within the open-source community quickly pounced on the company's inadvertent violation of the GPL in its Windows 7 USB/DVD Download Tool. Microsoft's Peter Galli was quick to acknowledge it:

[The license violation] was not intentional on our part. While we had contracted with a third party to create the tool, we share responsibility as we did not catch it as part of our code review process.

As conspiracies against open source go, it sounds pretty harmless--because it probably is. Open-source licensing is complex enough and the process for acquiring open-source software is loose enough, that there is room for all sorts of error, both nefarious and benign.

Guess what? People--and corporations filled with people--make mistakes. Even Microsoft. If it was as evil as some suspect, the devil himself would be out of a job.

As open-source adoption dramatically increases, we should expect to see errors of this kind increase, and not out of any sinister plan to pilfer open-source code. Errors are natural and are evidence that adoption is spreading beyond the inner sanctum of open sourcerors.

We shouldn't expect open-source adoption to be flawless or painless.

Consider Symbian. The foundation decided to aggressively embrace open source as a way to guide it to an optimistic future, but the process of open-sourcing its code is taking time. A lot of time. As Rich Sands suggests, Symbian may actually be taking too much time, frustrating its community and allowing Google Android to assume the leadership position in open-source mobile platforms.

Who knew that giving away things for free could be so hard?

It's tempting to think that open source should be an automatic reflex for companies and individuals alike. It's not. It takes time to learn how to do it properly, and even then mistakes are possible. Perhaps likely.

In the case of its Windows 7 tool, Microsoft screwed up. It's not the first time, and it's not the last.

But error is not evil.

Google CEO Eric Schmidt argues that competition is just a "click away." By opening up Google's access to personal data as well as the software that collects it, Google is adding substance to that claim.

It won't work to write better software than Google, because Google is not a software company. The only way to beat Google is through superior execution; through better operations.

The way to lose to Google? That's easy: try to sell software that Google is shoveling out the door as free (open source) software.

This thought hit me last week as Google announced the open-sourcing of its Closure tools. These are JavaScript compression tools that Google uses to build its own Web services like Gmail. Basically, Google was saying, "Here's how we build our software services. You can, too."

This follows on the heels of Google open-sourcing other software like Android ("Here's a free mobile operating system to help more people connect to our services"), Gears ("Here's how to run Google-like services offline"), and more, each opening up windows into the software that runs Google's services.

In many ways, Google is giving away the recipe to those that would like to build a Google clone.

The problem? Google is so much more than software.

In fact, one of the primary reasons that Google can write and open-source so much software is that it isn't a software company. Not even remotely. I could have every line of Google's software, both open source and proprietary, and I couldn't hope to compete with Google.

Google is what Google does with the software, and not the software itself.

Ditto for Red Hat. The company used to retain significant chunks of proprietary code in its Red Hat Network offering, but it has released that software under and open-source license in the last year. Doing so hasn't had any effect--positive or negative--on Red Hat's sales, because Red Hat isn't in the business of selling software anymore.

Red Hat, like Google, is in the business of providing services to customers, services enabled by software but which are much more dependent on IT operations and overall efficiency of execution.

And while both companies rely on open-source software to fuel those operations, Google, more than Red Hat, realizes that the conversation has moved on from open-source licenses to higher-order value, a theme that is going mainstream. Cloudera CEO Mike Olson captures this theme well:

The license terms attached to products have become secondary to the value it offers. People now are much more rational about how they adopt technology across the board. Open source is a detail, not a defining characteristic. At Sleepy Cat, we were proud to be an open source company. At Cloudera, I think of us as an enterprise software company that happens to be built on open source software.

Such sentiment would resonate well within the walls of Google's Mountain View headquarters, I suspect.

Even within their respective open-source communities, neither Google nor Red Hat company is particularly saintly. Red Hat has never waited on the Linux Standards Base or industry efforts to coordinate Linux distributions (like United Linux), but instead forged ahead with its own efforts...until the LSB simply adopted Red Hat's distribution as the standard.

Google, for its part, takes flak for dominating its open-source project communities like Android. Google's contributions (or lack thereof) to outside projects, like Linux, don't always mesh well with others in the industry.

To open-source community critics of Red Hat and Google, some advice: get over it.

The companies that spend the most time chumming around, talking up interoperability and the need for everyone to work together are usually the ones losing the race, a race whose rules may be written in software but whose victory depends upon execution.

Google and Red Hat have moved beyond software. Software enables their operations, but software doesn't define such operations. Google, for its part, is open sourcing Microsoft, one line of code at a time, and Microsoft hasn't a clue as to how to respond, because it only knows the old world: competition through better IP.

That world is gone. Open source has killed it. The new world is built on execution and superior IT operations. Google gets this. Red Hat gets this. Microsoft? Not so much.

For those new to open source, whether on the business or development side, it's hard to appreciate just how far the movement has come in the past few years.

In 1998, when I had my first taste of open-source software through my company's investment in Cobalt Networks, virtually no one knew what open source was, including now-common projects like Linux. Things were a little better in 2000, when I joined a Linux start-up (Lineo), but I spent much of my time working with prospective customers to ease their concerns over open-source licenses like the GPL.

By 2004, when a group of friends and I founded the Open Source Business Conference, there was significant, growing awareness of open source, but its adoption was still stymied by Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt, much of it fomented by Microsoft (Steve Ballmer in 2001: "Linux is a cancer") and the SCO Group (lawsuit over the provenance of Linux code in 2003).

Today, SCO Group, once a high-flier, is struggling for existence. Meanwhile, Microsoft has committed another $100,000 to Apache Software Foundation, has started its own open-source foundation, and has embedded significant bits of open-source code within its proprietary programs, among other things.

Linux, for its part, struggled to get noticed in data centers back in 2003. It has since become essential, mission-critical infrastructure across the Global 2000 ranking of public companies

We've come a long way.

This progress reflects itself in the job market, where Linux-related jobs have seen a 6 percent rise in 2009 alone, while Windows-related jobs have plunged by 8 percent, according to data from Dice.com.

But it's also evident in enterprises' willingness--even eagerness--to discuss open-source adoption plans. Virgin America CIO Ravi Simhambhatla tells The Register that his need to do more with less drove the company to adopt open source and suggests that the open-source philosophy is a positive, disruptive force:

Our company doesn't need just another IT team, the more and more we get entrenched in the...way of doing things the less and less room we will make for ourselves to be innovative.

In 2004, when I was trying to find an IT executive to speak at OSBC, it was a lost cause. No one wanted to paint a legal bull's-eye on themselves for SCO or Microsoft. Today, company executives line up to talk up how they're differentiating through open source.

Open source has "arrived," and the signs are everywhere, from the U.S. Defense Department's efforts to boost its open-source adoption further to patent-rich Qualcomm's foray into open source.

Open source is no longer a question of "why" but rather one of "how." It's the way the industry does business, and the way it does development.

No, not everyone in the industry, all of the time. But for those of us who have been involved in open source for even the past five years, it's amazing to see how much things have changed, which suggests they'll evolve even further.

For some within the open-source world, this is unwelcome news. They defined themselves as freedom fighters, battling the forces of proprietary darkness. And as far as good-and-evil metaphors work in technology, they were.

But as that world embraces open source, they're largely left bereft of bogeymen, like old soldiers still struggling against an unseen enemy.

Winning can be a bit disorienting.

All the same, it's time to move on. There are no more vampires to slay, but simply further open-source education to undertake. Enterprises need open source now, more than ever, and they're adopting it now, more than ever.

What a long, strange trip it's been.

Linux jobs in the United States are booming, up 6 percent since January, according to data from Dice.com. This will come as small consolation to Novell employees, however, which weathered another round of layoffs at the Waltham, Mass.-based company.

According to several sources within the company, and confirmed by Novell's public-relations director, Ian Bruce, Novell last week laid off 100 to 130 people of its roughly 3,900 global employees.

While my sources indicated that the Workgroup division was particularly hard-hit, Bruce told me that the cuts came "across the company, both geographically and productwise."

Novell appears to be doing its best in caring for these employees, offering several months of severance pay, apparently based on the number of years with the company, among other factors.

For those remaining employed there, Novell announced this week that it would be suspending 401(k) matching contributions, which followed on the heels of its formal filing on Monday, to that effect, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Novell has spent the past few years attempting to reinvent itself as a Linux company, and it has managed to string together several quarters with strong earnings in its Linux business on the back of its controversial partnership with Microsoft. The company has struggled to compete effectively with Linux-leader Red Hat.

On November 2, a Novell PR representative contacted me to arrange a conversation with CEO Ron Hovsepian about Novell's "new focus in its strategic direction."

Whether this means more or less open source is not yet clear. It is clear, however, that Novell needs to focus more on top-line revenue growth, and not merely ways to cut costs. Until Novell learns to grow business, and not simply reduce expenses, its employees are going to remain all-too-familiar with layoffs.

Some of us take longer than others. Tim O'Reilly moved on years ago from talking about open-source licenses and instead focused on the importance of data to business success. In the open-source industry, we heard his words but clearly didn't understand them.

We kept selling software through our "awkward teenage years," even as Google, 37Signals, Facebook, and others gave it away.

Years later, as Google pays for mountains of open-source code by aggregating data and selling data-rich services, we're starting to grok O'Reilly's message. It's what makes companies like Path Intelligence so interesting.

Redmonk's Stephen O'Grady notes:

Much has been made of the lack of an obvious revenue model for properties like Twitter, and to a lesser extent, Facebook. But when looking at the organizations' balance sheets...it seems self-evident that the value of the data assets involved is seriously underreported...

The economic value being assigned to data helps to explain why, while being sympathetic to questions about Twitter business models, I've never been overwhelmingly concerned. Where the revenue model for the dot-com era "eyeballs" strategy was equal parts indistinct and aspirational, the Web 2.0 businesses are being built out in an era of customers increasingly predisposed to analytics and data driven decision making. In other words, there's a market for their most valuable asset.

As Microsoft's Windows, Office, Xbox, and SharePoint businesses demonstrate, the real money is in the platform business, which is, or which can be, a data business. The more businesses and developers that build upon your software, the more valuable that software becomes. Even systems like Twitter are being turned into platforms.

But how you build the platform is increasingly important. Microsoft is Platform 1.0. Open source is Platform 2.0. It's a more efficient way to build community around a core, which is why Google and other savvy companies increasingly turn to open source as a fundamental way to entice developers, which developers create more software which invites more adoption which yields more data...you get the picture.

It's also why I believe Google Android, in its platform battle with Apple's iPhone, will ultimately prevail, so long as it can work in peaceful coexistence with the developer community (which has not always been the case).

Unlike many open-source companies, however, Google et al. have the singular benefit that since their business is data, not software, they can shepherd open-source development without taking a heavy hand in community management. More open source leads to more adoption, which leads to more data, which leads to the Googles of the world being able to give away even more software for "less than free."

It's genius. And it's amazing that it took so many of us so long to heed the counsel O'Reilly offered years ago.

In sum, this isn't a suggestion that companies should forgo profits in exchange for mindless popularity contests, as 37Signals' Jason Fried rightly pillories.

Instead, it's a call to look for ways to fund open-source development with rich, data-driven businesses. Most open-source companies focus too much on software, and most Web 2.0 companies focus too much on data. It's the blend of the two that makes a company successful.

Just ask Google.

(As an end note, I think Gartner's Brian Prentice is on to something when he speculates that enterprise applications may increasingly be communally developed by IT end users, though perhaps coordinated by vendors. It's a very interesting prospect, one that will enable even more open-source development in an area where data may not fund it.)

The day open source became big business is the day that open-source development exploded. Yes, open source predates the moneyed interests hankering to use it to competitive advantage, but it really wasn't until IBM dropped $1 billion on Linux that companies began paying employees to write free software that the movement saw broad adoption.

That's when open source became more than an efficient way to develop software, and also became a great way to build a business.

However, adding open source to one's business is not magical pixie dust that guarantees its viability. As IBM's Bob Sutor explains:

The basic principles around revenue, profit, loss, taxes, payroll, overhead, accounting, sales, incorporation, health care, and human resources all apply. You can be a starving open source software entrepreneur as easily as a starving proprietary software entrepreneur. No one will excuse basic business failures and screw-ups just because you use open source. Make sure that you will produce a product that people want and in some way will pay for, no matter how indirectly.

Sutor's counsel applies to any company or individual that wants to build a business around open-source software, but arguably some of the industry's best projects are not the product of any one company, but rather of several. Linux, Mozilla, Apache Software Foundation, Eclipse, and other collaborative communities represent an interesting way to use open source to competitive advantage.

In many ways, open source has become a critical component of the software industry because the market has largely moved from vertical businesses (i.e., companies controlling all aspects of production, distribution, etc.) to horizontal markets (i.e., companies focusing on their core competencies and depending on others for complementary functions).

As Gartner's Brian Prentice astutely points out, however, horizontal markets have a flaw:

But this business control system has a inherent risk. Should an organization monopolize a specific segment of a value chain system they can extract a higher percentage of its total proceeds. If the product, or service, in question is price elastic than those additional proceeds will come from other participants in the value chain system.

Case in point? Windows. By owning the operating system, Microsoft threw a wrench into the collective cogs of horizontally oriented software firms like Intel, IBM, and others.

The industry's response--Linux--is a classic example of the open-source approach to mitigating individual choke holds within an industry, as Prentice goes on to write:

What then does a CEO do when facing a squeeze on their profits because a direct, or downstream, supplier is dominating a segment of the value chain system? Besides negotiating a better deal - if they can - they've been left with little choice but to get directly into that segment of the value chain system themselves. But by doing so their organization is distracted from focusing on its own core competency.

The risk of such an undertaking can be mitigated if there is a collective response by similarly affected members of the value chain system. After all, it is usually a shared problem. But collective responses have always had an inherent, and often fatal, flaw. Who owns the resulting assets? Either organizations enter into complex joint venture agreements to sort this out or run the risk of shifting the distortion in the value chain system to another organization.

Again, Linux offers the perfect example. IBM, Intel, Red Hat, and others aren't investing in Linux because they're all chums at the country club together, but rather because they're looking for ways to reduce Microsoft's hold on their own businesses through its control of personal computer and server operating systems.

As an added benefit, it's a great way for companies to collaborate without running afoul of antitrust laws. It's collusion without the collusion.

Intriguingly, even Microsoft is getting into this game. Microsoft's partnership with open-source ad serving company OpenX indicates that Microsoft, too, is figuring out how to use open-source complements to loosen strangleholds competitors like Google may be hoping to throw in its way.

This is why open source is growing so much faster than the rest of the industry, as IDC finds. It's not because we love each other more. Quite the opposite. It's because proprietary vendors have figured out that open-sourcing key complements to their core businesses can be strategically decisive in hurting competitors while helping themselves.