Meet the MULE, short for Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment, a 2.5-ton unmanned ground vehicle that's just one component of the U.S. Army's Future Combat Systems. It's built to carry up to 2,400 pounds of gear.
(Credit: U.S. Army)The Pentagon is no stranger to overpriced equipment and cost overruns, but it may never have seen a program quite like the U.S. Army's long-running and hugely ambitious Future Combat Systems initiative.
For this fiscal year alone, Congress has allocated some $3.5 billion in funding for FCS, en route to what is expected to be a total tab of $160 billion or so by the middle of the next decade. But $160 billion doesn't buy what it used to: the Government Accountability Office has been lamenting recently that the overall estimated FCS tab remains at that level even as pieces have been lopped out of the program.
On top of that, the Army is apparently looking for an additional $251.8 million in funds for the current fiscal year to help speed delivery of some components. That money, according to a story this week in the Army Times, would allow the Army to "introduce some of the manned vehicles a year or two earlier, speed up delivery of networked sensors and UAVs, and field the first FCS brigade combat team in 2013, two years early."
That new money, which would come out of some other research programs, is somewhat more than the $230 million that Congress cut out of the budget for fiscal 2008. Lest the congressional budget minders take issue with that, the Pentagon last week sent FCS representatives to Capitol Hill for another in a continuing series of dog-and-pony shows on the benefits of high-tech battlefield gear, including the FCS cousin known as Land Warrior. (The gear is on display there through this week.)
This is a tactical unmanned ground sensor (UGS) gateway node, on display in February at a symposium and exposition in Florida put on by the Association of the United States Army.
(Credit: C. Todd Lopez/Army News Service)FCS is the Army's grand plan for becoming a 21st century fighting force in which superior information trumps mass of forces, and it comprises a wide array of systems, all of them still early in the R&D or prototyping stages. Key elements include artillery pieces, unmanned aerial vehicles, robots, software-based radios, battlefield sensors, and a high-speed wireless network to tie them--along with individual soldiers--all together.
The real challenge for FCS isn't just in developing those individual pieces. Eventually, it will be getting them all to work in unison--no small feat for a system that will encompass voice, data, and video communications among ground, aerial, and satellite assets.
"This new way of fighting can be achieved only if the data can be made available in near real-time at sensor processors, at the battlefield command nodes, and at the lethal systems," the GAO wrote in a March report (PDF).
But that real-world test remains quite a ways in the future. In the shorter term, the concern is much more about taming the R&D sprawl. "Today, the FCS program is about halfway through its development phase, yet it is, in many respects, a program closer to the beginning of development," the GAO wrote in a report (PDF) issued last week. "This portends additional cost increases and delays as FCS begins what is traditionally the most expensive and problematic phase of development."
Perhaps most significant is this statement from the April report: "It is not yet clear if or when the information network that is at the heart of the FCS concept can be developed, built, and demonstrated."
How complex an undertaking is this? Consider the network configuration: "Current plans call for the network supporting a BCT (brigade combat team) to include more than 5,000 nodes on over 1,500 radio sets running at least four different advanced networking waveforms, supporting networks and sub-networks interconnected by gateways, and carrying 3 million identified, point-to-point information exchange requirements," according to the March report. And all that would have to work over a wireless network in constantly shifting, unpredictable battlefield conditions.
A whole host of critical FCS technologies are also still "immature," the GAO said, "(and) software development is in its early stages." The estimate for the software code expected for full-fledged FCS now stands at 95.1 million lines, three times the estimate from five years ago and, the GAO wrote, "the largest software effort by far for any weapon system." (By comparison, Windows XP is estimated to have roughly 40 million lines of code, and Vista, more than 50 million.)
The FCS program faces a congressionally mandated "go/no-go" milestone review in 2009 in order to justify continuation; critera for that decision are to be set by the end of July this year. If it clears that hurdle, a planned production decision is scheduled for 2013.
Meanwhile, the Pentagon has been working on "low-rate spin-outs" of some FCS components, such as unattended ground sensors, to get that gear into the hands of soldiers today. It's just an educated guess, but we're likely to see a lot more of that in the next few years.
The price tag on the Marine Corps' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (PDF) has gone up 168 percent--just one of the military's flagship programs that cost more, take longer to produce, and deliver less, according to a government report.
(Credit:
GDLS)
The military has doubled the amount it will spend on new weapons systems since 2000, but many are behind schedule or cannot deliver on the crucial technological innovations, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) found in an annual review of 72 high-profile programs.
Proposed spending has rocketed from $790 billion to $1.6 trillion since 2000, a 26 percent increase, according to the congressional watchdog agency. But more money has not meant better results. Even at increased costs, the GAO found, weapons programs are failing to deliver promised capabilities and are almost never on time. This means that the military must settle for "suboptimal" acquisitions and late delivery to the battlefield, even though the "warfighter's urgent need" is what's often cited when these weapon systems are pitched.
The average delay is 21 months, according to the report. Of all the programs assessed, none had met the "best-practices standards" for mature technologies, stable design, or mature production, which are essential to meet cost, schedule, and performance targets.
(Credit:
GAO)
Money misspent on weapon systems means not only reduced buying power for defense, but also less money for other priorities--such as the global war on terror and growing entitlement programs, Acting Comptroller General Gene L. Dodaro warned Congress.
The report identified four major problems with the Defense Department's acquisition process: program changes (63 percent of performance requirements changed mid-stream), frequent program manager turnover (making it hard to hold anyone accountable), reliance on private contractors to support and oversee contracts (fox guarding the hen house), and weapon systems dependent on increasingly complex, yet-to-be-developed software (we need more H-1B visas).
When consumers have gripes about unwanted telemarketing calls, cell phone billing rates, junk faxes, or indecent mouthing-off on broadcast television, the Federal Communications Commission is supposed to look into their complaints and respond accordingly.
But are federal regulators carrying out that duty as they should? It depends, of course, on who's doing the analysis.
A new report (PDF) released Thursday by the Government Accountability Office presents a mostly negative view, charging that the agency's processes for monitoring complaints and punishing violators is flawed.
At the request of Rep. Edward Markey, the Democratic chairman of a House of Representatives telecommunications panel, the GAO set to work analyzing multiple FCC databases of some 454,000 complaints received between 2003 and 2006. It reported finding that the FCC opened investigations on 46,000 of those complaints and concluded 83 percent of those inquiries without taking any enforcement actions, such as issuing fines--and without clear explanations as to why.
But the FCC says that key parts of the GAO's findings--including the numbers of investigations and complaints it reports--are simply incorrect.
If the GAO had bothered to comb through the FCC's paper files and "scroll through" all relevant database information, it would have discovered that the FCC actually closed only 3 percent of its investigations without enforcement actions, FCC Enforcement Bureau chief Kris Anne Monteith said in her response letter (PDF).
The GAO auditors, anticipating the FCC's disagreement, stood by their report's findings. They acknowledged that they did not sift through tens of thousands of paper case files because that wasn't its goal: They wanted to focus on how its database systems interact with its enforcement activities.
Based on that analysis, the GAO also determined that the FCC only "rarely" relied on more serious penalties and only "sometimes" assessed a fine. All told, it levied $73 million in fines and payments through negotiated consent decrees with alleged violators, but the dollar amount declined between 2003 and 2006, the GAO said.
FCC Chairman Kevin Martin suggested the report gives his agency short shrift.
"Since I became chairman, the Enforcement Bureau is responding to 100 percent of consumer complaints," he said in a statement after the report's release. "Additionally, under my chairmanship, the Commission has collected a record amount of fines, forfeitures and consent decree payments."
There were, however, some areas of agreement. The GAO recommended that the FCC take certain steps to address those concerns about its setup for keeping its enforcement activities organized--that is, five separate databases and tens of thousands of paper files. The FCC said it welcomed those recommendations and had already begun making improvements.
Both Markey and Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which oversees the FCC, said the report demonstrates that enforcement at the FCC isn't enough, and state-level activity is also necessary. Markey has sponsored a bill in this session that would impose new obligations on wireless carriers and would give both the FCC and state officials the power to enforce complaints about violations.
(Credit:
Project SHAD)
Thousands of people who may have been exposed to chemical or biological agents during military tests remain unaccounted for, and the Defense Department and Department of Veterans Affairs have given up on tracking them down, according to a new report.
Some of the tests were conducted as part of a weapons testing program known as "Project 112." In others (click here for PDF), individuals were intentionally exposed to hazardous substances such as blister, nerve, and biological agents as well as LSD and PCP, according to a Government Accounting Office report (PDF).
Any veterans who believe they have sustained a disability from exposure during testing may file a claim (PDF) for compensation with the VA.
The DOD stopped actively searching for test subjects in 2003 "but did not provide a sound and documented basis for that decision," the GAO reported. At the time, it had identified 5,842 service members and about 350 civilians as having been potentially exposed during Project 112 alone (PDF). It is estimated that tens of thousands of military and personnel and civilians may have been exposed over the last 60 years.
(Credit:
VFW)
However, in 2004 the GAO reported that there was still a chance that additional test subjects could be located, and it recommended that the DOD determine the feasibility of continuing the search. Instead, the Pentagon determined that it had reached "a point of diminishing returns" and called it off; a decision not supported by an "objective analysis of the potential costs and benefits of continuing the effort," the congressional agency charged.
Further, the GAO found that the Pentagon's efforts lacked oversight, clear and consistent objectives, and most of all transparency, because it had not kept Congress or veterans organizations fully informed of its progress, or lack thereof.
The DOD was pretty much an equal-opportunity employer when it came to its human test subjects--healthy adults, psychiatric patients, and prison inmates were all used. In some instances, service members who consented to serve as test subjects found themselves participating in experiments quite different from the one they had been pitched when they volunteered, according to the report.
Also known as "Project SHAD" ("Shipboard Hazard and Defense"), the highly classified Project 112 was started in 1962 to determine the vulnerability of U.S. warships to chemical and biological attacks. In this case, service members and civilians were not the test subjects, but rather conducted the tests on animals, in some cases with foreign observers present, according to the DOD. Veterans of the tests tell another story.
The same week this GAO report came out, a federal judge ruled, in dismissing a lawsuit brought by individual members of the military, that there is no reason for troops to second-guess the Food and Drug Administration when it comes to the safety of anthrax vaccinations. DOD says the shots are now mandatory. If this means you, make sure you leave a forwarding address.
A new report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office charges that the Department of Homeland Security used biased methods to enhance performance results in tests on a new generation of radiation detectors meant to protect U.S. ports.
At stake are $1.2 billion in contracts to produce advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors and thousands of lives should they fail to work.
Experts from four national laboratories were consulted prior to publication of the report (PDF) by the GAO, the nonpartisan audit and investigative arm of Congress, which was released yesterday.
(Credit:
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office)
The agency found that the DHS' Domestic Nuclear Detection Office "used biased test methods that enhanced the performance of ASPs." Specifically, it conducted preliminary tests and then allowed contractors access to the results, which they then used to adjust systems accordingly.
It is "highly unlikely that such favorable conditions" would be found in a real-world situation, the GAO report deadpanned.
Portals in use today detect radiation but cannot distinguish between different types. This leads to expensive and time-consuming delays at ports of entry when customs officers respond to false alarms, according to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. To remedy this, DHS sponsored research on new technology to enhance detection capabilities at the nation's ports. In 2006, it awarded contracts to three companies based on performance tests in Nevada the previous year: Raytheon, Thermo Electron and Canberra Industries.
The GAO, however, was not convinced that any "additional detection capability provided by the ASPs was worth the considerable additional costs." The accounting agency found that the DHS had no sound basis for spending taxpayer money and "relied on assumptions of anticipated performance instead of actual test data." It recommended further testing and a rigorous cost-benefit analysis.
It wasn't the first time that problems had been found in the procurement process. In a March 2007 report (PDF), the GAO concluded that DHS' decision to procure and deploy the new equipment was not supported by the cost and suggested that the department come up with some "objective" assessments of ASP capability.
The question was whether the new equipment, at six times the cost of current models, was better able to detect radiation through different masking materials, such as a lead. The GAO charged that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office did not test portal limitations or make any effort to replicate the material that would be used to mask a radiation source from detection, a "critical oversight in DNDO's original test plan." Instead, the detection office is attempting to get off the hook by substituting what are essentially computer simulations that are not comparable with "actual testing with nuclear and masking materials," according to the GAO.
The GAO recommended that production of the new portal monitors be delayed until the DHS provides a "sound analytical basis for its decision to purchase and deploy the new technology."
At least $17 million was wasted by Uncle Sam last year on federal employees who intentionally collected excess public transit benefits--at times, only to turn around and pawn them off illegally on eBay and Craigslist.
A new Government Accountability Office report (PDF) documented numerous instances in which employees at nine agencies in the Washington area admitted to falsifying their applications to receive extra benefits, continued receiving the passes even during extended absences, and earned thousands of dollars selling the wares online.
Established in 2000, the government's transit program requires that federal agencies in the Washington area offer their permanent employees up to $105 per month in tax-free public transportation hand-outs. Nationwide, about 250,000 people had claimed about $250 million in benefits as of July 2006, according to the Department of Transportation.
When they sign up, employees are supposed to attest that they won't ask for more benefits than they truly need, and the checks come inscribed with warnings that they cannot be used by anyone except the person to whom they were rightfully issued. Failure to comply could result in criminal prosecution, the GAO report said.
But that didn't stop 20 federal employees interviewed by GAO from selling more than $21,000 of the paper transit checks, known as MetroCheks, on eBay during the past two years, the GAO discovered during an undercover investigation. Of those employees, which GAO found while monitoring eBay for a three day period and posing as potential buyers, the majority admitted they did not even use public transportation regularly to get to work and said they did not report income earned from the MetroChek sales on their tax returns.
In another case, a GAO investigator posing as an interested buyer corresponded with an Air Force captain who posted an ad on Craigslist offering $420 worth of MetroCheks for $350. The captain, who said he usually caught a ride with someone else to work, told the buyer that he would meet him at the Metro station of his choosing, clad in "my Air Force service dress uniform," complete with "all the awards and everything on it." He later refused to back down on his posted price because he angered his wife by doing so on a previous occasion.
Some of the fraud may be resolved as the Washington Metro Area Transportation Authority, which issues the transit passes, phases out the paper-based MetroCheks in favor of plastic SmartCards, which are tied to a person's name and "less negotiable," in the GAO's words. Even so, the auditors urged federal agencies to be more vigilant about punishing abusers of the system.
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