The mobile-computing world is increasingly a two-horse race between Google and Apple, with Apple clearly in the lead but Google Android making up ground quickly. Microsoft and Symbian are also still in the game, but the ultimate winner will be the one that best appeals to consumers or developers.
Or both.
Sexy? Yes. But what about the developers?
This struck home while reading Mark Sigal's analysis of the "inevitability" of Google Android. On his way to dismantling the idea that Google's victory is assured, Sigal stumbles into apparently divergent interest groups:
[U]nlike the PC, where "good enough" was the bar required to seize the market,...for most consumers, their mobile device of choice is a lifestyle decision, a personal, ever-present extension of themselves that is resident in a way that never existed before with the PC--a value proposition that Apple has completely run with on iPhone (and iPod before that).
Fundamentally, though, mobile is a platform play, a game that is largely won by securing the hearts and minds of developers, and for them, the expectation bar is now set pretty high, owing to the success of iPhone across so many domains....
If you're Google (or Microsoft or Symbian), then, who do you target? Developers or consumers?
It's a real question, as while both parties' interests ultimately converge (consumers want developers to make great applications so that those same consumers can pay the developers lots of money), the short-term interests of consumers (sexy product) and developers (ease and richness of development platform) don't necessarily go together.
Motorola RAZR? Sexy product, lame development platform. Windows Mobile? Arguably a solid development platform...with almost zero sex appeal for consumers.
This is why John Carroll is probably right to argue that Microsoft should reinvigorate its mobile strategy with an emphasis on .Net as a powerful way for developers to write powerful mobile applications, it's not going to be enough. Microsoft can port all the business applications it wants for Windows Mobile. It won't matter.
Consumers don't buy business applications. Not until after they've chosen a phone that meets their personal needs, first.
Yes, enterprises do try to dictate corporate standards with Blackberrys and dull Dell PCs heading the list. But in the fast-changing mobile market, you can't hope that consumers will be forced to use your software. You want them to want to do so.
This is why I believe Google has a good chance of taking a serious bite out of Apple, and Symbian and Microsoft do not. Symbian is too difficult an application development platform, as Gartner notes, and Microsoft...is boring.
Not that it needs to be. XBox certainly isn't, and actually helped Microsoft surpass Apple in a recent consumer survey focused on product innovation.
But not in mobile, or even in computers. Apple understands how to create wicked cool products that consumers want, which is why its Mac sales are projected to grow by 26 percent in 2010, right through the recession, and why its iPhone continues to thrive.
But Apple's Achilles heel could well be developers, which are reportedly tiring of Apple's apparently arbitrary application approval and updating process. If Google can continue to help handset manufacturers to achieve the "Wow factor," while simultaneously creating a more open, robust development platform, it just might be able to beat Apple at the game it started.
In other words, the winning mobile vendor will be the one that marries sex appeal for consumers with platform appeal for developers. Google is on course to deliver, but it probably needs to win big with consumers before it makes waves with developers.
In the past week, the open-source business community appears to have reached consensus: making money from open-source software is a bad model, but making money with open source is golden.
This can't be good for Microsoft.
Microsoft has long maintained that as the open-source industry has matured, it has become more and more like the commercial world it sought to leave behind. Fundamental freedoms of open source, like the right to modify source code, are signed away to secure a support contract with Red Hat or another vendor.
In many ways, Microsoft was right. Unfortunately for the Redmond giant, however, the new consensus should lead to less commercialization of open source, and more commercialization around open source. There's a big difference, and it's one that threatens to seriously undermine Microsoft and every other traditional software vendor.
That is, unless Microsoft responds in kind.
The new consensus
This consensus has been articulated by TechDirt, Redmonk's Stephen O'Grady, GigaOm, and here on The Open Road.
In fact, it's a drum I've been beating for over a year as Tim O'Reilly's wisdom on the topic finally caught up with my 33MHz brain.
There are fundamental, strategic benefits to open source: ease of distribution, friction-less adoption, costs, etc. There are also serious downsides when it comes to selling it: people chafe at paying for something if they can get it, or something similar to it, for free.
Such problems don't plague companies like Google, which distributes open-source software to drive more adoption of its proprietary advertising or SaaS services. Even Red Hat isn't really in the software business: not with its Linux distribution, anyway. It's in the business of providing certification and update services; of managing the complexity of an operating system.
It's a great business, but if you had to choose between Google's sales or Red Hat's, it's a no-brainer.
Microsoft's response
As this lightbulb goes on across the industry, companies like Microsoft, which insist on direct monetization of software, with little in the way of open-source complements to fuel adoption (or simply undermine competitors), are going to struggle. More and more companies will give away Microsoft's core business as open-source complements to their own.
So, here's a suggestion for Microsoft as just one good way to respond: open-source Internet Explorer.
Fight Firefox with fire
Cut Google's Chrome and Chrome OS off at the knees. Undermine Mozilla Firefox's raison d'etre. Give the European Commission a reason to love you.
More importantly, give developers something to embrace and extend. Microsoft has been steadily losing browser market share as Firefox eats into it. In some countries, like Germany, Firefox has even surpassed IE's market share.
Fight fire with fire. IE is still the world's most popular browser. Make it the world's most open browser, too.
Every Microsoft business could benefit from this move. Even if one assumes that Microsoft isn't ready to take the plunge and fully open up the development process around IE, here's some comfort: neither has Google around Chrome. Microsoft can still steer the IE ship, even if it were open source.
Microsoft needs a proactive open-source strategy, rather than the reactive policy it has had to date. Open source is a threat, yes, but it's a threat to everyone, especially as the industry collectively comes to grips with open source as a business enabler, rather than as a product to sell.
If Microsoft wants to win big in the new world of Web-based software, it needs a bold strategy. Open-sourcing IE is the starting point.
Follow me on Twitter @mjasay.
For those who have fret about Microsoft fighting against open source, I have news for you: Microsoft's impact on open source may be worse as a friend than as an enemy.
Now with MySQL inside! Yes, we can.
(Credit: Microsoft)Over the past few years, Microsoft has steadily warmed to open source, to the point that it now hosts its own open-source code repository and has seen its Microsoft Public License used more often than venerable licenses like the Mozilla Public License or the Eclipse Public License, according to new data released by Black Duck Software.
The open-source world should be worried.
After all, as IBM's Savio Rodrigues points out, an open-source-friendly Microsoft no longer has qualms about embedding open-source software like MySQL into its products. In particular, Microsoft supports MySQL as part of its Azure cloud service...without paying Sun a dime for the privilege.
It's a completely legitimate way to offer open-source value to Microsoft customers, and is very similar to what Amazon is doing with MySQL.
However, as Rodrigues notes, it's not necessarily good for MySQL, or other open-source projects that could be used this same way:
The larger point is if Amazon, Microsoft, IBM, HP, Google, Cisco, EMC/VMware, or Oracle/Sun offer a simple and supported cloud service for running MySQL, Tomcat, JBoss, Mule, or Apache HTTP instances, what reason do customers have to acquire "enterprise subscriptions" from the vendors developing these open source projects? Until now, the value of an open source "enterprise subscription" has largely been access to support and access to administration and management tooling. In the case of MySQL, the former is provided by Amazon RDS and Azure SQL as part of the per-hour service. Again in the case of MySQL, the latter is rendered unnecessary or replicated through Amazon RDS and Azure SQL tools.
Consider it a super-friendly, and super-dangerous, bear hug.
For those who think that this affects commercial open source and not community-led open source, think again. Money and open source don't grow on trees.
The explosion of open-source development has directly correlated to the explosion of cash investments into open-source projects, starting with IBM's $1 billion commitment to Linux. MySQL, the database, would be a pale shade of what it is today without MySQL AB, the company that has funded the overwhelming majority of its development.
So, is this cause to castigate Microsoft? No. After all, it's really no different from what Amazon, Google, Apple, and others do with open source.
Rather, Microsoft's move should serve as a reminder to open-source companies that they need to upgrade their business models or risk being rendered irrelevant by the cloud and all that it enables vendors to do with open-source software.
After all, the protections that the GNU General Public License (GPL) and other open-source licenses offer in the traditional software world are essentially meaningless in the networked world, where software is used to create services, but isn't actually distributed.
This is as true for Red Hat as it is for open-source start-ups like Openbravo and Talend. Imagine if Amazon decides to start offering JBoss as a cloud service. Or Red Hat Enterprise Linux, for that matter (minus the trademarks).
It could happen. Actually, I'll go one step further: it will happen. It's just a matter of when.
This is why companies like IBM, Google, and increasingly Microsoft strategically invest in open source, but don't try to directly monetize open source. It's also why the "open-source companies" need to figure out a Plan B before Plan A gets taken from them.
Is Apple an enterprise software or hardware company? That's the question Gartner's Nick Jones asks, ultimately answering with "you have to have a pretty relaxed definition [of enterprise] before Apple fits it."
"Enterprise" is defined by the company you keep.
With this definition in mind, Apple clearly fits the "enterprise" moniker, whether Apple wants it or not. As BusinessWeek reported back in 2008, the Mac is finding its way into enterprise computing, with or without the IT department's blessing. Ditto the iPhone.
Is it somehow less enterprise because the CIO didn't issue a policy giving permission?
Maybe "enterprise" means something more than "gets used a lot within the enterprise." In fact, Jones points out a few reasons he, personally, doesn't feel Apple is an enterprise vendor:
Apple does the bare minimum for enterprises, they aren't deeply committed to security, management, road maps, low TCO and so on. And they don't open up the architecture of iPhone enough for third parties to fill the holes.
But, again, is this really how we should define "enterprise?"
It reminds me of the criticisms leveled at open-source software early in its adoption. Originally Linux, for example, wasn't considered "enterprise grade" or "enterprise ready," presumably because it didn't meet Jones' hurdles above.
Now, however, Linux is considered an essential enterprise technology. What changed? Nothing...except adoption.
Here's a test for Jones: while Gartner pooh-poohs Apple's iPhone as an enterprise mobile device, perhaps for a variety of good definitional reasons, will it hold to such a rationale once the iPhone's market share within the enterprise dwarfs that of Windows Mobile, which has lost a third of its market share since 2008?
Seriously, at some point it won't be enough to listen to Microsoft's Ray Ozzie deprecate the iPhone's enterprise credentials because its 100,000-plus applications are "not very deep" and lack the "thousands of man years" that have gone into the applications that run on Windows. It won't make sense. Why? Because no matter how "enterprise grade" those Windows Mobile applications are, few within the enterprise are using them.
Enterprise is as enterprise does. Would you rather work for the company that builds software for the enterprise, or would you prefer to work for the company whose software gets used by the enterprise?
If you can have both, great. But it's silly to say Apple isn't an enterprise company simply because it sells to the enterprise without even trying.
There was a time when Microsoft could skimp on Internet Explorer innovation. Having trounced its Netscape rival, Microsoft rested on its IE laurels for years, barely updating the browser.
In part this is due to rising competition. The open-source Mozilla Firefox browser, for example, now tops 24 percent market share and it, along with the Google Chrome browser, and Apple's Safari browser, regularly push well beyond IE's comparatively glacial development.
However, the biggest challenge to Microsoft's IE development inertia is Microsoft itself. As Mozilla's Asa Dotzler posits:
That [IE] team has some really strong people and they're not going to let another release go by where they're still seen as badly trailing. Not with Office moving to the Web. Not with Search and other web services becoming huge revenue opportunities.
Falling short with IE 9 would be the last straw for Web developers' little remaining faith in Microsoft and so they won't miss this opportunity.
The browser used to be a sideshow to Microsoft's Windows and Office cash cows. In the future, however, the browser is the gateway to the next generation of Microsoft dominance...or irrelevance.
As the world moves online, how well Microsoft delivers an innovative browser experience will largely determine the future of the company.
At the same time, how well Mozilla delivers a neutral, innovative Firefox is the industry's best defense against Microsoft and Google too tightly coupling their browsers to their Web services.
It's therefore time for Facebook, IBM, Oracle, Salesforce, and others with a vested interest in an open gateway to an open Web to put their development resources where their mouths are. Contribute to Firefox. Microsoft (and Google) has an interest in building a better browser, yes, but to ensure that browser runs others' services as well as Microsoft's, Microsoft must be kept honest.
Firefox is the best way to accomplish this.
Despite the broad and deep trend toward open-source software, it's telling that Red Hat remains the only large, pure-play open-source vendor.
Without a strong, standalone open-source leader, will commercial open source endure?
The obvious answer is yes, but there are reasons to think that the industry would benefit from a billion-dollar open-source company. Actually, several.
It might seem counterintuitive to suggest that open source, which by its very nature tends to be decentralized and bottom-up in its growth, would benefit by concentrating wealth in a few hegemons.
David is nice, but the fact is that Goliath generally wins.
Open source needs a few more of these.
Take baseball, for example. The New York Times on Monday reported on the importance of the spending power of the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox to the overall strength of the American League. A rising tide may raise all boats. But in the case of baseball, a few dominant teams force the rest of the league to follow suit or die, a curse/blessing that the National League doesn't share.
The stronger Red Hat is, by analogy, the better-positioned it is to set the pace of spending and innovation for other open-source companies.
The same is true in football, i.e. soccer. "Soccernomics" traces the importance of the Manchester Uniteds, Arsenals, and Real Madrids for pulling in fans: fans flock to watch the big teams, either to cheer for them or against them. The prospect of cheering on Hull City to best Bolton simply isn't that appealing.
In a similar manner, Red Hat serves as a beacon for would-be open source buyers. It may be hard to get excited about buying into No-Name Open-Source Vendor X, but buying from an established brand-name vendor like Red Hat? Much more appealing.
The problem, however, is that Red Hat is still a minnow in the global software pool, and its fixed focus on baseline infrastructure leaves it ill-equipped to lead the open-source market. Most open-source start-ups simply don't need Red Hat to thrive, and they derive little value from a partnership with the company.
A lot of companies make money in the shadow of Microsoft. Not so in Red Hat's.
Nor is Red Hat a viable exit for most open-source companies. Google, IBM, and others actively contribute to open-source projects--and arguably contribute even more to the continued health of the commercial open-source ecosystem by offering healthy exits for open-source start-ups.
Tim O'Reilly called out this phenomenon years ago when he suggested that the likely exit for most open-source companies would be acquisitions by proprietary software vendors. This is good for the open-source companies, but it may not be good for open source.
It would be ideal to have a large open-source applications vendor, but it's unlikely we'll get one anytime soon, particularly since successful open-source companies keep getting swallowed by proprietary vendors before they can crack the $100 million mark, much less than $1 billion mark.
It's also possible that we don't need IBM-sized, pure-play open-source companies. After all, we have IBM and its ilk already funding open source.
It's equally likely that getting to such a size with a pure-play open-source model simply isn't possible.
But I think we need a few open-source hegemons, companies that can offer a clear alternative to Oracle and Microsoft for both buyers looking for open-source software solutions and vendors looking for open-source software partners. Such hegemons can also help to fund the growth of the next generation of open-source innovation.
But from where will they come? I'm not sure. Your thoughts, please.
It's a convenient fiction that Microsoft is the source of all evil in the technology world, particularly for a vocal minority within the open-source community.
For such people, Microsoft hate is an excuse for a distinct lack of introspection, and credits Microsoft with far better execution and strategy than it actually possesses.
Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer has a goofy laugh. I'm not sure it's an evil one.
I mention Microsoft because some within the open-source community quickly pounced on the company's inadvertent violation of the GPL in its Windows 7 USB/DVD Download Tool. Microsoft's Peter Galli was quick to acknowledge it:
[The license violation] was not intentional on our part. While we had contracted with a third party to create the tool, we share responsibility as we did not catch it as part of our code review process.
As conspiracies against open source go, it sounds pretty harmless--because it probably is. Open-source licensing is complex enough and the process for acquiring open-source software is loose enough, that there is room for all sorts of error, both nefarious and benign.
Guess what? People--and corporations filled with people--make mistakes. Even Microsoft. If it was as evil as some suspect, the devil himself would be out of a job.
As open-source adoption dramatically increases, we should expect to see errors of this kind increase, and not out of any sinister plan to pilfer open-source code. Errors are natural and are evidence that adoption is spreading beyond the inner sanctum of open sourcerors.
We shouldn't expect open-source adoption to be flawless or painless.
Consider Symbian. The foundation decided to aggressively embrace open source as a way to guide it to an optimistic future, but the process of open-sourcing its code is taking time. A lot of time. As Rich Sands suggests, Symbian may actually be taking too much time, frustrating its community and allowing Google Android to assume the leadership position in open-source mobile platforms.
Who knew that giving away things for free could be so hard?
It's tempting to think that open source should be an automatic reflex for companies and individuals alike. It's not. It takes time to learn how to do it properly, and even then mistakes are possible. Perhaps likely.
In the case of its Windows 7 tool, Microsoft screwed up. It's not the first time, and it's not the last.
But error is not evil.
Google CEO Eric Schmidt argues that competition is just a "click away." By opening up Google's access to personal data as well as the software that collects it, Google is adding substance to that claim.
Google's secret sauce? Operations.
It won't work to write better software than Google, because Google is not a software company. The only way to beat Google is through superior execution; through better operations.
The way to lose to Google? That's easy: try to sell software that Google is shoveling out the door as free (open source) software.
This thought hit me last week as Google announced the open-sourcing of its Closure tools. These are JavaScript compression tools that Google uses to build its own Web services like Gmail. Basically, Google was saying, "Here's how we build our software services. You can, too."
This follows on the heels of Google open-sourcing other software like Android ("Here's a free mobile operating system to help more people connect to our services"), Gears ("Here's how to run Google-like services offline"), and more, each opening up windows into the software that runs Google's services.
In many ways, Google is giving away the recipe to those that would like to build a Google clone.
The problem? Google is so much more than software.
In fact, one of the primary reasons that Google can write and open-source so much software is that it isn't a software company. Not even remotely. I could have every line of Google's software, both open source and proprietary, and I couldn't hope to compete with Google.
Google is what Google does with the software, and not the software itself.
Ditto for Red Hat. The company used to retain significant chunks of proprietary code in its Red Hat Network offering, but it has released that software under and open-source license in the last year. Doing so hasn't had any effect--positive or negative--on Red Hat's sales, because Red Hat isn't in the business of selling software anymore.
Red Hat, like Google, is in the business of providing services to customers, services enabled by software but which are much more dependent on IT operations and overall efficiency of execution.
And while both companies rely on open-source software to fuel those operations, Google, more than Red Hat, realizes that the conversation has moved on from open-source licenses to higher-order value, a theme that is going mainstream. Cloudera CEO Mike Olson captures this theme well:
The license terms attached to products have become secondary to the value it offers. People now are much more rational about how they adopt technology across the board. Open source is a detail, not a defining characteristic. At Sleepy Cat, we were proud to be an open source company. At Cloudera, I think of us as an enterprise software company that happens to be built on open source software.
Such sentiment would resonate well within the walls of Google's Mountain View headquarters, I suspect.
Even within their respective open-source communities, neither Google nor Red Hat company is particularly saintly. Red Hat has never waited on the Linux Standards Base or industry efforts to coordinate Linux distributions (like United Linux), but instead forged ahead with its own efforts...until the LSB simply adopted Red Hat's distribution as the standard.
Google, for its part, takes flak for dominating its open-source project communities like Android. Google's contributions (or lack thereof) to outside projects, like Linux, don't always mesh well with others in the industry.
To open-source community critics of Red Hat and Google, some advice: get over it.
The companies that spend the most time chumming around, talking up interoperability and the need for everyone to work together are usually the ones losing the race, a race whose rules may be written in software but whose victory depends upon execution.
Google and Red Hat have moved beyond software. Software enables their operations, but software doesn't define such operations. Google, for its part, is open sourcing Microsoft, one line of code at a time, and Microsoft hasn't a clue as to how to respond, because it only knows the old world: competition through better IP.
That world is gone. Open source has killed it. The new world is built on execution and superior IT operations. Google gets this. Red Hat gets this. Microsoft? Not so much.
For those new to open source, whether on the business or development side, it's hard to appreciate just how far the movement has come in the past few years.
In 1998, when I had my first taste of open-source software through my company's investment in Cobalt Networks, virtually no one knew what open source was, including now-common projects like Linux. Things were a little better in 2000, when I joined a Linux start-up (Lineo), but I spent much of my time working with prospective customers to ease their concerns over open-source licenses like the GPL.
The world is open source's oyster.
By 2004, when a group of friends and I founded the Open Source Business Conference, there was significant, growing awareness of open source, but its adoption was still stymied by Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt, much of it fomented by Microsoft (Steve Ballmer in 2001: "Linux is a cancer") and the SCO Group (lawsuit over the provenance of Linux code in 2003).
Today, SCO Group, once a high-flier, is struggling for existence. Meanwhile, Microsoft has committed another $100,000 to Apache Software Foundation, has started its own open-source foundation, and has embedded significant bits of open-source code within its proprietary programs, among other things.
Linux, for its part, struggled to get noticed in data centers back in 2003. It has since become essential, mission-critical infrastructure across the Global 2000 ranking of public companies
We've come a long way.
This progress reflects itself in the job market, where Linux-related jobs have seen a 6 percent rise in 2009 alone, while Windows-related jobs have plunged by 8 percent, according to data from Dice.com.
But it's also evident in enterprises' willingness--even eagerness--to discuss open-source adoption plans. Virgin America CIO Ravi Simhambhatla tells The Register that his need to do more with less drove the company to adopt open source and suggests that the open-source philosophy is a positive, disruptive force:
Our company doesn't need just another IT team, the more and more we get entrenched in the...way of doing things the less and less room we will make for ourselves to be innovative.
In 2004, when I was trying to find an IT executive to speak at OSBC, it was a lost cause. No one wanted to paint a legal bull's-eye on themselves for SCO or Microsoft. Today, company executives line up to talk up how they're differentiating through open source.
Open source has "arrived," and the signs are everywhere, from the U.S. Defense Department's efforts to boost its open-source adoption further to patent-rich Qualcomm's foray into open source.
Open source is no longer a question of "why" but rather one of "how." It's the way the industry does business, and the way it does development.
No, not everyone in the industry, all of the time. But for those of us who have been involved in open source for even the past five years, it's amazing to see how much things have changed, which suggests they'll evolve even further.
For some within the open-source world, this is unwelcome news. They defined themselves as freedom fighters, battling the forces of proprietary darkness. And as far as good-and-evil metaphors work in technology, they were.
But as that world embraces open source, they're largely left bereft of bogeymen, like old soldiers still struggling against an unseen enemy.
Winning can be a bit disorienting.
All the same, it's time to move on. There are no more vampires to slay, but simply further open-source education to undertake. Enterprises need open source now, more than ever, and they're adopting it now, more than ever.
What a long, strange trip it's been.
Linux jobs in the United States are booming, up 6 percent since January, according to data from Dice.com. This will come as small consolation to Novell employees, however, which weathered another round of layoffs at the Waltham, Mass.-based company.
According to several sources within the company, and confirmed by Novell's public-relations director, Ian Bruce, Novell last week laid off 100 to 130 people of its roughly 3,900 global employees.
While my sources indicated that the Workgroup division was particularly hard-hit, Bruce told me that the cuts came "across the company, both geographically and productwise."
Novell appears to be doing its best in caring for these employees, offering several months of severance pay, apparently based on the number of years with the company, among other factors.
For those remaining employed there, Novell announced this week that it would be suspending 401(k) matching contributions, which followed on the heels of its formal filing on Monday, to that effect, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Novell has spent the past few years attempting to reinvent itself as a Linux company, and it has managed to string together several quarters with strong earnings in its Linux business on the back of its controversial partnership with Microsoft. The company has struggled to compete effectively with Linux-leader Red Hat.
On November 2, a Novell PR representative contacted me to arrange a conversation with CEO Ron Hovsepian about Novell's "new focus in its strategic direction."
Whether this means more or less open source is not yet clear. It is clear, however, that Novell needs to focus more on top-line revenue growth, and not merely ways to cut costs. Until Novell learns to grow business, and not simply reduce expenses, its employees are going to remain all-too-familiar with layoffs.
