Defense in Depth

Window Snyder, Mozilla's chief security something-or-other (her official title), wants to bring open source practices to the security community.

"At a lot of companies," she told me recently, "there's fear around security: you don't want to talk about what you're doing around security because one might deem it not enough--or might want to criticize it." She said most companies have a lot of reasons to keep what you're doing in security quiet, but not Mozilla. "We benefit from being open; it's the model for us and it's been successful for us."

Snyder started her security work at @Stake (now a part of Symantec) then went to Microsoft and later Matasano Security. She describes her journey as moving toward open source with each environment. At Mozilla, makers of the popular Firefox browser, Thunderbird e-mail client, and other open software, she's pretty much at ground zero.

Snyder said the idea of opening up security came about by asking, "What are we doing internally that we can make publicly available to help somebody else in some other project."

They decided to start out small. "We're starting off with secure programs and practices for C and C++. There is a focus on how to make it useful for a browser, but there is of course a general aspect to this. It's training materials, it's syllabi, exercises, it's a workshop-style class. Hopefully we'll be able to do video as well." The idea is that one employee from a company can attend these workshops and then take the training back home to train even more people.

Johnathan Nightingale of Mozilla echoed this. "It's pretty brittle if there's only one person who is the security guy or gal that always solves a problem. It's better to get that knowledge out there--whether it's working on Mozilla or some other project. By working at understanding the good habits and the bad habits, you've made a huge step forward."

In addition to training sessions, Mozilla will be making a variety of tools available. Last year Mozilla released a protocol fuzzer created by Michael Eddington, and a Javascript fuzzer created by Jesse Ruderman. Further, Mozilla admitted that these tools had found vulnerabilities within Firefox. Accepting that openness, Opera reported that the tools had also discovered a flaw within its browser product. Microsoft, maker of Internet Explorer, and Apple, maker of Safari, haven't revealed whether they used the tool to detect any flaws in their products.

Snyder says often the security story isn't that a company created a tool that found 14 vulnerabilities in it own product, it's that there were 14 vulnerabilities in the product in the first place. "Why would they want to share this tool? Maybe they want to demonstrate how successful it was because it found a vulnerability. That's something that we can do that other companies cannot."

In addition to training and tools, Mozilla wants to talk more about security metrics and threat modeling.

In this video, Window Snyder talks about security metrics.

"Threat modeling is a methodology for identifying security vulnerabilities, for identifying the risks of a security vulnerability within that application," Snyder said. "Making a threat model available shows other development environments how a complex application like Firefox gets deconstructed into threats, along with the mitigations that we've implemented to address those specific threats.

"But it also gets us feedback on whether or mitigations are sufficient. It gets the research community engaged in another point in the development process. Instead of looking for vulnerabilities at the end of the lifecycle, they're able to get involved in the threat modeling process which is between design and implementation, ideally. You want to be able to do it early enough in the process so that you can actually change at the architectural level as the result of threat modeling."

The goal, she said, is to remove whole categories of vulnerabilities. "Here's a pattern, and if we implement one architectural change we can eliminate all these vulnerabilities."

Threat modeling is more theoretical; it's abstract. "So, instead of saying concretely if you do this that and the other thing, that will result in an actual vulnerability, threat modeling, says there is no input validation mechanism, for example. If you send a request this way, you end up bypassing the input validation mechanism and you're sending content, unvalidated to this audio decoder. That would be scary. So the threat would be unvalidated content is being passed directly to the audio decoder if it comes in this way. A vulnerability would be there's an overflow in the audio decoder that an attacker is able to trigger if they craft a URL this way, and because it bypasses the input validation mechanism, all these other mechanisms that would have protected from an exploit are bypassed as well."

She concludes that the training, the tools, and the threat modeling is "good for peer reviews, it's good for testers, it's good for developers." She sees it as delivering on a promise to "to make the Web more secure."

Mozilla has been steadily demonstrating how open source projects can make money without betraying their community goals. At Mozilla, she says "we absorb the costs in criticism and we tolerate that in security because the benefit for us far outweighs everything else."

Last week, a new report (PDF) on emerging threats from the Georgia Tech Information Security Center mentioned, among other predictions, that botnets were likely to hit mobile phones sometime in the next year. On Tuesday, I spoke with VeriSign CTO Ken Silva about that possibility and why it might happen within the coming year.

"Criminals will go where the money is," Silva told CNET News. "If you start doing things of financial interest with your mobile phone, they will find a way to get your money."

Silva said the mobile phone market is changing. Today's mobile phones don't just make phone calls, they stream video and support content. "Most consumers did not care about a smartphone until Windows Mobile, the Apple iPhone, and now Google Android came along. Now more and more consumers want smartphones. Kids want them; it's a cool phone to have."

Silva said that smartphones tend to use either Java-based Blackberry OS, Mac OS, or Windows Mobile OS as platforms, and it is this standardization of operating systems that should make it easier for criminals to target their victims. The way mobile users browse the Web already is standardizing. With Windows Mobile you have Internet Explorer, and on Apple's iPhone you have Safari. Both of these browsers have vulnerabilities that can be exploited, although not always on the mobile version.

Another compelling reason to think malware is coming soon to your smartphone is more bandwidth. Because of the streaming media options, this year's phones process data much faster than last year's models.

One possible malware vector might be new application downloads. "People are thirsty for applications to run on their devices," Silva said. "Despite the fact Apple has gone to great lengths to make sure the applications are signed (and) have gone through a vetting process, users continue to break their iPhone and install software outside the channel."

Silva doesn't, however, think denial-of-service (DoS) attacks will be the first choice of botnets operating on mobile phones. For one thing, DoS attacks require always-on computers, and mobile devices are not always on or connected to the Internet.

He ranks DoS attacks second behind data theft. "These smartphones now have e-mail on them--and also corporate e-mail on them. We're doing more personal transactions with them." Silva thinks it's the rise of mobile payments and the popularity of banking on mobile phones in Europe and Asia that are leading malware to the mobile phone.

"If we've learned nothing else from the desktop, we should have learned that software needs to be secure right from the get-go." We have opportunity on the mobile platform to write secure code, he said, knowing what has happened on the desktop.

As for the currently status of botnets operating on mobile phones: "Definitely theoretical." But Silva adds, "Someone--just to prove the point--will develop a toolkit to do it." So it's never too early to be thinking about this problem.

Your ordinary bank robber can now steal hundreds of account numbers from ATMs without so much as lifting a finger. Instead, he skims.

Skimming is the physical use of secondary readers to capture the magnetic tracks on the backs of credit and debit cards. On ATMs, skimmers and secondary keypads are used to capture account numbers and PINs. Often, the ATM transaction goes through, and the customer doesn't realize that the account has been compromised until later.

Two risks these high-tech criminals face are being caught fitting a faux cover over an ordinary ATM card slot and keypad, then later retrieving the skimmers in order to get the account information.

With the arrest last week of "Chao," a Turkish ATM skimmer, comes new information on the lifestyles of modern bank robbers, including details on new devices that send captured account data via SMS to their smartphones.

For about $8,000, skimmers can have their own ATM overlay capable of transmitting 1,856 cards via SMS. Bulk pricing is available. And if they don't want the information sent card by card, they can dial into the device and download the data at their convenience.

You're probably saying, "wait, I'd notice the compromise." Not so fast. These guys are good. Very good. See the photos of a compromised ATM machine on Snopes.com. Or watch this video to see how ATM skimming with SMS was accomplished last year in Pennsylvania.

Skimming got its start in South Africa, and since 2004, there have been a handful of noteworthy cases in the United States, affecting ATMs in Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Austin, Texas. Late last year, Citibank replaced debit cards for its Manhattan customers because of a skimming operation there.

Last February, during a presentation by Billy Rios and Nitesh Dhanjani at the Black Hat conference in Washington, I saw a photograph of a warehouse full of ATM card input overlays from one of the criminal enterprises they stumbled upon. You want black? They got black. You want beige? They have that. What about white or gray? Covered.

Industry standardization of ATM readers makes it easier for criminals to copy, so a bank robber needs only to match the look and style. A second photo showed boxes of keypad overlays. Large. Small. Again, you need only to match the look and style.

Once the account information is captured, the criminals tend to burn it onto blank magnetic stripe cards (ISO standard 7810), then use it at ATMs worldwide.

How are they able to fool so many people? In a blog on ZDNet, Dancho Danchev speculates that there might be some collusion with individuals working with ATM manufacturers. His blog is full of details from a site offering these overlays.

There is a downside to having the SMS service. As with a cell phone, the devices need batteries, which wear out. And some SMS transmissions simply fail. Still, if a criminal gets 1,500 bank account numbers, I don't think they're going to mind.

Debit cards and PINs are hot subjects on the criminal underground forums these days, Tom Rusin said on a recent visit to CNET. Rusin is president of North American operations at Affinion Group, a company that monitors the criminal underground for several thousand banking institutions by lurking in carder chat rooms.

"Carders" are the people who buy, sell, and trade online the credit card data stolen from phishing sites or from large data breaches at retail stores. Affinion is one of the largest identity protection companies in the world, with offices in more than a dozen countries. Over the years, it has provided a wealth of information to the U.S. Secret Service and the FBI. A few weeks ago, Affinion identified .Mac users who found themselves victims of a phishing scam.

While scrolling through posts in an online underground criminal forum on his laptop, Rosin explained that since "every American keeps some money in their savings account," unlike when stealing credit cards, debit cards grant thieves immediate access to cash. Next in demand are usernames and passwords because "most people use the same password on the sites they visit."

Carders once used to peddle their wares on forums as "novs" for novelties, as though they were only providing fake accounts or fake personal details for fun. What Rusin showed me on his laptop were bold, even boastful, claims. For example, today they're not just selling card information online.

Threaded among the expected offers in the forum were those for proxy servers and bullet-proof servers (i.e. servers that are unlikely to ever be shut down, located in parts of the world where the law often doesn't reach). These are used in conjunction with phishing kits (packages that help you create your own fake Bank of America page), which are also for sale.

Getting to this level of access hasn't been easy, Rusin said. Carders are tremendously paranoid. Often, just to gain access to the forums, you have to demonstrate your chops by providing up to five active credit card account numbers. It's the equivalent of gang or mafia initiation.

Rusin says Affinion has been establishing its carder credentials since 1998 or so. The company maintains several credit cards, accounts that they use to test their own software as well as that of others in spotting customer's data among the carder forums. For example, they once fed an Affinion credit card account to a carder, then watched at the bank's end of things.

There is a predictable pattern. Often, the purchasing individual will first run a $1 transaction through to a charity--say, the American Red Cross. Once that transaction is authenticated, a flood of illegal purchases cascade in until the card account is shut down.

That's an example of what's known in the business as an "account takeover," the most common use of personal information, in which thieves start using your active account without your knowledge. The effect is immediate, and the losses can be large.

The next most common use, according to Rusin, is new-account creation. This is a slower process, and it often involves establishing utility accounts. Here, the goal is to actually become someone else so that if it ever gets to court, a jury would have a tough time determining the difference between your transactions and another's.

New-account creation requires that a carder have a Social Security number, birth date, and mother's maiden name, at least. Rusin explained that a "full" profile will contain a name, address, SSN, date of birth, and driver's license number. Scrolling through the forum, he fingered one of the entries on the screen and said, "this guy's selling U.S. fulls for $20."

Rusin says that once a criminal has your Social Security number, it's possible to find the rest of that personal information from various sources via Google. "Typically, they're garnished from phishes but also from hacks. It's everything I need to become you. So your identity in the underground is worth about 20 bucks."

Terrorists, not just organized criminals, are interested in stealing and using your credit card history. That's one of the surprising trends identified by Rusin and documented in a Department of Justice white paper (PDF) that cites the increasing involvement of terrorist networks, starting as far back as the 2002 bombing in Bali.

In 2007, FaceTime Communications' Chris Boyd and Wayne Porter gave a standing room-only talk at the RSA Conference in San Francisco on a botnet they'd traced back to the Q8 Army sites.

Unfortunately, personal information is going to flow, admits Rusin. He cites high-profile data breaches such as the ones affecting ChoicePoint and the parent company of TJ Maxx.

Rusin, whose company also sells ID protection services, likens the process of ID monitoring to having a smoke detector: "You should have a smoke detector in your house." So the goal isn't necessarily to stop ID fraud, but rather to manage it.

In addition to having antivirus software and a firewall to protect our digital information on our desktops, it looks as if we now need ID protection for our real-world information as well.

You can hear more of my interview with Tom Rusin in this week's Security Bites podcast.

What if you wanted to build your own botnet to act as a spam relay or to launch a denial-of-service attack against an organization or a country? "It's actually a lot of work," says Joe Stewart, director of malware research at SecureWorks.

I had a chance to talk with Stewart at this year's Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas where, in a talk, he provided insight into the inner workings of one botnet, the Storm worm botnet. Using unpackers, debuggers, and decompilers, Stewart was able to dissect the rogue network and learn how it works and why Storm remains so resilient when other botnets simply fail over time.

Joe Stewart of SecureWorks at Black Hat Las Vegas 2008

(Credit: Robert Vamosi / CNET)

Botnets, whose combined computing power can equal that of a large supercomputer, are organic, yet they only evolve when they need to, such as after they've been discovered and shut down, Stewart said. But he said anyone wanting to copy a successful botnet like Storm would simply be wasting their time. While all the coding tricks used to make Storm successful are available on the Internet, it's combining them that's the trick.

"How you are going to make all that work for your specific needs? It's pretty complex," he said. "The person who developed Storm did it over a long period of time. They didn't start out with the peer-to-peer program (as used today); they started out with something much simpler. They then made small modifications. A lot of hours have been put into it."

Storm's structure
A basic botnet would includes a Command and Control (C&C) server contacted to thousands of compromised desktop computers worldwide. Were that always the case, botnets could be taken down quickly by simply finding and shutting down the C&C server. Storm's approach is more nuanced and layered. Top level is a Command & Control server running Apache (presumably somewhere in Russia). Next level is a server running a Nginx 0.5.17 proxy; this server is designed to hide the Apache machine from view. At the third level are a couple more Nginx 0.5.17 proxies used to hide the master Nginx 0.5.17 proxy from view. Sitting at the fourth level are public nodes that act as reverse proxies leading back to the controller and perform as fast-flux name servers. Fast flux means that a hard-coded URL can be sent out with the bot code, but where that URL resolves changes.

The final level is composed of thousands of compromised computers worldwide. Stewart says that Storm starts out infecting a computer with a dropper. Right now the preferred infection process is via an e-mail link, but this might change to a peer-to-peer process. However infected, the initial click by the end user installs a rootkit which, in turn, reaches out to the EXE file from a fourth-level supernode. Once infected, the compromised computer and supernode trade the infected desktop's IP information. This information is sent to a third-level supernode proxy as pert of its mapping operation. At the third level it is also compressed and encoded for obfuscation, then sent on to the second level proxy, and finally to the top level server.

Overnet/eDonkey
At the second and third levels, the Nginx proxies listen for Overnet/eDonkey peer-to-peer Internet traffic. Overnet/eDonkey was a popular peer-to-peer network application until it was shut down by the Recording Industry Association of America. While the service is gone, the code still exists. What botnet operators like most is Overnet/eDonkey's distributed nature; it lacks a central peer list. Thus, each of the nodes keeps only a small list of neighboring peers.

This decentralized network is what Stewart and many other experts say is the key to Storm's resilience.

And it almost proved to be Storm's undoing. Overnet/eDonkey is still used for file-sharing, so in Storm's view there is a lot of bogus traffic out there. To better distinguish its traffic from other traffic, Stewart says Storm uses the Kadamlia distributed hash table (DHT) and its C&C servers listen only for predictable MD4 hashes. Those hashes are derived from a simple checksum algorithm that includes IP address and the port used. Authentication is accomplished through a 4-byte challenge and response.

The predictable hashes also have a positive effect for researchers, says Stewart: If a given peer doesn't know the location of the specific node you're searching for, the known peer will provide you with a list of peers closest to what you asked for. And, because the Overnet/eDonkey supernode peers all broadcast their presence, Stewart and other researchers can walk all the nodes in a network to get a fairly accurate count of the botnet's size.

Not perfect
Lately, though, Storm has been evolving yet again. This time it's isolating its network further from the general Internet traffic by encrypting packets using an embedded key and simple XOR. It also has been changing its initial infection packing or compression process. The outer layers change every 10 minutes, while the interior bot code changes packing more on the order of once a month. Neither the packing nor the encryption have so far proven defeating to security researchers.

However, one downside to encryption is that Storm's handlers could now segment parts of their network--that is, they could rent or sell off pieces of the botnet to others. Although speculation around segmentation has been widespread, Stewart says he has not observed it.

In addition to Stewart's research, see Brandon Enright's report for another detailed look at the structure of this venerable botnet.

LAS VEGAS--On the second day of the Black Hat security conference, a trio of journalists turned on other journalists within the press room.

This was my ninth Black Hat in nine years, and I have lived in dread year after year that such a headline would affect me. On Thursday, CNET News was named as one of the two organizations "hacked," but I disagree that any such hack occurred.

Just before noon on Thursday, a trio of reporters from Global Security Mag sat in one of the two press rooms at Black Hat. Both rooms have a wired LAN that is a separate part of the wireless network open to all attending the security conference. What happened on Thursday was not a wireless attack--it is important to stress that. Most of the reporters in the press room are veterans of security conferences and take precautions against such attacks. Even so, the press room is separate from the conference and often a safe harbor for posting our stories to the Internet. Conference speakers and members of the Black Hat staff also use this network.

Mauro Israel, one of the Global Security Mag reporters, is alleged to have used a USB on his laptop to turn it into a gateway for all Internet packets going through the wired network switch located at each table in the room. In other words, he routed all the signals going through the LAN through his computer and used a program called Cain to view the packet information. It is unclear how long this was done. Log files seen by CNET News suggest it might have only been a short period before lunch on Thursday.

Cain, the tool used to view the packet information, can be a helpful network administrator tool. But in the wrong hands, it can also be used to gain access to a network in violation of federal wiretapping laws.

After lunch, Isreal, Dominique Jouniot, and Marc Brami from Global Security Mag moved to the table where I was sitting with my colleague Elinor Mills. I use a commercial encrypted VPN service to connect to my office remotely; Mills uses the corporate VPN we have at CNET. We suspect that when I left the table, the trio turned their attention to CNET. Mills, also a veteran of many security conferences, offers a first-person account of being targeted here.

The reporters' badges sit on a chair after they were confiscated.

(Credit: Declan McCullagh/CNET News)

Ironically, I left the table to go and interview Aries Security, the guys running the Wall of Sheep, a project that passively monitors the wireless open network traffic at Black Hat and Defcon for the purposes of educating users on safe practices. What I didn't realize was that Brami, Jounio, and Isreal had been talking with the Wall of Sheep guys just prior to my arrival. One member of Aries Security, Riverside, even made a comment about "journalists hacking journalists."

I didn't get the reference at the time.

Apparently, Israel and his colleague tried moments before I arrived to get the usernames and passwords for reporters from eWeek and CNET added to the Wall of Sheep, a display of partially obscured usernames and passwords that is sometimes referred to as the "Wall of Shame." Riverside and others at Aries Security told them they would not post journalists' names to the Wall of Sheep because the press room was on a network separate from the one they were monitoring.

Another reporter that had been sitting in the Wall of Sheep room, Humphrey Cheung of TGDaily, overhead the conversation with Brami, became curious, and was allowed to take a photo of Israel's laptop screen. Those photos are important. The images that appear on the TGDaily site are redacted, of course. I later saw the originals.

What the trio of French reporters offered the Wall of Sheep was a Cain log with columns for timestamps, HTTP, client, username, and other information. From the log screen, it is apparent that on Thursday, beginning at 10:55 a.m., there were packets captured that were going out to eWeek.com. The IP address in the log resolved to a log-in page, presumably for a publishing tool used at that publication. The Wall of Sheep asks that submissions be done via Notepad file, so Israel pasted the username, password, and destination IP address into a file.

One eWeek reporter, Brian Prince, later confirmed his username and password were collected and displayed. eWeek immediately changed his password. Prince was not using a VPN for reasons he explained here.

But here's where it gets curious. A second line was added to the Notepad file, this one purportedly showing log-in information from news.cnet.com. When I saw the un-redacted photo, I knew instantly that the reference to CNET was a fake. My colleague Declan McCullagh resolved the IP address given as the destination to the CNET News home page--not a tool page, but our standard home page. That could be explained as anyone in the press room could have surfed to that page.

What tipped me off that the reference to CNET was truly bogus is that the username was a word within the code of the home page, a word anyone might find by right clicking and viewing the page source. Second, the password "control" wasn't strong enough, nor did it belong to Declan, Elinor, or myself. It was a fake.

I went back to the Wall of Sheep. Riverside was incredibly helpful, confirming that reporters from Global Security Mag had been there offering some log data. He even had the business card for Marc Brami, director of the publication. Moments later, a spokesperson for Black Hat confirmed that conference officials were looking for Brami and his colleagues as well. The three were later required to leave the conference and are banned for life from Black Hat and its sister conference, Defcon.

What I don't understand is if this was a prank--as Brami has suggested to Mills--then why didn't they simply say to Prince or anyone else in the press room that they could see their network communications? And, if they simply wanted to send a message to U.S. journalists about laptop security--as they reportedly suggested to the Black Hat officials--why did they apparently lie about CNET also being exposed?

A strange thing happened on Thursday. As the story unfolded, reporters from competing publications gathered in the press room. It was a bonding moment. The protected network in any press room is a circle of trust, and when that trust is violated, bad things can happen. Potentially everyone in the room had been a victim. And as such, we rallied around each other for support.

As a result of Thursday night's events, I think I know my security colleagues a little better, and that's a good thing. They're good, hard-working reporters. But in the future, if anyone I don't know joins me at a press table, I'm going to interrogate them, and a few others have told me they will as well, and that's a bad thing.

Like the biblical story, this instance of Cain has also brought evil into a world that was previously safe and welcoming.

Kurt Opsahl, left, a senior staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, discusses the ejection of the three French journalists over networking snooping allegations.

(Credit: Declan McCullagh/CNET News)

Click here for full coverage of Black Hat 2008.

LAS VEGAS--This year marks my ninth year of attending Black Hat in Las Vegas. From a small gathering of security professionals in 2000 to an uberconference in 2008, Black Hat has scaled well. And the transition from private company to corporate-owned also appears smooth. But hardly anyone's here yet.

On Tuesday, there are only a thousand or so attendees of the 30-some training sessions. Already I've noticed a few minor changes from last year.

The press room is now on the third floor, away from the maddening crowds. This may or may not work since almost all the sessions are on the fourth floor. So far the escalators have been jammed during breaks and it will only get worse as Black Hat ramps up.

Lunch, served in a tent located in the front of Caesar's Palace, is now buffet as opposed to being a serviced meal. This gives quicker access to the food (no more waiting until everyone at your table had finished a course before the next course was served). However the buffet itself (at least four different food stations) also removed a good chunk of tables and seats. By my count only one thousand people can eat at one time.

To accommodate the rest of us, Black Hat is also serving boxed lunches on the third floor. My lunch ticket is for a boxed lunches. I suspect that vendors and press will be shunted into the cold box-lunch room.

There are about 30 vendors set up across from the Augustus ballrooms. Last year it was impossible to move from session to session without bumping into the vendor tables. While this year's location is better, it's still not ideal. Perhaps next year Black Hat will simply shunt the vendors into a separate room. Those who want to chit-chat with the vendors can do so, while the rest of us get to our sessions unimpeded.

The hall for Dan Kaminsky's DNS talk seems too small. Maybe they'll simulcast it on jumbo screens in the hallway. We'll see on Wednesday.

Click here for full coverage of Black Hat 2008.

Jay Foley, co-founder of the Identity Theft Resource Center, told me recently that 57 percent of all identity fraud involves opening new accounts "for short-term gain." The ITRC should know: it has been surveying ID fraud victims for several years and has amassed some impressive real-world statistics.

Foley also said 13 percent of the identity theft victims found out about the attacks only after criminals had established utility or cable service in their names. "So your credit record is more theirs than yours, making it harder to fight them in court," he said.

Clearly the best solution is to stop credit fraud at the moment it starts, when the account is first applied for, but for years credit histories and scores lay shrouded in mystery.

Fortunately, there's greater transparency with regard to credit reports these days. Since 2003, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, or Facta, makes it possible for individuals to request one free annual credit report from each of the three major credit reporting agencies. (Go to AnnualCreditReport.com.) Initially, it was to correct any errors in the credit report; many people, however, use this process to monitor their reports for credit fraud.

While you can request all three credit reports at once, experts recommend staggering these, requesting one from a different reporting agency every 90 days or so. That way you'll see a comprehensive view. In addition to requesting your credit report, Congress, through laws such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), has provided other tools for monitoring your credit activity.

A fraud alert placed on your credit history requires an issuing entity to contact you first before opening a new account. Fraud alerts need to be renewed every 90 days unless you are a documented victim of identity fraud, in which case you are entitled to additional protection for up to seven years.

Another option is to place a credit freeze on your credit history. As of November 1, 2007, all three major credit reporting agencies offer this option. Lenders looking to issue credit in the name of someone with a credit freeze will be unable to access the credit history without your explicit permission. In most states there is no termination date, however there is a $10 fee to institute a freeze, and a $12 fee to lift it whenever you want to allow a credit check. These fees are waived if there is proof the individual is an identity fraud victim. The main advantage of a credit freeze over a fraud alert is that the credit freeze does not expire. Credit freezes, however, do not apply to entities with whom the consumer has an existing account. Nor do they apply to law enforcement agencies and certain governmental agencies.

The plans from Experian, Trans Union, and Equifax are similar, each providing a complementary credit report from all three reporting agencies, continuous monitoring of credit activity and any online use of your personal information, and some insurance against identity fraud abuse. The plans range from $11 to $14 per month, with annual and family plans available for less. They do not, however, place alerts or a freeze on your credit history.

This creates a market for private identity protection companies. One of the first was TrustedID, which costs $10 per month per adult (with annual and family plans available) and places both a fraud alert and a credit freeze on your credit history (requiring you to be contacted in both cases), opts you out of credit offers, $1 million in loss insurance, scans for personal data on the Internet, and monitors change of address. TrustedID also scans for medical fraud and protects against spyware.

Providing similar protection is LifeLock. This company is perhaps the best known because its CEO advertises his personal Social Security number as an example of how secure the company is. Bruce Schneier recently did an analysis of what's right and what's wrong with LifeLock as did the CNET Blogger Network's Chris Soghoian.

The Achilles' heel in all of these plans is that the financial institution does not have to make a reasonable attempt to contact you, so the fraudulent account may still get opened. Even with a credit freeze, some financial intuitions won't contact you. There's no way to prove or disprove an institution called you, said ITRC's Foley.

Until now.

Back in 2004 a guy named Bo Holland took a gamble. He bet that that identity fraud would only get worse, not better. And he was right. Having built a series of start-ups within the financial services industry, Holland had an insider's perspective on the problem; he knew how banks and other institutions handled credit requests; he also had worked at Critix Systems, so he had understanding about application delivery. With his latest start-up, Debix, an identity protection network, Holland pulled together all of his skills.

Not only does Debix put a credit freeze on your profile, but it uses its own phone number to log whether the credit institution tried to contact you. And if you're not available, Debix puts the pending account or loan on hold until you are able to return the call. And by using a Debix phone number, not your home number, on your credit report, that adds another layer of security to the product.

So how does Debix work in the real world? Say you are at a car dealership and you need to finance a new car. Shortly after the salesperson leaves the showroom floor, your mobile phone should ring. That's Debix; you know it because it's your voice saying a secret code. Then Debix asks if you indeed are seeking to establish a new account. If yes, you type in a secret personal identification number.

Say you are on vacation and Debix conveys a permission request for a new account. Since you didn't request a new account, you press star and you are instantly put in touch with a Debix investigator, who then contacts the party requesting the credit check. The advantage here, says Holland, is that the ID fraud case is still hot. In some cases, Debix has been able to identify a particular IP address and then turn that information over the local law enforcement. This saves local law enforcement time; they don't have to get a warrant for the bank's information--Debix has already provided the information.

Jerry Dixon, former director of the National Cyber Security Division of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, told me that there are many reasons why ID fraud cases aren't investigated.

"An assistant U.S. attorney might ask 'What's the likelihood of this going overseas?' 'What is the likelihood of being able to nail down who this is without having to write 20 subpoenas first?'"

If the IP address goes out to Belarus, then Dixon says forget it; the U.S. no longer has a law enforcement attache in Belarus so it's hard to enlist sympathy from law enforcement in that country. But if a company like Debix can provide law enforcement with details from the financial institution and a party willing to press charges, your odds of getting someone arrested improve.

Sound too good to be true? In a study published by Julie Fergerson, vice president of Emerging Technologies, and Debix's Holland, the authors looked at 30,000 Debix-secured transactions during a two-month period at the end of 2007. Of those, 380 were identified as fraud and were stopped immediately. Overall, the rate of new account fraud among Debix customers was zero percent.

ITRC's Foley said he was impressed with the results within the survey. Holland told me that during the survey period there were four instances of new account fraud. In each case, however, the financial institution did not call the customer. With Debix, though, you have some recourse. Debix maintains a record and can prove the institution in question did not attempt to call the customer.

Since learning about Debix in June, I've been trying to knock the protection, but so far cannot. Holland, it turns out, is no stranger to the computer security community; since 2004 he's been showing his wares and soliciting opinions at Defcon in Las Vegas. He invited Phil Zimmerman, creator of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) to fault it, and he could not. Holland has invited other computer hackers to pick apart his logic. Even Foley and Dixon are full of praise for Debix.

And it gets better.

As of Monday, Debix is lowering its prices "way down" says Holland. One adult can sign up for $24 a year; families with up to three adults and four children can sign up for $72; and families with up to five adults and four children can sign up for $144 a year. That's much less than similar plans being offered by Experian, Trans Union, Equifax, TrustedID, and LifeLock. And Debix has been protecting people since 2004, so it's not some untested entity.

If you can name a more secure ID protection service for less cost, I'd like to hear from you.

For the last few months, I've been hearing some well-regarded security people tell me they are considering ditching their antivirus protection all together. They haven't done it, but these individuals feel the days of having a special application scan to remove malware on your desktop are numbered. Malware has changed, but the applications to ferret them out have not.

Antivirus programs, as we know them today, are based on 20-year-old technology of pattern matching. Pattern matching may have worked in the days of the Micheangelo virus and even as recently as Netsky, but methodically matching each and every file on a computer against a list of known malware is getting tedious, if not archaic. In 2007, Symantec detected more than 1 million viruses, with two-thirds created within the calendar year. Loading 1 million signatures, or even a percentage of that if generic signatures are used, is a pretty serious undertaking.

That's why vendors are talking to me about newer strategies for 2009 (and beyond). Among these is the exact opposite of signature file databases--something called whitelisting. If pattern matching is just another way of saying certain bad files have been blacklisted, whitelisting goes to the other extreme: it only allows certain trusted files to run on your machine.

That's more or less what Symantec CEO John Thompson called for at this year's RSA: "If the growth of malicious software continues to outpace the growth of legitimate software, techniques like whitelisting--where we identify and allow only the good stuff to come in--will become critical." He actually didn't say much more about whitelisting, yet everyone talks about this speech as though Thompson had provided clear guidance the year of whitelisting.

So how viable is whitelisting? Turns out we've been using it to defend against spam for years.

To see how whitelisting works on an enterprise level, I spoke with Tom Murphy, chief strategy officer for Bit9, a Massachusetts-based company that has been quietly leading the way in whitelist technology.

For several years Bit9 has been building what it calls a Global Software Registry or GSR (formerly called Bit9 Knowledgebase), cataloging "known good" and "known bad" applications and files. Murphy said Bit9 uses three methods--MD5, SHA1 and OMAC--to create a unique hash of the file and ensure that the file is what it says it is. For the moment, the catalog is used for Bit9's enterprise products. But they've entered into an agreement with Kaspersky, who will be using the registry for its 2009 desktop security products.

Bit9 is not alone. SecureWave's Sanctuary, Savant Protection, and DriveSentry have also been creating whitelisting technology for the enterprise. What's interesting is that the big guys Google (Green Border Technologies), Microsoft (Winternals Software's Protection Manager, and now Symantec have started paying attention to whitelisting.

Which gets us back to antivirus software.

If hosting a million antivirus signature files is daunting, how many "clean" files might there be? Think about all the versions of software that exist, not to mention the files those products create.

The downside of whitelisting, indeed the main argument, is that all those clean files outnumber the bad guys by a considerable margin. Right now, maintaining a whitelist file is impractical for the desktop.

Trend Micro (if it wants to get into the whitelist space) thinks it has the answer. For the last few years, Trend Micro has been building servers around the world to provide continuous service to its Software-as-a-service enterprise systems. Last month, Trend Micro CEO Eva Chen told me it's time to bring that SaaS service down to the desktop. Instead of having all the signature files on the desktop, the desktop app would instead ping "the cloud" and get results from the much larger database of known malware stored there.

Make no mistake, Trend Micro is still using antivirus signature databases. Chen said even after 20 years, there are still advantages to pattern-matching antivirus signature files. For one thing, she says it's faster than firing up a heuristic sandbox and testing each individual piece of malware. True, although we're talking about shaving nanoseconds between the two processes. Still, with several thousand files, those saved nanoseconds do add up. So instead of running the operation on the PC, the PC sends all its unknowns to a server in the cloud and gets the results back lickety-split. An added benefit, says Chen, is that new samples are submitted in real time and evaluated quickly. In her estimate, Trend Micro can have a new signature file for an unknown threat ready within 15 minutes.

Fifteen minutes is also the new mantra over at Symantec. For its 2009 Norton products, Tom Powledge, vice president of consumer product management at Symantec, told me the new products are lighter and faster in part because they've jettisoned the multiple copies of the signature database found in previous versions. They're also not scanning each and every file. Instead, the 2009 products will be building a trust index--that is, the app will declaring certain files (say photos or MP3s) clean and then not scan them again unless the files change. He showed me a graphic where roughly 70 percent of a given machine is trusted, and only that last 30 percent is actively scanned.

Like Trend, Norton is experimenting with faster new malware turnaround. Powledge says Norton should be updating not every 15 minutes, but every couple of minutes. This is a vast improvement from hourly or even daily updates by some antivirus vendors.

Given the improvements to the traditional antivirus programs proposed by Trend Micro and Symantec, are the days of antivirus applications numbered?

Yes.

I asked Murphy if white lists worked well enough to replace traditional antivirus protection at some companies. He answered, very diplomatically, "if (a customer) feel(s) that they have a control over the environment, some customers have removed antivirus off their machines."

I'm still not convinced that white listing is the way to go, but I do know that security solutions in the enterprise space have a way of trickling down to the desktop.